Serbia and Montenegro, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 2006

All men and women desire and deserve to live in dignity and liberty. As President Bush said: "The advance of freedom is the great story of our time." Promoting human rights and democracy is a worldwide phenomenon and there is a growing global discussion of democracy and the universal values protected by democratic governance.

The increasing demand for democratic governance reflects recognition that the best guarantor of human rights is a thriving democracy with representative, accountable institutions of government, equal rights under the rule of law, a robust civil society, political pluralism, and independent media.

The United States and other free nations have a duty to defend human rights and help spread democracy’s blessings. We must help countries develop the democratic institutions that will ensure human rights are respected over the long term. We must help fragile democracies deliver a better life for their citizens. We must call countries to account when they retreat from their international human rights commitments. And we must always stand in solidarity with the courageous men and women across the globe who live in fear yet dream of freedom.

By defending and advancing human rights and democratic principles, we keep faith with our country’s most cherished values and lay the foundation for lasting peace. Fulfilling the promise of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and building vibrant democracies worldwide will take generations, but it is work of the utmost urgency that cannot be delayed.

With these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to transmit the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 to the United States Congress.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 2006

These reports describe the performance of 196 countries in putting into practice their international commitments on human rights. These basic rights, reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have been embraced by people of every culture and color, every background and belief, and constitute what President Bush calls the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity."

The Department of State published the first annual country reports on human rights practices in 1977 in accordance with congressional mandate, and they have become an essential element of the United States’ effort to promote respect for human rights worldwide. For nearly three decades, the reports have served as a reference document and a foundation for cooperative action among governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all.

The worldwide championing of human rights is not an attempt to impose alien values on citizens of other countries or to interfere in their internal affairs. The Universal Declaration calls upon "every individual and every organ of society … to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…"

President Bush has committed the United States to working with other democracies and men and women of goodwill across the globe to reach an historic long-term goal: "the end of tyranny in our world."

To be sure, violations of human rights and miscarriages of justice can and do occur in democratic countries. No governmental system is without flaws. Human rights conditions in democracies across the globe vary widely, and these country reports reflect that fact. In particular, democratic systems with shallow roots and scarce resources can fall far short of meeting their solemn commitments to citizens, including human rights commitments. Democratic transitions can be tumultuous and wrenching. Rampant corruption can retard democratic development, distort judicial processes, and destroy public trust. Nonetheless, taken overall, countries with democratic systems provide far greater protections against violations of human rights than do nondemocratic states.

The United States’ own journey toward liberty and justice for all has been long and difficult, and it is still far from complete. Yet over time our independent branches of government, our free media, our openness to the world, and, most importantly, the civic courage of impatient American patriots help us keep faith with our founding ideals and our international human rights obligations.

These country reports offer a factual basis by which to assess the progress made on human rights and the challenges that remain. The reports review each country’s performance in 2005, not one country’s performance against that of another. While each country report speaks for itself, cross-cutting observations can be made. Six broad observations, supported by country-specific examples, are highlighted below. The examples are illustrative, not exhaustive.

First, countries in which power is concentrated in the hands of unaccountable rulers tend to be the world’s most systematic human rights violators. These states range from closed, totalitarian systems that subject their citizens to a wholesale deprivation of their basic rights to authoritarian systems in which the exercise of basic rights is severely restricted.

In 2005 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) remained one of the world’s most isolated countries. The systematically repressive regime continued to control almost all aspects of citizens' lives, denying freedoms of speech, religion, the press, assembly, association, and movement, as well as workers’ rights. In December 2005, the regime further receded into isolation by calling for significant drawdowns of the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) presence in the country.

In Burma where a junta rules by diktat, promises of democratic reform and respect for human rights continued to serve as a façade for brutality and repression. Forced labor, trafficking in persons, use of child soldiers, and religious discrimination remained serious concerns. The military’s continuing abuses included systematic use of rape, torture, execution, and forced relocation of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities. The regime maintained iron-fisted control through the surveillance, harassment, and imprisonment of political activists, including Nobel Laureate and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who remained under house arrest without charge.

In 2005 the Iranian government’s already poor record on human rights and democracy worsened. In the June presidential elections, slightly more than a thousand registered candidates – including all the female candidates – were arbitrarily thrown out of contention by the country’s guardian council. The newly elected hard-line president denied the Holocaust occurred and called for the elimination of Israel. The ruling clerics and the president oversaw deterioration in prison conditions for the hundreds of political prisoners, further restrictions on press freedom, and a continuing rollback of social and political freedoms. Serious abuses such as summary executions, severe violations of religious freedom, discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, disappearances, extremist vigilantism, and use of torture and other degrading treatment continued.

In Zimbabwe the government maintained a steady assault on human dignity and basic freedoms, tightening its hold on civil society and human rights NGOs and manipulating the March parliamentary elections. Opposition members were subjected to abuse, including torture and rape. New constitutional amendments allowed the government to restrict exit from the country, transferred title to the government of all land reassigned in the land acquisition program, and removed the right to challenge land acquisitions in court. The government’s Operation Restore Order, initiated to demolish allegedly illegal housing and businesses, displaced or destroyed the livelihoods of more than 700 thousand persons and further strained the country’s weak and depressed economy.

In Cuba the regime continued to control all aspects of life through the communist party and state-controlled mass organizations. The regime suppressed calls for democratic reform, such as the Varela Project, which proposed a national referendum. Authorities arrested, detained, fined, and threatened Varela activists and the government held at least 333 political prisoners and detainees.

China's human rights record remained poor, and the government continued to commit serious abuses. Those who publicly advocated against Chinese government policies or views or protested against government authority faced harassment, detention, and imprisonment by government and security authorities. Disturbances of public order and protests calling for redress of grievances increased significantly, and several incidents were violently suppressed. Key measures to increase the authority of the judiciary and reduce the arbitrary power of police and security forces stalled. Restrictions of the media and the Internet continued. Repression of minority groups continued unabated, particularly of Uighurs and Tibetans. New religious affairs regulations were adopted expanding legal protection for some activities of registered religious groups, but repression of unregistered religious groups continued, as did repression of the Falun Gong spiritual movement.

In Belarus President Lukashenko continued to arrogate all power to himself and his dictatorial regime. Pro-democracy activists, including opposition politicians, independent trade union leaders, students, and newspaper editors, were detained, fined, and imprisoned for criticizing Lukashenko and his regime. His government increasingly used tax inspections and new registration requirements to complicate or deny NGOs, independent media, political parties, and minority and religious organizations the ability to operate legally.

Second, human rights and democracy are closely linked, and both are essential to long-term stability and security. Free and democratic nations that respect the rights of their citizens help to lay the foundation for lasting peace. In contrast, states that severely and systematically violate the human rights of their own people are likely to pose threats to neighboring countries and the international community.

Burma is a case in point. Only by Burma’s return to the democratic path from which it was wrenched can the basic rights of the Burmese people be realized. The junta refuses to recognize the results of the historic free and fair legislative elections in 1990. The regime’s cruel and destructive misrule has inflicted tremendous suffering on the Burmese people and caused or exacerbated a host of ills for its neighbors, from refugee outflows to the spread of infectious diseases and the trafficking of drugs and human beings. On December 16, the UN Security Council held a landmark discussion on the situation in Burma.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is another example. When the Korean peninsula was divided, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) were at roughly the same economic point, and both were subject to authoritarian rule. Political and economic freedom has made the difference between the two Koreas. Today, North Koreans are deprived of the most basic freedoms, while the regime’s authoritarian rule produced tens of thousands of refugees. The government earned hard currency through illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting of currency and goods such as cigarettes, and smuggling. Pyongyang has not heeded the international community’s repeated calls to dismantle its nuclear programs.

The Iranian government continued to ignore the desire of the Iranian people for responsible, accountable government, continuing its dangerous policies of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, providing support to terrorist organizations, and advocating – including in several public speeches by the new president – the destruction of a UN member state. Iran’s deprivation of basic rights to its own people, its interference in Iraq, its support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations, and its refusal to engage constructively on these issues, have further isolated it from the world community.

Similarly, the government of Syria refused international calls to respect the fundamental freedoms of its people and end its interference in the affairs of its neighbors. Syria continued to provide support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups and did not cooperate fully with the UN International Independent Investigative Commission on the assassination in Beirut of former Lebanese Prime Minister al-Hariri. The Chief Investigator’s reports concluded that evidence pointed to involvement by Syrian authorities and made it clear that Syrian officials, while purporting to cooperate, deliberately misled the investigators.

By contrast, in the Balkans, a marked overall improvement in human rights, democracy, and the rule of law over the past several years has led to greater stability and security in the region. Increasingly democratic governments are in place, more war criminals are facing justice, significant numbers of displaced persons have returned home, elections are progressively more compliant with international standards, and neighbors are deepening their cooperation to resolve post-conflict and regional problems. Many countries of the former Yugoslavia have made progress in bringing persons accused of war crimes to trial in domestic courts, which is important to national reconciliation and regional stability. At the end of 2005, however, two of the most wanted war crimes suspects, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, remained at large.

Third, some of the most serious violations of human rights are committed by governments within the context of internal and/or cross-border armed conflicts. The Sudanese government’s 2003 attempt to quell a minor uprising of African rebels in Darfur by arming janjaweed militias and allowing them to ravage the region resulted in a vicious conflict. The Department of State in September of 2004 determined that genocide occurred in Darfur. It continued in 2005. By the end of 2005, at least 70 thousand civilians had perished, nearly 2 million had been displaced by the fighting, and more than 200 thousand refugees had fled into neighboring Chad. Torture was widespread and systematic in Darfur, as was violence against women, including rape used as a tool of war. There were reports of women being marched away into the desert; their fate remained unknown. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement opened the way to adopt a constitution in July and form a government of national unity to serve until elections in 2009. The African Union deployed seven thousand troops to Darfur, where their presence helped curb some but not all of the violence. At the end of 2005, government-supported janjaweed attacks on civilians continued.

Nepal’s poor human rights record worsened. The government continued to commit many serious abuses, both during and after the February-April state of emergency that suspended all fundamental rights except for habeas corpus. In many cases the government disregarded habeas corpus orders issued by the Supreme Court and often rearrested student and political party leaders. The Maoist insurgents also continued their campaign of torturing, killing, bombing, conscripting children, kidnapping, extorting, and forcing closures of schools and businesses.

The political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, which continued to divide the country, led to further abuses in 2005, including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings committed by government and rebel security forces. There were fewer reports of rebel recruitment of child soldiers, and many were released. Violence and threats of violence against the political opposition continued. Despite continued efforts by the international community and the African Union, the political process to establish a power-sharing government remained stalled. By the end of September, little work had been completed to prepare for the scheduled October 30 elections, and disarmament of the New Forces rebel group had not begun. On October 6, the African Union decided to extend President Laurent Gbagbo’s term in office by up to one year.

In Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia’s Northern Caucasus region, federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen forces engaged in abuses including torture, summary executions, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries at times appeared to act independently of the Russian command structure, and there was been no indication that the federal authorities made any effective effort to rein them in or hold them accountable for egregious abuses. Antigovernment forces also continued to commit terrorist bombings and serious human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. The year 2005 saw the continued spread of violence and abuses throughout the region, where there was an overall climate of lawlessness and corruption.

The Great Lakes region of central Africa, encompassing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, has been plagued by civil war, large-scale interethnic violence, and severe conflict-related human rights abuses for well over a decade. However, there was less violence overall in 2005, and the human rights situation improved markedly, encouraging tens of thousands of displaced persons, particularly Burundians, to return home. Burundi concluded its four-year transitional process, and there were historical electoral advances in the DRC. Governments in the Great Lakes region made significant progress in demobilizing thousands of child soldiers in their military forces and those belonging to various rebel groups. At the same time, various armed groups based in eastern Congo continued to destabilize the region and compete with one another for strategic and natural resources, despite UN-supported Congolese military operations to disband armed groups in the DRC. Thousands of rebels from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, including Rwandan rebels who led the 1994 Rwandan genocide, continued to oppose the government of their respective countries, attack civilians in the DRC, and commit numerous serious abuses, particularly against women and children. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda reportedly continued illegally to channel arms to armed groups operating and committing abuses in the eastern DRC.

In Colombia, human rights violations related to the 41-year internal armed conflict continued. However, the government’s concentrated military offensive against illegal armed groups and ongoing demobilization of paramilitary groups led to reductions in killings and kidnappings. Colombia also began a four-year process to implement a new adversarial accusatory-style criminal procedures code. However, impunity remained a major obstacle, particularly for officials accused of committing past human rights abuses, as well as for certain members of the military who collaborated with paramilitary groups.

Fourth, where civil society and independent media are under siege, fundamental freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are undermined. A robust civil society and independent media help create conditions under which human rights can flourish by raising awareness among publics about their rights, exposing abuses, pressing for reform, and holding governments accountable.

Governments should defend – not abuse – the peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms by members of the media and civil society even if they do not agree with their views or actions. Restrictions that are imposed by law on the exercise of such freedoms can only be justified to the extent they are consistent with a country’s human rights obligations and are not merely a pretext for restricting such rights.

When states wield the law as a political weapon or an instrument of repression against civil society and the media, they rule by law rather than upholding the rule of law. The rule of law acts as a check on state power, i.e., it is a system designed to protect the human rights of the individual against the power of the state. In contrast, rule by law can be an abuse of power, i.e., the manipulation of the law and the judicial system to maintain the power of the rulers over the ruled.

In 2005, a disturbing number of countries across the globe passed or selectively applied laws against the media and NGOs. For example:

The Cambodian government utilized existing criminal defamation laws to intimidate, arrest, and prosecute critics and opposition members over the course of the year.

China increased restrictions on the media and the Internet, leading to two known arrests.

The Zimbabwean government arrested persons who criticized President Mugabe, harassed and arbitrarily detained journalists, closed an independent newspaper, forcibly dispersed demonstrators, and arrested and detained opposition leaders and their supporters.

In Venezuela new laws governing libel, defamation, and broadcast media content, coupled with legal harassment and physical intimidation, resulted in limitations on media freedoms and a climate of self-censorship. There continued to be reports that government representatives and supporters intimidated and threatened members of the political opposition, several human rights NGOs, and other civil society groups. Some NGOs also charged that the government used the judiciary to place limitations on the political opposition.

In Belarus the Lukashenko government stepped up its suppression of opposition groups and imposed new restrictions on civil society. There were politically motivated arrests, several independent newspapers were closed, the operations of others were hindered, and NGOs were harassed.

In Russia raids on NGO offices, registration problems, intimidation of NGO leaders and staff and visa problems for foreign NGO workers had a negative effect, as did the parliament’s adoption of a new restrictive law on NGOs. The Kremlin also acted to limit critical voices in the media. The government decreased the diversity of the broadcast media, particularly television, the main source of news for the majority of Russians. By the end of 2005, all independent nationwide television stations had been taken over either by the state or by state-friendly organizations.

Fifth, democratic elections by themselves do not ensure that human rights will be respected, but they can put a country on the path to reform and lay the groundwork for institutionalizing human rights protections. Democratic elections are, however, milestones on a long journey of democratization. They are essential to establishing accountable governments and governmental institutions that abide by the rule of law and are responsive to the needs of citizens.

In Iraq 2005 was a year of major progress for democracy, democratic rights and freedom. There was a steady growth of NGOs and other civil society associations that promote human rights. The January 30th legislative elections marked a tremendous step forward in solidifying governmental institutions to protect human rights and freedom in a country whose history is marred by some of the worst human rights abuses in the recent past. In an October 15 referendum and December 15 election, Iraqi voters adopted a permanent constitution and elected members of the country’s new legislature, the Council of Representatives, thus consolidating democratic institutions that can provide a framework for a democratic future. Although the historic elections and new institutions of democratic government provided a structure for real advances, civic life and the social fabric remained under intense strain from the widespread violence principally inflicted by insurgent and terrorist elements. Additionally, elements of sectarian militias and security forces frequently acted independently of government authority. Still, the government set and adhered to a legal and electoral course based on respect for political rights.

Although deprived of basic human rights for years, Afghans in 2005 continued to show their courage and commitment to a future of freedom and respect for human rights. September 18 marked the first parliamentary elections in nearly three decades. Women enthusiastically voted in the elections, which included 582 female candidates for office. Sixty-eight women were elected to the lower House in seats reserved for women under the 2004 Constitution. Seventeen of the 68 women would have been elected in their own right even without the set-aside seats. In the upper House, 17 of the 34 seats appointed by the president were reserved for women; the Provincial Councils elected an additional 5 women for a total of 22 women. The September 18 parliamentary elections occurred against the backdrop of a government still struggling to expand its authority over provincial centers, due to continued insecurity and violent resistance in some quarters.

In Ukraine there were notable improvements in human rights performance following the Orange Revolution, which led to the election of a new government reflecting the will of the people. In 2005 there was increased accountability by police officers, and the mass media made gains in independence. Interference with freedom of assembly largely ceased, and most limitations on freedom of association were lifted. A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups also generally operated without government harassment.

Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim majority country, made significant progress in strengthening the architecture of its democratic system. Through a series of historic local elections, Indonesians were able directly to elect their leaders at the city, regency, and provincial levels for the first time. There were improvements in the human rights situation, although significant problems remained, and serious violations continued. A critical development was the landmark August 15 peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement ending decades of armed conflict. The government also inaugurated the Papuan People's Assembly and took other steps toward fulfilling the 2001 Special Autonomy Law on Papua.

Lebanon made significant progress in ending the 29-year Syrian military occupation and regaining sovereignty under a democratically elected parliament. However, continuing Syrian influence remained a problem.

Liberia emerged into the international democratic arena with its dramatic step away from a violent past and toward a free and democratic future. On November 23, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was declared the winner of multiparty presidential elections, making her Africa’s first elected female head of state and marking a milestone in the country's transition from civil war to democracy. The transitional government generally respected the human rights of its citizens and passed legislation to strengthen human rights. However, police abuse, official corruption, and other problems persisted and were exacerbated by the legacy of the 14-year civil war, including severely damaged infrastructure and widespread poverty and unemployment.

Sixth, progress on democratic reform and human rights is neither linear nor guaranteed. Some states still have weak institutions of democratic government and continue to struggle; others have yet to fully commit to the democratic process. Steps forward can be marred with irregularities. There can be serious setbacks. Democratically elected governments do not always govern democratically once in power.

In 2005, many countries that have committed themselves to democratic reform showed mixed progress; some regressed.

The Kyrgyz Republic’s human rights record improved considerably following the change in leadership between March and July, although problems remained. President Akayev fled the country after opposition demonstrators took over the main government building in the capital to protest flawed elections. The July presidential election and November parliamentary election constituted improvements in some areas over previous elections. However, constitutional reform stalled and corruption remained a serious problem.

In Ecuador, congress removed democratically elected President Lucio Gutierrez in April following large scale protests and public withdrawal of support by the military and the national police leadership. Vice President Alfredo Palacio succeeded Gutierrez, and elections were scheduled for 2006.

Although the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of Congo postponed national general elections until 2006, the country held its first democratic national poll in 40 years. Voters overwhelmingly approved a new constitution in a largely free and fair national referendum, despite some irregularities.

In June, the Ugandan parliament approved a controversial amendment to eliminate presidential term limits, clearing the way for President Museveni to seek a third term. However, citizens voted in a national referendum to adopt a multiparty system of government, and the parliament amended the electoral laws to include opposition party participation in elections and in government.

The Egyptian government amended its constitution to provide for the country’s first multiparty presidential election in September. Ten political parties fielded candidates, and the campaign period was marked by vigorous public debate and greater political awareness and engagement. Voter turnout was low, however, and there were credible reports of widespread fraud during balloting. Presidential runner-up Ayman Nour, his parliamentary immunity stripped away in January, was sentenced in December on forgery charges to five years’ imprisonment after a six-month trial that failed to meet basic international standards. The November and December parliamentary elections witnessed significant gains by candidates affiliated with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. These elections were marred by excessive use of force by security forces, low turnout, and vote-rigging. The government refused to admit international observers for either the presidential or parliamentary elections. The National Council for Human Rights, established by the Egyptian parliament, issued its first annual report, frankly describing government abuses.

During the Ethiopian parliamentary elections in May, international observers noted numerous irregularities and voter intimidation. Scores of demonstrators protesting the elections were killed by security forces. Authorities detained, beat, and killed opposition members, NGO workers, ethnic minorities, and members of the press.

Azerbaijan’s November parliamentary elections, while an improvement in some areas, failed to meet a number of international standards. There were numerous credible reports of local officials interfering with the campaign process and misusing state resources, limited freedom of assembly, disproportionate use of force by police to disrupt rallies, and fraud and major irregularities in vote counting and tabulation. Thus far, additional actions taken during the postelection grievance process have not fully addressed the shortcomings of the electoral process.

Kazakhstan showed improvements in the pre-election period for the December presidential election, but overall it fell short of international standards for free and fair elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted serious limitations on political speech that prohibited certain kinds of criticism of the president, unequal access to the media for opposition and independent candidates, and violent disruptions of opposition campaign events. Legislation enacted during 2005, in particular the extremism law, national security amendments, and election law amendments, eroded legal protections for human rights and expanded the powers of the executive branch to regulate and control civil society and the media. But the Constitutional Court deemed unconstitutional a restrictive NGO law.

Uzbekistan’s human rights record, already poor, worsened considerably in 2005. A violent uprising in May in the city of Andijon led to disproportionate use of force by the authorities and a wave of repressive government actions that dominated the remainder of the year. The uprising started after a series of daily peaceful protests in support of businessmen on trial between February and May for Islamic extremism. On the night of May 12-13, unidentified individuals seized weapons from a police garrison, stormed the city prison where the defendants were being held, killed several guards, and released several hundred inmates, including the defendants. They then occupied the regional administration building and took hostages. On May 13, according to eyewitness accounts, government forces fired indiscriminately into a crowd that included unarmed civilians. resulting in hundreds of deaths. In the aftermath, the government harassed, beat, and jailed dozens of human rights activists, journalists, and others who spoke out about the events and sentenced numerous people to prison in trials that did not meet international standards. The government forced numerous domestic and international NGOs to close and severely restricted those that continued to operate.

In Russia, efforts continued to concentrate power in the Kremlin and direct democracy from the top down. To those ends, the Kremlin abolished direct elections of governors in favor of presidential nomination and legislative approval. In the current Russian context, where checks and balances are weak at best, this system limits government accountability to voters while further concentrating power in the executive branch. Amendments to the electoral and political party law amendments, billed as intended to strengthen nationwide political parties in the longer term, could in fact reduce the ability of opposition parties to compete in elections. This trend, taken together with continuing media restrictions, a compliant parliament, corruption and selectivity in enforcement of the law, political pressure on the judiciary, and harassment of some NGOs, resulted in an erosion of the accountability of government leaders to the people.

Pakistan’s human rights record continued to be poor, despite President Musharraf’s stated commitment to democratic transition and "enlightened moderation." Restrictions remained on freedom of movement, expression, association, and religion. Progress on democratization was limited. During elections for local governments in 2005, international and domestic observers found serious flaws, including interference by political parties, which affected the outcome of the vote in parts of the country. Police detained approximately 10 thousand Pakistan People’s Party activists in April prior to the arrival for a rally of Benazir Bhuto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari. The security forces committed extrajudicial killings, violations of due process, arbitrary arrest, and torture. Corruption was pervasive throughout the government and police forces, and the government made little attempt to combat the problem. Security force officials who committed human rights abuses generally enjoyed de facto legal impunity.

Despite hard realities and high obstacles, there is an increasing worldwide demand for greater personal and political freedom and for the spread of democratic principles. For example, in the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region, recent years have witnessed the beginnings of political pluralism, unprecedented elections, new protections for women and minorities, and indigenous calls for peaceful, democratic change.

At the November 2005 Forum for the Future held in Manama, Bahrain, 40 leaders representing civil society organizations from 16 BMENA countries participated alongside their foreign ministers. The civil society leaders outlined a set of priorities with a particular focus on rule of law, transparency, human rights, and women's empowerment. Among those serving on this civil society delegation were representatives from the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), who presented the outcomes of discussions and debates held over the course of the year between civil society leaders and their government counterparts on the critical topics of election reform and the development of legitimate political parties. The growing DAD network includes hundreds of civil society leaders from the BMENA region. To better support growing reform efforts in the region, a Foundation for the Future to provide support directly to civil society and a Fund for the Future to support investment in the region, were also launched at the Forum. The level and depth of civil society participation at the Forum for the Future was historic and positive and set an important precedent for genuine dialogue and partnership between civil society and governments on issues of political reform.

The Forum for the Future is just one of the many mechanisms through which the United States, other Group of 8 countries, and regional governments support the indigenous desire for reform in the broader Middle East and North Africa.

The growing worldwide demand for human rights and democracy reflected in these reports is not the result of the impersonal workings of some dialectic or of the orchestrations of foreign governments. Rather, this call derives from the powerful human desire to live in dignity and liberty and from the personal bravery and tenacity of men and women in every age and in every society who serve and sacrifice for the cause of freedom.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 8, 200

Serbia and Montenegro is a state union consisting of the relatively large Republic of Serbia and the much smaller Republic of Montenegro.* The state union is a parliamentary democracy. The state union government's responsibilities are limited to foreign affairs, national security, human and minority rights, and internal and external economic and commercial relations. The country has a population of 10.8 million** and is headed by President Svetozar Marovic, who was elected by parliament in 2003.

The Republic of Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with approximately 10.2 million inhabitants. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has led Serbia's multiparty government since March 2004. Boris Tadic was elected president in June 2004 elections that observers deemed essentially in line with international standards. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were a few instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority.

The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens and continued efforts to address human rights violations; however, numerous problems from previous years persisted. The following human rights problems were reported:

The government's increased efforts in addressing human rights violations brought notable improvements. The government cooperated to a significant degree with the ICTY to turn over persons indicted for war crimes, potential witnesses, and documents; demonstrated that it could effectively prosecute high-profile crime cases in its domestic special courts; increased attention to human rights abuses of minorities; and implemented a witness protection program to help combat trafficking in persons.

The government or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings; however, security forces killed two persons.

On January 7, members of the armed forces shot and killed a 16-year-old ethnic Albanian while he was trying to cross the country's border with Macedonia illegally. A Ministry of Defense investigation determined that the military acted in accordance with the law.

On October 21, a man died after being beaten by a police officer in Kikinda. Authorities charged officer Sasa Mijin in the Zrenjanin district court two days later and suspended a total of eight officers in connection with the case. Mijin was in custody and awaiting trial at year's end. Another officer, Tatjana Radisic, received a reduction in pay and was demoted.

Long-delayed trials for political killings from previous years continued during the year, some with notable progress.

At year's end the Belgrade special court for organized crime continued the trial of three dozen suspects in the 2003 assassination of prime minister Djindjic. Former secret police special operations unit (JSO) commander Milorad Ulemek was charged with organizing the assassination, former JSO deputy commander Zvezdan Jovanovic-Zveki was charged with murder, and 12 other persons were charged with organization and taking part in murder. Several others were charged with lesser crimes in connection with the assassination.

On July 18, the Belgrade special court for organized crime concluded its trial of Ulemek and others for the 2000 killing of former Serbian president Ivan Stambolic. The court sentenced Milorad Ulemek and 3 persons under his command to 40 years in prison, 2 others to 15 years in prison, and 1 person to 4 years in prison. The verdict named former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, on trial before the ICTY, as the main instigator of the political assassination.

On June 29, a Belgrade district court concluded the retrial of Milorad Ulemek and 5 other former JSO members for the 1999 attempted killing of then Serbian Renewal Movement leader Vuk Draskovic. The court sentenced the 6 to 15 years in prison and also handed down prison sentences to a former intelligence chief and a former customs administration chief for their involvement.

The government had yet to complete its investigation into the disappearance and subsequent killing of Yili, Mehmet, and Agron Bytyqi, three US citizen brothers who were executed in Serbia in 1999. The bodies of the three were discovered in 2001 in a mass grave in rural Petrovo Selo, near a Serbian police facility. The bodies were found with their hands bound and gunshot wounds to their heads. At year's end there had been no indictments in the killings.

Domestic courts and the ICTY continued to try cases arising from crimes committed during the 1991-99 conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (see sections 1.e. and 4).

Several military conscripts died during the year while on guard duty in remote areas, and their families challenged the military's determination that the deaths were suicides. During the year an official commission of inquiry rejected the military's finding that two soldiers who died in October 2004 while on guard duty in Topcider were victims of a homicide and suicide without third-party involvement. Authorities referred the case to the courts for resolution; however, no court action had been taken by year's end.

In July a demining expert was killed in an unexploded ordnance removal operation in Nis.

During the year authorities failed to investigate human rights groups' allegations that, early in the year and subsequently in July, individuals belonging to the Security Information Agency threatened witnesses to the government's alleged involvement in incinerating bodies of Kosovar Albanians at the Mackatica plant in 1999. Authorities also did not investigate mass graves on Serbian Ministry of the Interior property that were discovered in 2001.

State union and Serbian authorities continued to cooperate with neighboring countries, the International Commission on Missing Persons, and other international organizations to identify missing persons and investigate graves discovered in Serbia. However, progress was slow, and at times the government showed an unwillingness to release information to the public. During the year authorities identified 560 bodies exhumed from mass graves dating to the Kosovo conflict and returned them to Kosovo. The government had not completed the identification and return of all the remains recovered by year's end. There were 2,494 missing persons cases that remained unsolved.

The law prohibits such practices; however, police at times beat detainees and harassed persons, usually during arrest or initial detention for petty crimes.

The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) reported that, on February 16, police hit a 17-year-old girl in the stomach at a downtown Belgrade police station and handcuffed her to a radiator for several hours while detaining her for suspected theft. Authorities had not taken action on the report at year's end.

The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (HCS) reported that, on June 30, traffic police ordered a family to lie on the floor of their home in a village near Nis while the police hit and threatened to kill them. Police arrested the family and took them to a police station without informing them of their rights or the charges against them and continued to threaten and harass family members. Authorities had not taken action on the case at year's end, and the family reported continued police harassment.

HLC reported that, on July 5, police entered the apartment of a Belgrade man without authorization and beat the man and a friend. Police reportedly broke the door open, punched and kicked the men, then took them to the police station without informing them of any charges against them. Authorities had not taken action on the report by year's end.

On July 31, a lawyer for the Leskovac Committee for Human Rights reported that a police officer in Leskovac, Goran Velickovic, had beaten him. The lawyer had represented a client who was severely beaten by Velickovic in 2003. Authorities were investigating the case by year's end.

The Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM) reported that, on September 28, Novi Sad police officers beat a man during a train ride from Belgrade to Novi Sad, mistaking him for a rowdy football fan. YUCOM also received reports during the year of police using excessive force during football games and other sports events in Belgrade. The victims in these cases decided not to file charges against the officers.

Two court decisions during the year addressed past cases of police misconduct. In February the Vrbas municipal court ordered the Serbian government to pay approximately $3,700 (260 thousand dinars) to Dragan Sijacki for police abuse in 2000. In March the first municipal court in Belgrade ordered the Serbian government to pay approximately $14 thousand (1 million dinars) to the parents of the late Milan Ristic after an investigation found that police conduct was probably responsible for his death. The court found that authorities failed to conduct an expedient and comprehensive investigation into the cause of death and that they had hastily concluded that the death was a suicide.

There was no information on whether any further action was taken during the year in the following cases of alleged police misconduct: the prosecution, reported pending in 2004, of police officers Zoran Gogic and Dragan Bojanic for beating a man in Zrenjanin while on duty in January 2004 and the prosecution, reported pending in 2004, of three police officers for beating a man while in detention in 2003. A judge dismissed the private prosecution by the HLC, reported pending before an investigative judge in 2004, of officers in the Cacak police department for allegedly hitting and threatening a man in 2003 to force him to confess to a robbery.

Prison conditions generally met international standards; however, conditions varied greatly between facilities, and some guards abused prisoners.

In some prisons, most notably the Belgrade reformatory hospital housing psychiatric prisoners, inmates complained of dirty and inhumane conditions. The quality of food varied from poor to minimally acceptable, and health care was often inadequate. Guards were inadequately trained in the proper handling of prisoners. Juveniles were supposed to be held separately from adults; however, this did not always occur in practice.

The government permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local independent human rights monitors, including HCS, to visit prisons and to speak with prisoners without the presence of a warden.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions, with some high-profile exceptions.

The approximately 43 thousand police officers in Serbia are part of the Ministry of the Interior. The police are divided into 33 regional secretariats that report to the republic government. The armed forces are under the control of the state union government and are responsible for national security. During the year responsibilities for border security were formally transferred to the Ministry of the Interior; however, in practice there has been no hand over of border post responsibilities from the military to the interior ministry, and military personnel still perform these functions.

The effectiveness of the police was uneven and generally limited. While most officers were Serbs, the force included Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), ethnic Hungarians, a small number of ethnic Albanians, and other ethnic minorities. The multiethnic police force in southern Serbia was composed primarily of ethnic Albanians and Serbs.

Corruption and impunity in the police force were problems, and there were only limited institutional means of overseeing and controlling police behavior. The inspector general's office, created in 2003, had increasingly limited authority, and the office had no autonomy to investigate and redress abuses. While the office recommended numerous disciplinary proceedings against interior ministry employees since its establishment, it had no means of following up on proceedings, and some secretariats completely ignored its recommendations.

During the year the interior ministry inspector general's office recommended disciplinary measures against ministry employees, leading to 856 cases that resulted in financial penalties, reassignments, and dismissals. The office filed 29 criminal complaints against 48 ministry employees on charges including forgery, misuse of public funds, corruption, accepting bribes, assault, and incompetence.

The Center of Public Security also took disciplinary measures against interior ministry employees, including submitting 1 employee for precriminal investigation, dismissing 7, opening a misdemeanor investigation of 1, reassigning 23, and reducing the salary of 9. In 63 cases, the center filed reports with department chiefs, who dismissed 33 employees, reassigned 45 to lower positions, reassigned 2 to equal positions, and reduced the salary of 141.

During the year the government and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) trained police, including on community relations. A foreign government also sponsored police training programs on witness protection and corruption.

Arrests were generally based on warrants, although police were authorized to make arrests without a warrant in limited circumstances, including if there was a well-founded suspicion that a person had committed a capital crime. The law requires an investigating judge to approve any detention over 48 hours, and authorities respected this requirement in practice. Bail was allowed but rarely used; detainees facing charges that carried possible sentences of less than five years were often released on their own recognizance.

The law provides that the police must inform arrested persons immediately of their rights. While police usually did so in practice, some abuses were reported (see section 1.c.).

The law provides access for detainees to counsel, at government expense if necessary, and this right was generally respected in practice. Unlike the previous year, there were no reports that police pressured attorneys to limit their contact with detainees. Family members were normally able to visit detainees. Suspects can be detained for up to six months without being charged.

The law prohibits the use of force, threats, deception, and coercion, as well as use in court of evidence acquired by such means; however, police sometimes used these means to obtain statements.

Authorities used arbitrary arrest and selective enforcement of the law for political purposes, particularly to undermine the credibility and reputation of those critical of the government.

On March 22, the government arrested then Belgrade police chief Milan Obradovic and charged him with permitting the beating of a murder suspect. Details of the charges were leaked to the media, and observers believed the arrest was politically motivated. The government released Obradovic after 60 days in detention and dropped the criminal investigation; however, the investigation was pending at year's end, and the interior ministry carried out disciplinary measures against Obradovic, first suspending him for four months, reducing his pay by 20 percent, and demoting him to a low-ranking position in the provinces, then further reducing his pay and classifying his position as unassigned.

On September 28, the government arrested former minister of justice Vladan Batic on charges related to the release from prison of a member of the so-called Jotka group in 2003. Batic said he was acting upon the Constitutional Court's ruling that holding these prisoners was unconstitutional. Human rights organizations criticized the arrest as politically motivated, stemming from Batic's regular and public criticism of the government. No charges were raised, and Batic was released within 48 hours.

Shortly after Batic's arrest, police arrested Dragan Vulic, former assistant minister in charge of Serbian correctional facilities, also in connection with the release of the Jotka member. Human rights organizations again decried this arrest and detention as selective enforcement of rule of law to punish allies of former prime minister Djindjic. Vulic was released after 30 days in detention.

The law limits the length of pretrial detention from indictment to the conclusion of a trial to 2 years for most cases, but allows detention for up to 4 years for crimes that carry up to the maximum penalty (40 years in prison). The law sets 2 years as the maximum detention permitted after an appellate court vacates the judgment of a trial court. Nonetheless, prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. The law prohibits excessive delays by authorities in filing formal charges against suspects and in opening investigations; however, such delays continued regularly. Due to the inefficiency of the courts, cases often took an excessively long time to come to trial, and once started, trials often took an excessively long time to complete (see section 1.e.).

Persons detained for serious crimes generally were held for the full six months allowed before charges are required to be filed.

The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the courts remained susceptible to corruption and political influence.

Corruption in the judiciary remained a problem. There were reports that government officials attempted to undermine politically sensitive prosecutions, including by applying pressure on prosecutors. On September 16, authorities arrested Supreme Court judge Slavoljub Vuckovic and charged him with accepting a bribe in the Jotka organized crime case.

On October 14, a court resumed the trial of former deputy public prosecutor Milan Sarajlic, who was charged with accepting payments from the Zemun organized crime clan in 2004; the trial had been put on hold due to Sarajlic's poor health in 2004.

The private sector still considered corruption in the commercial courts to be widespread. In addition land transfers often were extremely difficult, leading many in the private sector to allege administrative corruption.

The court of the state union is responsible for coordinating jurisprudence in the state union, resolving jurisdictional disputes between Serbian and Montenegrin institutions, ruling on alleged violations of rights guaranteed by the state union constitutional charter, and settling disputes that the state union's joint customs office is unable to resolve. The court was established in 2004, but no cases had been brought before it by year's end.

The Serbian judicial system consists of municipal courts, district courts, a Supreme Court, and a Constitutional Court. In addition, the law provides for special courts for war crimes and organized crime; these were operational during the year within the Belgrade district court. The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and regulations. While the law provides for an administrative appeals court and a second instance appeals court to reduce the Supreme Court's caseload, the National Assembly has postponed the establishment of the courts until 2007.

The government disbanded military courts on January 1. A special branch in each district court assumed responsibility for military cases.

Trials are generally public, but they are closed during testimony of a state witness. There are no juries. The law provides that defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to have an attorney represent them at public expense, if needed, and to be present at their trials. Both the defense and the prosecution have the right to appeal a verdict. Defendants have the right to access government-held evidence and question witnesses. These rights were generally respected in practice.

The special war crimes court continued trying war crimes cases, some of which concluded with long-awaited indictments and sentences. On June 17, the court concluded the retrial of Aleksandar Cvjetan for the 1999 killing of 19 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In March 2004 a court sentenced Cvjetan to 20 years in prison, but the Supreme Court subsequently ordered a retrial. The war crimes court confirmed the original 20-year sentence; however, the decision was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court at year's end.

The Belgrade district court also tried Dejan Demirovic in absentia for the Podujevo killings and obtained his extradition from Canada; Demirovic was in custody pending trial at year's end.

On July 15, the special war crimes court concluded the retrial, ordered by the Supreme Court in 2004, of the Sjeverin war crimes case involving the torture and killing of 16 Muslims in 1992. The court confirmed the original conviction and sentencing of Dragutin Dragicevic, Oliver Krsmanovic, and ICTY indictee Milan Lukic to 20 years in prison, and Djordje Sevic to 15 years in prison. The court's decision was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court at year's end. In August authorities in Argentina arrested Lukic, and his extradition to the ICTY was pending at year's end.

The special war crimes court commenced several trials during the year. On October 12, it began the trial of Anton Lekaj, who was accused of the 1999 murder and torture of Roma in Kosovo during a wedding procession. On December 12, the court passed its first verdict in the Ovcara case (also known as the Vukovar massacre), convicting 14 Serbs of murder, torture, and inhumane treatment of more than 200 Croatian prisoners of war in 1991. The convictions can be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The special war crimes court made preparation for two additional trials. In August the court indicted seven persons in the Zvornik case involving the 1992 eviction and murder of Bosnian Muslims. In October the court indicted six persons in the Scorpions case involving the execution of six Bosnian Muslim civilians from Srebrenica in 1995.

During the year a government commission began preparing a register of property seized since 1945, but it made no progress on enacting a property restitution law or returning property.

The law prohibits such actions; however, the government interfered with privacy and correspondence. While the law requires the interior ministry to obtain a court order before monitoring potential criminal activity and police to obtain a warrant before entering property except to save people or possessions, police occasionally did not respect these provisions in practice.

Most observers believed that authorities selectively monitored communications, eavesdropped on conversations, read mail and e-mail, and tapped telephones. Human rights leaders frequently reported that their communications were being monitored.

On October 20, the Serbian post office confiscated promotional materials (such as leaflets, lighters, pens) of the Movement for an Independent Montenegro while the group was in Belgrade for a news conference. Authorities explained that the materials contained "politically unacceptable content," but the group claimed the post office screened mail without a court order and illegally confiscated materials.

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, there were reports of government interference in these freedoms and reprisals against persons who criticized the government.

In general, independent media organizations were active and expressed a wide range of views; however, some media organizations experienced threats and reprisals for publicizing views critical of the government, and many reporters lacked professionalism in citing sources and achieving accuracy.

The government published the daily Borba and owned one of the country's most important printing houses, also named Borba. The oldest nationwide daily, Politika, was co-owned by a German company and the government but operated by several shareholding companies.

State-controlled Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) was a major presence, operating three television channels as well as radio service. The government had considerable influence, although not formal control, over other major television stations, including TV Politika and TV Novi Sad, as well as Radio Belgrade's three stations. In addition, many television stations relied on the state-owned news agency Tanjug for news information. While RTS's coverage was generally objective, there occasionally appeared to be a bias toward the government.

In August parliament amended the broadcast law to postpone the privatization of local broadcast media until the end of 2008 and give government appointees to the broadcasting council six-year terms in office, while persons appointed by NGOs and professional organizations would serve for four years.

Media organizations, particularly the radio station B92, were victims of vandalism, bomb threats, and intimidation for coverage of views unpopular with the government.

Local government leaders in Vranje reportedly harassed OK Radio reporters, and several reporters received death threats, following the radio's September 2004 report that 2,500 ballots had been printed illegally for the local elections there. The report was confirmed by the Center for Free Elections and Democracy.

Libel is a criminal offense. In September the Serbian parliament adopted a new penal code that replaces imprisonment with fines of $552 to $13,800 (460 euros to 11,500 euros) as punishment for libel.

In March the Vranje committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) charged Goran Vladkovic, editor-in-chief of OK Radio, with disseminating false information and libel in connection with the radio's September 2004 report on the illegal printing of ballots for a municipal election. The SPS sought over $343 thousand (24 million dinars) in compensation for alleged damages. A trial was pending at year's end, and OK Radio reported numerous threats and break-ins of its offices.

Journalists sometimes practiced self-censorship because of possible libel suits and fear of offending public opinion, particularly on subjects relating to wars in the former Yugoslavia.

While there were no government restrictions on the Internet or academic freedom, there were reports that the government selectively monitored e-mail correspondence.

The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government usually respected it in practice; however, authorities occasionally impeded public protests.

On March 30, police prevented approximately 300 members of the Association of Free and Independent Unions from protesting in front of a Serbian government building.

On July 10, members of the Women in Black organization gathered in Belgrade to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica killings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the government provided security and did not interfere with the event, which was organized by an outspoken critic of the government, some human rights groups criticized police for not responding adequately to threats and tear gas used by other groups against participants.

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected it in practice.

The law provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respected this right in practice; however, the Serbian government maintained a discriminatory property tax.

While there is no state religion, the majority Serbian Orthodox Church received some preferential treatment. For example, the military continued to offer only Serbian Orthodox services, although it allowed members of other faiths to attend religious services outside their posts. There were also complaints that the Serbian government funded construction of a large Serbian Orthodox Church by raising postal charges. The Serbian government subsidized salaries of Serbian Orthodox clergy in Kosovo.

Although there is no formal registration requirement for religious organizations, any group planning to hold gatherings is required to register with local police. Religious organizations may register as citizen groups with the interior ministry in order to gain the legal status necessary to own real estate and conduct other transactions.

Serbian tax law exempts property owned by 7 traditional religious groups (the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Muslim community, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Jewish community, the Reform Christian Church, and the Evangelical Christian Church) from taxation but requires tax to be paid on property owned by any of the country's 182 other religious communities. Some religious organizations received tax notices during the year; the tax was expected to have the greatest impact on the smaller, unrecognized religious communities, such as the Adventist Church, which holds approximately 200 properties in the country.

A number of religious groups reported problems dealing with local government authorities.

Non-Orthodox religious organizations continued to report difficulty obtaining permission from local authorities in Serbia to build new worship facilities. The Belgrade Islamic community reported continued difficulties in acquiring land and government approval for an Islamic cemetery in the city.

During the year the municipal council for the prevention of addictions and religious sects in the town of Leskovac identified Adventists, Baptists, Pentecostals, the Evangelical Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, and "Satanists" as sects and promoted propaganda against them.

Local authorities ordered the demolition of a Romanian Orthodox church built on private land in the village of Malajnica. Authorities reportedly acted because the local Serbian Orthodox clergy had not approved the church. The case was before the Serbian Supreme Court at year's end. In May a local Romanian Orthodox priest who led a religious procession without police permission was charged with inciting religious hatred but was acquitted.

Serbian law requires students in primary and secondary schools either to attend classes from one of the seven traditional religious communities or, alternatively, to take a class in civic education. Leaders of religions groups excluded from the program continued to express their dissatisfaction at the government's narrow definition of religion.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reported one case of the government restricting the import of religious material. Church members attempted to bring religious materials from Bulgaria, but border police refused them entry until they emptied the materials from their vehicles.

There was no progress noted during the year on restitution of previously seized religious property. The government reported that it was near to completing a register of seized religious property. As a temporary measure, a few religious communities have been granted free use of some facilities that had been seized from them. There was no progress noted in drafting a law on restitution of religious property in Serbia.

Religion and ethnicity are closely related; in many cases, it was difficult to identify discriminatory acts as being either primarily religious or primarily ethnic in motivation. Minority religious communities reported continuing problems with vandalism of church buildings, cemeteries, and other religious sites. Many attacks involved spray-painted graffiti, rock throwing, or the defacing of tombstones, while a few cases involved much more extensive damage. The police response was often inadequate.

Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Belgrade reported several incidents to police during the year when they were physically assaulted by youths; in one of these incidents, a church member lost consciousness after being beaten in a park. The police told the members that nothing could be done, since the perpetrators were minors.

During the year courts made progress in several of the trials connected to attacks against mosques in Belgrade and Nis in apparent response to violence against the Serb community in Kosovo in March 2004.

In April a court sentenced 1 person arrested in connection with the burning of a Belgrade mosque to three months in prison; the trial of 10 other persons indicted in the attack continued at year's end. The Serbian government repaired the outside of the mosque but had not yet repaired the interior.

In July a Nis municipal court convicted and sentenced eight persons to spend three to five months in prison for the March 2004 burning of the Islam-Aga mosque in Nis. Muslim leaders criticized the sentences as too lenient.

The Jewish community had fewer than four thousand persons. Representatives of the Union of Jewish Communities of Serbia and Montenegro reported continued incidents of anti-Semitism but no physical violence against Jewish persons. There were several reports of anti-Semitic graffiti and vandalism at a few Jewish cemeteries. In addition the release of foreign anti-Semitic literature translated into Serbian often led to a spike in hate mail and other expressions of anti-Semitism.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The law provides for these rights, and the government generally respected them in practice. The law prohibits forced exile, and the government did not employ it.

According to official figures of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were approximately 208 thousand IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia, mainly Serbs, Roma, and Bosniaks as a result of the 1999 events in Kosovo. Approximately nine thousand remained in collective centers that were inadequate for any purpose other than as emergency shelter.

The state union government did not screen or assume responsibility for the six thousand IDPs that the ICRC ceased supporting when its mandate expired in 2004; however, it continued to pay salaries to IDPs who were in the Kosovar government before June 1999. In order to obtain temporary residence status in Serbia, the law requires IDPs to first return to Kosovo and deregister themselves from their previous address. Failure to complete this process effectively prevents IDPs from obtaining access to health insurance, social welfare, and public schools.

In 2004 the Serbian government signed agreements with 13 countries. During the year it signed agreements with 2 additional countries to accept unsuccessful migrants and persons without legal residence in those countries, who were primarily Roma. The Serbian Red Cross opened an office at the Belgrade airport to assist returning Roma.

The UNHCR estimated that there were 40 to 45 thousand displaced Roma living in Serbia proper; half of those were not registered due to lack of documents. Many Kosovar Roma were perceived to be Serb collaborators during the conflict in Kosovo and could not safely return there. Living conditions for Roma in Serbia were extremely poor. Local municipalities often were reluctant to accommodate them, hoping that, if they failed to provide shelter, the Roma would leave the community (see section 5). If Roma did settle, it was often in official collective centers with minimum amenities or, more often, in makeshift camps in or near major cities or towns.

There were sporadic incidents of attacks and vandalism against IDPs, particularly ethnic Ashkalis. In Vojvodina, several Ashkali houses were vandalized during the year.

The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. The state union has adopted a law on asylum that provides a framework but does not mention procedures or implementation. The government, on the republic level, has not passed legislation or established a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice the government may provide protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution, and UNHCR grants the refugee status. Forty-four persons were granted refugee status during the year.

The government provided temporary protection to individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Croatia who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol.

According to the 2005 refugee re-registration process, there were approximately 140 thousand refugees in Serbia from other successor states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, primarily Croatia (100 thousand) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (40 thousand). The government, with UNHCR support, worked to close the remaining collective centers for refugees by establishing qualifications for persons to remain at the centers and by seeking alternate housing for others. Approximately six thousand refugees remained in collective centers in Serbia at year's end.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The law provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal suffrage.

The state union and the Serbian republic each have a parliamentary system of government. The state union parliament elects the state union president, while the president of the Serbian republic is elected by popular vote. On June 2, the Serbian National Assembly (parliament) adopted amendments to the state union's constitutional charter that postponed direct elections for the state union parliament and stipulated that state union and Serbian republic parliamentary elections take place separately.

An OSCE and Council of Europe election observation mission reported that the June 2004 Serbian republic presidential elections were peaceful and conducted essentially in line with international standards. Problems noted by the mission included lack of a central voter register, lack of facilities for eligible voters living in Montenegro, and evidence of some degree of disenfranchisement in the Romani community. Voting took place in Kosovo, where 97 thousand voters were registered; however, restrictions on movement hindered the ability of ethnic Serbs to vote, while the ethnic Albanian population, with very few exceptions, did not participate in the election, even in areas where some were on the voter lists.

An OSCE election observation mission reported that December 2003 Serbian republic parliamentary elections were conducted generally in line with international standards.

There were 13 women in the 126-seat state union parliament and 23 women in the 250-seat Serbian parliament. There were no women in the 5-member state union cabinet and 1 woman in the 16-member Serbian cabinet.

There were 7 members of minorities in the 126-seat state union parliament and 11 members of minorities in the 250-seat Serbian parliament. There was 1 member of a minority in the 5-member state union cabinet but no members of minorities in the 16-member Serbian cabinet.

Serbian law exempts ethnically based parties from the 5 percent threshold required for a political party to enter the Serbian parliament. Roma continued their historical pattern of low voter turnout. Local ethnic Albanian leaders in southern Serbia boycotted national elections notwithstanding their active involvement in local governance.

There was a widespread public perception of government corruption, and it appeared at every level. A Gallup survey released in March indicated that 60 percent of Serbians polled believed that government corruption was a major problem.

In June the government announced it would phase out the existing council for combating corruption, but it was unclear at year's end whether another body would replace it. During the year the council failed to investigate a number of corruption cases, including government contracts, questionable energy imports, and the use and sale of state-owned commercial office space.

Government authorities were inconsistent in their approach to official corruption. Investigations often appeared to be politically motivated and there are numerous examples of authorities failing to act in response to detailed reports of suspected corruption involving a wide range of officials. Media reporting of corruption was often sensationalist. Official anti-corruption bodies could be responsive and did have some success; however, there were cases where their efforts were blocked.

On September 8, Minister of Defense Prvoslav Davinic announced his resignation following the finance minister's criticism of his awarding of a $360 million (300 million euros) procurement contract in August as excessive, unjustified, and possibly corrupt. The contract allegedly involved the purchase of 74 thousand helmets and 69 thousand flak jackets for an army with only 28 thousand soldiers. Observers believed the accusations were politically motivated and stemmed from a rivalry between the two ministers. The Belgrade district court found no criminal wrongdoing in connection with the procurement but at year's end was investigating minor charges of misuse of office while Davinic was defense minister. The charges involved facilitating apartment leases for his bodyguards.

Authorities took no further action during the year against the interior ministry officials who were accused by the finance minister in September 2004 of having misappropriating public funds; observers believed the charges were politically motivated and lacked evidence.

Officials also engaged in questionable procedures in several high visibility privatizations, and the media reported that the political leadership overlooked and justice ministry officials ignored illegal transfers of funds made to government ministers.

The Serbian government's implementation of the November 2004 access to information law was slow, and the government generally did not provide access in practice. The law provides for public access to information of "legitimate public importance" (with many exceptions) and establishes an independent commissioner, selected by the Serbian parliament, to handle appeals when government agencies reject requests for information. NGOs reported that their requests for information from the government went unanswered.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A variety of independent domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. However, these groups were often subjects of harassment, threats and libel suits for expressing views critical of the government. Prominent human rights groups included the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Center, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, the Fund for an Open Society, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, and Belgrade Center for Human Rights.

After a video recording of the 1995 execution of six Srebrenica Muslims by a Serb paramilitary group called the "Skorpions" was shown on television on June 1, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party, and the Democratic Party of Serbia accused the Humanitarian Law Center, other NGOs, and media outlets of conducting an anti-Serb campaign. Some NGO workers were subsequently threatened and attacked, primarily through media campaigns demonizing them and publication of personal information, such as their addresses.

The state union government does not have an autonomous human rights ombudsman; however, during the year the Serbian government established a new ombudsman's office in Belgrade. Vojvodina Province has an ombudsman, who operated independently during the year. The legal aid office in the state union Ministry for Human and Minority Rights also assisted citizens with human rights complaints.

The state union and Serbian governments made significant progress in their cooperation with the ICTY to apprehend and bring to justice war criminals; however, two of ICTY's most wanted war crimes suspects with links to Serbia, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remained at large. From January through April, Serb authorities assisted in the transfer of 13 indictees to the tribunal, with one additional transfer in September; however, six ICTY indictees with ties to the country remained at large, including key indictee Mladic. The state union and Serbian governments also made progress in complying with ICTY document requests and in facilitating the testimony of witnesses. The state union government's national cooperation council (NCC) transferred approximately 900 pages of documents to the ICTY prosecutor's office in response to requests for information, but outstanding requests remain. The NCC facilitated the testimony of 46 witnesses by granting waivers that freed potential witnesses from local prosecution under state secrets laws.

The law prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language, or social status; however, discrimination against women and ethnic minorities as well as trafficking in persons and violence against women and children were problems.

Violence against women was a problem, and high levels of domestic violence persisted. The Serbian Victimology Society reported in July that one-third of women have been victims of physical violence, and half of women have been victims of psychological violence.

Domestic violence is a crime punishable by a prison sentence of 6 months to 10 years, depending on the seriousness of the offense, and a minimum of 10 years if death results. Such cases were difficult to prosecute due to lack of witnesses and evidence, as well as unwillingness of witnesses or victims to come forward. In a 2005 World Health Organization study of Serbian women, two-thirds of physically abused women reported that they did not seek help because they thought such abuse was normal or not serious. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family violence had inadequate resources.

Rape, including spousal rape, is punishable by 1 year to the legal maximum sentence (40 years' imprisonment) for a simple case, a minimum of 3 years for an aggravated case, and a minimum of 5 years if death results or the victim is a minor. Only a small proportion of rapes were reported because victims feared that they would not be protected, that their attackers would take revenge, or that they would be humiliated in court. Few spousal rape victims filed complaints with authorities. Women's groups reported that sentences were often too lenient.

The Center for Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offered a rape and spousal abuse hotline, and sponsored a number of self-help groups. The center also offered assistance to refugee women (mostly Serb), many of whom experienced extreme abuse or rape during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The Counseling Center Against Family Violence operated a domestic violence shelter partly funded by the government.

Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a problem (see section 5, Trafficking).

Sexual harassment was a common problem, but public awareness of it remained low. The law provides that sexual harassment is a crime punishable by up to six months' imprisonment for a simple case and by up to one year's imprisonment for abuse of a subordinate or dependent.

Women have the same legal rights as men, including under family law, property law, and in the judicial system. To ensure that women's rights are respected, the Serbian government established the council for gender equality in 2004. The Vojvodina government also has a secretariat for labor, employment, and gender equality. The OSCE mission to Serbia helped to establish municipal bodies in charge of gender equality in more than 30 municipalities.

Traditional views of gender roles, particularly in rural areas, resulted in discrimination against women. In remote rural areas, particularly among some minority communities, women could not effectively exercise their right to control property. In rural areas and some minority communities, it was common for husbands to direct the voting of wives.

The social status of women was generally considered inferior to that of men, and women were not well represented in commerce. Women were legally entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, according to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, women's average wage was 11 percent lower than that of men.

The government was committed to the rights and welfare of children. The educational system provided nine years of free, mandatory schooling. However, ethnic prejudice, cultural norms, and economic distress discouraged some children, particularly Roma, from attending school. One government survey found that approximately 99.8 percent of children attended school; however, the government acknowledged that the survey missed many transient Roma.

Romani education remained a problem. Many Romani children did not attend primary school, either for family reasons, because they were judged by school administrators to be unqualified, or because of societal prejudice. Due to the lack of primary schooling, many Romani children did not learn to speak Serbian. Some Romani children were placed mistakenly in schools for children with emotional disabilities because the Romani language and cultural norms made it difficult for them to succeed on standardized tests in Serbian. The UNHCR, with government support, conducted health education programs for Roma and catch-up and head-start programs for Romani children. During the year 48 elementary and secondary schools offered weekly Romani language and culture classes in which 1,336 students participated.

Free medical care was available in government clinics, including free medicines from a limited list of covered drugs. Boys and girls had equal access to medical care.

Child abuse was a widespread problem. While teachers were instructed to report suspected child abuse cases, they often did not do so. Police generally responded to complaints, and prosecutions of child abuse cases occurred during the year. Psychological and legal assistance was available for victims, and there was an incest trauma center.

Child marriage was a problem within some communities, particularly among Roma and in rural areas of southern and eastern Serbia. In the Romani community, boys and girls generally married between the ages of 14 and 18, with 16 as the average, and boys generally married a few years later than girls. Child marriage was most common among Muslim Roma, most of whom came from Kosovo and were living in other parts of the country as IDPs.

Trafficking of children for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a problem (see section 5, Trafficking). Some Romani children were trafficked within the Romani community and to Roma abroad for exploitation in begging and theft rings.

The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking in persons through and, to a lesser extent, to and from Serbia (excluding Kosovo) remained a problem. The penalty for trafficking is imprisonment of 1 to 10 years for a single offense, 3 to 40 years for multiple offenses, and 5 to 40 if a minor is involved or if a victim is killed.

The government's prosecution of trafficking cases became more effective, and courts handed down less lenient sentences for trafficking offenses than in previous years. On September 30, the special department of the Belgrade district court concluded a long-running and high-profile trafficking case involving Ukrainian victims, sentencing the organizer of the crime to eight years in prison and sentenced three others to three to six years in prison.

On December 28, the special court for organized crime concluded the 2004 case of 10 persons tried for trafficking women to Italy. The leader of the group, Dejan Stosic, received a four-year prison sentence; the others received sentences of 5 to 30 months.

During the year authorities filed 13 criminal charges against 21 persons for trafficking; antitrafficking groups worked with 113 trafficking victims and received 1,712 telephone calls on an SOS hotline for victims.

Serbian government antitrafficking efforts were led by an antitrafficking coordinator who was the chief of the border police and incorporated government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations. The state union ministries of foreign affairs and human and minority rights also participated. The government assisted in international investigations of human trafficking and participated in a regional antitrafficking operation.

With financial assistance and training from the international community, a witness protection unit became fully functional during the year. In addition reports suggested that police increasingly recognized and correctly assisted trafficking victims. For example, in February port of entry police recognized that an unescorted minor girl deported from Sweden with her two-year-old child and lacking paperwork was a trafficking victim and provided her assistance.

Serbia was a transit point, and to a lesser extent a point of origin and destination, for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Serbia was primarily a transit point for internationally trafficked women going to Kosovo as well as to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Western Europe. The primary source countries for persons trafficked to and through Serbia were Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Russia, and Bulgaria. Approximately two thousand trafficking victims were in or passed through Serbia during the year, including women trafficked for sexual exploitation, children in begging rings, and exploited seasonal agricultural laborers.

Underage girls were among those trafficked for sexual exploitation. In November authorities rescued a 14-year-old girl at the Slovenian border from an international trafficking ring attempting to take her to the Netherlands for work and sexual exploitation. Her family in Prokuplje had sold her for $3,600 (3 thousand euros); the parents stated they thought their daughter would be staying with an aunt and attending school in the Netherlands. Two Croatians and two citizens of the Netherlands were arrested for trafficking the girl.

While Serbia was not traditionally a major source for trafficked women, poor economic conditions have increased women's vulnerability to traffickers, particularly in the Romani community. Trafficking of children by Roma for use in begging or theft rings was a problem.

Traffickers recruited victims through enticements including advertisements for escorts, marriage offers, and offers of employment. Women often went to work as prostitutes knowingly and only later became trafficking victims. In many cases international organized crime networks recruited, transported, sold, and controlled victims. The main points in Serbia for holding and transferring trafficked women were the Belgrade suburbs and Pancevo.

Authorities encouraged victims to participate in trials of traffickers and did not prosecute victims.

The government's agency for coordination of protection to victims worked to ensure that trafficking victims were correctly identified and referred to assistance providers. Separate shelters for domestic and foreign trafficking victims operated during the year. The NGO Astra operated a hotline for trafficking victims. NGOs and volunteers provided legal, medical, psychological, and other assistance to victims.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) managed repatriation of foreign victims and assisted in the reintegration of local victims. The IOM also ran a regional clearing center for information on trafficking victims. There were numerous training programs, including training for hotline volunteers, shelters, social welfare officers, and police.

Serbian government and NGO public awareness efforts to combat trafficking included conferences on trafficking, documentary films shown across Serbia, and school outreach programs.

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, or in the provision of other state services, and the government generally enforced the law. There were no reports of discrimination against persons with physical or mental disability; however, facilities for their education and care were nonexistent or inadequate, and the government did not address the problem. A high unemployment rate and lack of accommodations made it difficult for persons with disabilities to obtain employment.

The law mandates access for persons with disabilities to new public buildings, and the government generally enforced this provision in practice.

Minorities constituted 25 to 30 percent of Serbia's population and included Hungarians, Bosniaks, Roma, Slovaks, Romanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Croats, Albanians, and others.

Although not widespread, there continued to be incidents of vandalism and some physical attacks against minorities, mainly Hungarians in Vojvodina. The number of incidents against minorities in Vojvodina decreased compared with 2004.

In October the European Parliament adopted a resolution asserting that the rights of minorities were being violated in Vojvodina and noting several cases of vandalism, verbal abuse, and physical attacks on ethnic Hungarians. On October 10, the NGO Human Rights Watch released a report on violence against minorities in Serbia that reached similar conclusions. The Serbian and state union government responded with increased engagement with ethnic minority leaders in Vojvodina. The Serbian government agreed to a 10-point strategy for improving ethnic relations in the province, including education and public awareness campaigns, and support for greater representation of minorities in the police and judiciary.

On November 9, a neo-Nazi group disrupted an anti-Fascist seminar at Novi Sad University in Vojvodina, harassing and slapping participants. Authorities charged 18 men with inciting ethnic, racial, and religious hatred and intolerance. In the weeks following this incident, the Serbian Ministry of Interior officially identified several neo-Nazi groups by name.

Ethnic Albanian leaders of the southern municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja continued to complain about the under-representation of ethnic Albanians in government structures. Dissatisfaction became particularly strong after army border guards shot and killed a 16-year-old ethnic Albanian in January as he was trying to cross the border with Macedonia illegally. A working group made up of interior ministry, OSCE, the coordination body for Southern Serbia, and municipal representatives addressed concerns between the ethnic Albanian community and police.

There were a few reports that police failed to take action to stop armed highway robberies that have occurred since mid-2004. Masked men claiming to belong to the Albanian National Army demanded money from drivers, mainly ethnic Albanian guest workers returning to Kosovo for the summer holidays.

Roma continued to be targets of numerous incidents of police violence, verbal and physical harassment from ordinary citizens, and societal discrimination. Police made modest improvements in investigating cases of societal violence against Roma. Twice during the year unknown persons attacked Romani settlements with Molotov cocktails; police investigated and pressed criminal charges against the assailants.

Many Roma, including IDPs from Kosovo, lived illegally in squatter settlements that lacked basic services such as schools, medical care, water, and sewage facilities. Some settlements were located on valuable industrial or commercial sites where private owners wanted to resume control; others were on the premises of state-owned enterprises due to be privatized. During the year Belgrade authorities continued to suspend demolition of one settlement on privatized land until they could locate alternative housing for Roma living there.

At year's end the prosecutor's office had not completed investigating the 2003 case of six Luzane villagers accused of attacking a Romani family.

During the year Belgrade authorities established a Romani coordination center and purchased land for the construction of an apartment complex for Roma; construction had not begun at year's end.

To address concerns of minorities, the state union Ministry for Human and Minority Rights operated a hotline for minorities and others concerned about human rights problems. Callers to the hotline most commonly reported being the victim of threats, ethnic slurs, and bullying. The government also sponsored several school programs to educate children about minority cultures and to promote tolerance.

Violence and discrimination against homosexuals was a problem. The media carried slurs against homosexuals. Some NGOs reported that homosexuals were denied equal opportunities in education and employment. A survey by the Youth Initiatives for Human Rights indicated that lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender persons experienced widespread threats, hate speech, verbal assault, and physical violence.

The law provides the right for workers, except military and police personnel, to join or form unions of their choosing, subject to restrictions, including approval by the Ministry of Labor and a statement from the employer that the union leader is a full-time employee, which reportedly was tantamount to an employer approval requirement. A state-affiliated trade union federation dominated organized labor, due to preference for unions belonging to it by the managements of the state-owned industries that dominated the economy. Smaller federations of independent trade unions competed with the government-affiliated federation, but were successful in doing so primarily in the relatively small proportion of the formal nonagricultural economy that is not state-owned. In the state-owned sector, 60 to 70 percent of workers belonged to unions. In the private sector, only 4 to 6 percent were unionized, and in agriculture approximately 3 percent.

The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination, and it was not a significant problem during the year.

The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, and the government protected this right in practice. The law protects the right to organize and bargain collectively, and it was exercised freely in practice. The new labor law implemented in March requires collective bargaining agreements for any company with more than 10 employees. However, in order to negotiate with an employer, a union must have 15 percent of company employees as members. In order to negotiate with the government, a union must have 10 percent of all workforce employees as members. Wage arrears were reported to be substantial and widespread. Approximately 27 percent of the workforce was covered by collective bargaining agreements.

The law provides for the right to strike except by persons providing essential services such as education, electric power, and postal service. These employees constitute approximately 50 percent of the workforce and must announce planned strikes at least 15 days in advance and ensure that a "minimum level of work" is provided. Workers exercised the right to strike.

The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred (see sections 5 and 6.d.).

The government effectively enforced laws protecting children from exploitation in the workforce. The minimum age for employment is 16, although in villages and farming communities it was common to find younger children at work assisting their families. Children, particularly Roma, also worked in a variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or selling small items such as newspapers. Romani children were often forced by their families into manual labor, compelled to beg, or trafficked abroad to work in begging or theft rings. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Issues checked for child labor during its inspections; however, the ministry stated it found no violations during the year. The ministry also included prevention of child labor in its regular child and family protection programs.

In Serbia, the minimum wage for the period July-December was set by the Social Economic Council at approximately $105 (7,400 dinars) per month. The minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. In companies with a trade union presence, there was generally effective enforcement of the minimum wage. This was not the case in smaller private companies, and workers were often afraid of losing their jobs because many of them were not legally registered. The Labor Inspectorate is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage.

The standard workweek of 40 hours was generally followed in state-owned enterprises but not in private companies. The law provides that an employee may not work overtime for more than 4 hours a day or for more than 240 hours in a calendar year. For an 8-hour workday, one 30-minute break is required. At least 12 hours of break are required between shifts during a workweek, and at least 24 hours of break are required over a weekend.

Collective agreements were the primarily means of providing premium pay for overtime. However, the new labor law requires that the premium for overtime work should be at least 26 percent of the salary base, as defined by the relevant collective agreement. Trade unions within a company are the primary agents for enforcing overtime pay; however, the Labor Inspectorate also has enforcement responsibilities. The inspectorate had mixed results enforcing labor regulation due to a variety of factors, including politics and corruption.

It is mandatory for companies to establish a safety and security unit to implement safety and security regulations; however, in practice these units often focused on rudimentary aspects of safety, such as purchasing soaps and detergents, rather than on providing safety equipment for workers. Workers did not have the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

Kosovo has a population of approximately 2.2 million and is administered by the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. UNMIK promulgated regulations that addressed the civil and legal responsibilities of governmental entities and private individuals and ratified laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly. The UNMIK-promulgated Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (the constitutional framework) defines the provisional institutions of self government (PISG). Multiparty elections in October 2004 for seats in the Assembly were generally free and fair. UNMIK international civilian authorities and a UN-authorized North Atlantic Treaty Organization peacekeeping force for Kosovo (KFOR) generally maintained effective control over security forces; however, there were reports that local elements of the security forces acted independently of their respective authority.

UNMIK and the PISG generally respected the human rights of residents; however, there were serious problems in some areas, particularly relating to minority populations. The following human rights problems were reported:

There were no reports that UNMIK, the PISG, KFOR, or their agents committed unlawful or arbitrary killings.

During the year unexploded ordnance from the 1999 conflict or landmines killed two children and seriously injured three, compared with one fatality and 13 serious injuries in 2004. Unexploded ordnance remained a threat to civilians.

There was one apparent politically motivated killing of a police officer. On January 13, unknown persons detonated a bomb under an official UNMIK vehicle, killing Omar Ali, an UNMIK police officer.

On April 7, authorities charged Shkumbin Mehmeti, Florim Ejupi, Xhavit Kosumi, and Faik Shaqiri with murder for the killing of a Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officer and an UNMIK police officer in Podujeve/Podujevo municipality after the March 2004 riots. All remained in custody awaiting trial at year's end.

There were apparent politically motivated killings of ethnic Albanians. On January 31, unknown persons shot and killed Sadik Musaj, a witness at the "Dukagjini group" trial. On April 6, unknown persons killed Muhamet Sallaj, a former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) member. On April 15, unknown persons killed Enver Haradinaj, brother of former prime minister and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) President Ramush Haradinaj; on July 25, Tasim Osaja, a suspect in the killing, turned himself in to police in response to a warrant for his arrest. On June 4, unknown persons shot journalist Bardil Ajeti of the Albanian language daily Bota Sot in a drive-by shooting; Ajeti died 20 days later from his injuries. In another drive-by shooting on July 12, unknown persons killed Muhamet Xhemajili, former commander of the UCPMB, the armed ethnic Albanian group previously active in Serbia's Presevo Valley. On September 5, a car explosion killed Kosovo Protection Corps and former KLA member, Naser Ramaj and his brother Jeton. On October 10, unknown persons shot and killed Hasan Rrustemi, a witness in the pending war crimes trial of former KLA (and former Kosovo Protection Corps) Commander Selimi Krasniqi.

There were apparent ethnically motivated killings of Serbs during the year. On August 28, unknown persons shot and killed Ivan Dejavnovic and Aleksandar Stankovic and injured two passengers in their car in the Serb-majority municipality of Strpce.

In a possible politically motivated attack, on October 11, unknown persons killed ethnic Turk Ibish Cakalli, a member of the Turk Democratic Party of Kosovo.

On May 18, an international panel of judges convicted six ethnic Albanians in connection with the killing of two ethnic Serbs during the March 2004 riots: Nexhat Ramadani was sentenced to 16 years, Xheladin Salihu to 11 years, Scaip Ibrahimi to 3˝ years, and Agron Ibrahimi, Agim Abdullahu and Sadri Shabani were each given 2˝ years in prison.

During the year a court acquitted Albanian Labinot Gashi, who was arrested by KPS police for the June 2004 killing of 17-year-old ethnic Serb Dimitrije Popovic and serious injury of another ethnic Serb teenager in a drive-by shooting. The trial of a second ethnic Albanian defendant, Albert Krasniqi, was ongoing at year's end.

There were no developments in the March 2004 killing of the father of Avni Elezaj, a former KLA fighter and bodyguard of former prime minister and AAK President Ramush Haradinaj.

There were no developments in the following 2003 cases: The killing of two witnesses in the Dukagjini group case, Tahir Zemaj and Ilir Selimaj; the sniper killing of UNMIK police officer Satish Menon; and the separate killings of KPS officers Hajdar Ahmeti and Agim Makolli. Bedri Krasniqi remained at large for the suspected 2003 killing of KPS members Sebahate Tolaj and Isuf Haklaj.

On April 7, authorities indicted Florim Ejupi on charges that he and accomplices planned and executed the 2001 Merdare bus bombing near Podujeve/Podujevo that killed 11 ethnic Serbs and wounded 40. A second April 7 indictment accused Ejupi, Shkumbin Mehmeti, Xavit Kosumi, and Faik Shaqiri of involvement in a March 2004 attack on international and KPS police at a road checkpoint established after the March 2004 riots.

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, there were still over two thousand persons missing from the 1999 conflict whose remains had not been identified or whereabouts determined.

A working group of Pristina and Belgrade officials on persons missing from the 1999 conflict met five times during the year under International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices. During the year the group accounted for approximately 560 sets of human remains and added 57 persons previously unaccounted for to its list of the missing. According to the ICRC, 2,464 persons were unaccounted for as of December, compared with more than 3 thousand at the beginning of the year. Of those still unaccounted for, the ICRC reported that 75 percent were ethnic Albanians, 17 percent were ethnic Serbs, 4 percent were from the Roma, Ashkalia, and Egyptian communities, and 3 percent were from other ethnic groups.

During the year UNMIK's missing persons and forensics office continued to identify the remains of missing persons in Kosovo. From its establishment in 2002 through the end of the December, the office performed 446 field operations and exhumations. Many bodies of missing persons have been recovered and the focus was on establishing the identities of the 1,389 sets of human remains discovered and received since 2002. By October the missing persons and forensics office submitted 2,655 bone samples for DNA testing to the International Commission on Missing Persons, which had returned 1,484 results.

In April the Office of Missing Persons and Forensics began excavation of a cave and its surrounding area in Kline/Klina municipality that was used to dispose of 21 human remains.

UNMIK continued to encourage the Serbian government to accelerate its cooperation on transferring identified remains of Kosovar victims of the 1999 war found in mass graves in Serbia; however, progress was slow. The missing persons and forensics office received 638 bodies, most of which were returned to families for burial. Families of the missing continued to demand that the Serbian government return all Kosovar remains still in Serbia and provide access to government files that might indicate locations of additional mass graves or places where Kosovar bodies may have been incinerated.

In 2004 the Prizren prosecutor's office announced arrest warrants for two former ethnic Serb policemen, Goran Janjusevic and Slavisa Milkovic, for committing war crimes against the civilian population in the Prizren region, including the kidnapping and killing of Ardian Zyrnagjiu during the 1999 conflict. The suspects remained at large at year's end.

The constitutional framework and criminal procedure code prohibit such practices, and there were no reports that UNMIK or KFOR employed them.

In June members of activist Albin Kurti's Kosovo Self-Determination movement began spray-painting their "no negotiation, self-determination" slogan on buildings and other property, escalating their activity during the year. On October 19, the KPS reportedly arrested and abused protestors, some of whom had spray-painted slogans on UN vehicles, following a demonstration in Pristina by members of the movement. In an October 25 letter to the UN special representative concerning the incident, Kosovo Ombudsperson Marek Nowicki cited eyewitness reports that "many" activists had experienced "severe ill-treatment" during their arrest and statements by persons who had been arrested that the ill-treatment continued after they had been taken into custody. An internal KPS investigation was ongoing at year's end.

Some individuals accused KFOR of using excessive force in executing searches. On September 18, UNMIK police and the KPS with KFOR support searched a private home and arrested four ethnic Serbs in Gracanica suspected of participating in a number of killings in Lipjan/Lipljan municipality in 1999. The family reported pushing and shoving by the KFOR soldiers and KPS officers who conducted the raid; the case was turned over to an international prosecutor, and the investigation was continuing at year's end.

On August 22, an international public prosecutor rejected a motion to allow the release of KPC Commander General Selim Krasniqi, under arrest with four other KPC officers for suspected involvement in 1998 abuse of persons in the Drenovac detention camp in the Prizren area. On August 22, the court released one of the five officers, Milaim Latifi, who was reinstated in the KPC.

There were reports of attacks and threats against ethnic Albanian political and institutional figures as well as private persons. On March 15, unknown persons detonated an explosive device near President Ibrahim Rugova's motorcade, causing injury to bystanders. On April 18, unknown persons detonated an explosive at the headquarters of the opposition political party Ora, injuring several persons in apartments above the offices. Nonpolitical motives, including clan rivalry and common criminality, were also suspected in some cases.

There were reports of politically motivated violence against ethnic Serbs during the year. On February 8, unknown persons destroyed the official vehicle of ethnic Serb leader Oliver Ivanovic with explosives, but caused no casualties. On July 4, unknown persons threw a hand grenade into the Zubin Potok offices of the Serbian Democratic Party for Kosovo and Metohija.

During the year authorities brought a number of persons to court for crimes related to the interethnic riots in March 2004 (see section 5).

Prison and detention centers generally met international standards, and UNMIK permitted visits by independent human rights observers; however, a local nongovernmental organization (NGO), Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF), claimed that UNMIK prohibited it from visiting detainees in prisons and detention centers since May.

Facilities were at times overcrowded; however, the construction of two new facilities continued during the year. UNMIK police corrections officers managed prisons and detention centers but increasingly transferred responsibilities to the Kosovo Correctional Service.

There were prisons in Lipljan and Dubrava as well as five detention centers in operation during the year. The CDHRF reported receiving approximately 10 telephone calls a day from prisoners and their families charging abuse and excessive solitary confinement in prison. While women and juveniles are supposed to be held separately from men, the CDHRF stated that there were cases of women and juveniles being held in Lipjan/ Lipljan prison in close proximity to men serving sentences for lesser crimes.

In December the OSCE found deficiencies in hygiene in holding cells but noted improvements in the conditions since 2002 due to UNMIK/KPS refurbishment of existing cells and the construction of new cells at police stations.

UNMIK reported that 35 disciplinary proceedings were brought against members of the Kosovo Correctional Service during the year, resulting in 1 dismissal, 1 suspension, 20 written warnings, 12 oral warnings and 1 suspension of promotion.

There were no reports that international prison monitoring groups visited Kosovo's prisons or detention centers during the year.

The constitutional framework and criminal procedure code prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG generally observed these prohibitions in practice.

UNMIK continued to transfer police authority and functions to the KPS, while maintaining oversight. An international commissioner of police directed both UNMIK police and the KPS. The combined force was generally effective and constituted an improvement over previous years. Members of ethnic minorities made up approximately 16 percent of the KPS' 6,900 officers at year's end, compared with 15 percent in 2004.

The International Crisis Group reported that corruption in the security forces was a problem, particularly in the KPS border police.

An UNMIK office of oversight investigated corruption in UNMIK and the criminal justice system. The judicial system effectively prosecuted members of the security forces who committed abuses. The KPS professional standards unit, run by UNMIK police, conducted over two hundred disciplinary investigations against KPS officers for participating in or failing to prevent violence in the March 2004 riots; most of these investigations were still ongoing at year's end.

As of November, of the 426 persons charged with criminal offences in connection with the March 2004 riots, the courts had convicted 209 and acquitted 12. There were 110 cases pending and charges were dropped in 95 cases. A December OSCE report accused the courts of inadequate charging and sentencing as well as the improper use of plea bargains, which are neither explicitly allowed nor regulated by law. The ability of authorities to conduct criminal investigations into the riots were hampered by the displacement of injured parties out of Kosovo, loss of material evidence, and witness intimidation or unwillingness to testify.

Police generally arrested suspects openly using a warrant issued by a judge or prosecutor; however, in certain high-security cases, suspects were arrested secretly by masked or undercover police officers. By law, arrests must be based on prosecutor orders and arrestees must be brought before a judge within 72 hours; however, there were reports that UNMIK police abused this authority by arresting persons, particularly petty offenders, and holding them for less than 72 hours with no intention of bringing charges and longer than 72 hours without bringing formal charges. Suspects have the right to be informed of the reason for their arrest in a language they understand; to remain silent and not answer any questions except those concerning their identity; to free assistance of an interpreter; to defense counsel and to have defense counsel provided if they cannot afford to pay for legal assistance; to medical treatment including psychiatric treatment; and to notify a family member. UNMIK police and the KPS generally respected these rights in practice. The law permits bail as an alternative to detention on remand, but this was applied in only a handful of cases.

KFOR could arrest and detain individuals without a warrant, and the KFOR commander could extend the detention of individuals in 30 day increments without charging them with a crime before a court, provided they were not released by a court. There were no reports that KFOR arrested persons without a warrant during the year.

There were no reports that KFOR, UNMIK, or the KPS held political detainees during the year.

UNMIK police and the KPS may hold individuals in pretrial detention for a maximum period of 1 month from the day of arrest, which could be extended by the courts up to a total of 18 months. The average length of pretrial detention was 30 days. The law allows for house arrest, an appeal for detention on remand, and expanded use of bail as alternatives to pretrial detention. There was a backlog of 700 to 800 pretrial detainees, and approximately 2,200 persons were detained on remand during the year.

The constitutional framework provides for an independent judiciary; however, the local judiciary was at times biased and subject to outside influence, particularly in interethnic cases, and did not always provide due process. There were credible reports of corruption in the local judiciary and that the Supreme Court and other courts deferred to the government in some cases.

Legal authority is held by UNMIK under UNSC Resolution 1244. UNMIK police and justice authorities held executive responsibility for the judicial system but worked with local judges and prosecutors. The Serbian government operated a non-sanctioned parallel judicial system in ethnic Serb enclaves.

The court system includes a Supreme Court, 5 district courts, 25 municipal courts, and a Commercial Court. On December 27, the number of UNMIK-appointed international judges was reduced from 18 to 14, and the number of international prosecutors rose from 8 to 13. At the end of the third quarter, there were 125,974 criminal and civil cases waiting resolution in the municipal courts and 11,924 criminal and civil cases waiting resolution in the district courts. The Supreme Court had 1,445 unresolved cases on its docket at the end of the third quarter.

UNMIK's judicial inspection unit monitored judicial performance and made recommendations on discipline and training. The joint UNMIK/PISGKosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (KJPC) was responsible for the review of cases of judicial misconduct. As of December 27, the KJPC had received 266 complaints of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, including 10 allegations of commission of a criminal act, 170 allegations of neglect of judicial/prosecutorial functions (95 for delay of cases), 20 allegations of breach of impartiality, 6 complaints of ethnic bias, and 24 allegations of breach of ethics. The KJPC had completed investigation of 159 complaints, dismissing 147 and recommending 12 for disciplinary action.

While the law provides that a panel of two professional and three lay judges tries serious cases, an UNMIK regulation authorizes international prosecutors to try cases of a sensitive ethnic or political nature, including before a panel of three international judges. Of the 250 active cases handled by international prosecutors through September, international judges tried approximately 75 with a conviction rate of over 90 percent.

Trials are public, and the law provides for the right of defendants to be present at their trials, to confront witnesses, to see evidence, and to have legal representation, at public expense if necessary; however, these procedures were rarely used in practice. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty and have the right of appeal. Trials are heard by panels consisting of professional and lay judges; there are no jury trials.

Legal experts and human rights observers continued to express concern over a lack of fairness in criminal trials involving ethnic minorities prosecuted or tried by ethic Albanian judicial personnel. The UNMIK-established judicial integration section continued to address judicial system problems that affected minorities. In addition, UNMIK operated nine court liaison offices, four of which were created during the year, to assist minority communities in ethnic Serb-majority areas by accompanying members of minorities to courts, filing documents with courts on their behalf, and providing information and legal assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Kosovo's investigative, judicial, and penal systems and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) continued to identify and punish perpetrators of war crimes from the 1999 conflict; however, many cases remained unresolved. Trials continued in local courts to adjudicate approximately 40 cases of alleged war crimes and genocide arising from the 1999 conflict. For example, on May 12, a Pristina district court found three of five former KLA fighters of the "Kacaniku group" guilty of war crimes committed against civilians between February 27 and March 21, 1999 and sentenced them to prison for three to five years; the court acquitted the other two defendants. The war crimes case against former KLA (and former Kosovo Protection Corps) Commander Selimi Krasniqi was in pretrial process at year's end. On October 10, a witness in the case, Hasan Rrustemi, was shot and killed.

There were no reports that KFOR, UNMIK, or the PISG held political prisoners during the year.

The UNMIK Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) is responsible for the resolution of residential property claims associated with the 1999 conflict. In Mitrovica, ethnic Serbs in the northern part of the city continued to occupy ethnic Albanian properties, while ethnic Albanians in the southern part occupied and denied ethnic Serbs access to their property. By year's end the HPD reported that it had decided all of the 1,824 property claims in north Mitrovica, Leposavic, and Zvecan and all 29 thousand overall claims. In over half of these cases, HPD resolved claims by allowing squatters to remain in place with owner permission and HPD administration of the property.

More than 17 thousand property-related claims were backlogged in municipal courts; these were almost exclusively monetary claims by ethnic Serbs for war-related damage. The OSCE estimated that 11 thousand additional claims involving agricultural and commercial property were awaiting adjudication at year's end.

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework prohibits such actions, and UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG generally respected these prohibitions in practice; however, KFOR forces assisted UNMIK civilian police and the KPS in conducting searches for high-risk suspects and independently searched private property for weapons without court orders, based on UNSC Resolution 1244's peacekeeping authority.

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and UNMIK and KFOR generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were allegations that the PISG interfered with freedom of speech and press, particularly with media outlets that were critical of its positions and performance.

Individuals could generally criticize authorities publicly or privately without reprisal.

UNMIK regulations prohibit hate speech and speech that incites ethnic violence, as well as newspaper articles that might encourage criminal activity or violence.

The 111 licensed independent broadcast outlets (89 radio and 22 television stations) were active and expressed a wide variety of views. International authorities controlled Radio Television Kosovo (RTK), Kosovo's public broadcasting company. The PISG did not own or expressly control any media outlets.

The office of the temporary media commissioner implemented UNMIK regulations governing the media and enforced codes of conduct on broadcasting and the print media. As envisioned in the constitutional framework, on April 21, the Kosovo Assembly passed and, on July 11, the special representative of the UN secretary-general (SRSG) promulgated, a law on the formation of a permanent independent media commission to regulate the broadcast media. Adoption of the law set in motion a transition, which began in September, during which the office of the temporary commissioner will evolve into the permanent commission overseen by a seven-member governing council.

On March 18, leading print media representatives adopted a press code and, on August 10, adopted the statute for a press council to provide for self-regulation of the print media. The temporary commissioner's office phased out its regulation of print media in October.

The PISG occasionally interfered with the media. On December 15, a local television station was covering a story on alleged fiscal misconduct by Enver Muja, chief executive officer of Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality, in the building of a road. Police reports stated that Muja's bodyguard and two friends attacked three television reporters, injuring one and breaking a television camera. Thirteen journalists in Gjilan/Gnjilane subsequently resigned, accusing their employer of trying to block the story due to pressure from the municipality.

During the year the office of the temporary media commissioner (TMC) fined Bota Sot approximately $78 thousand (65 thousand euros) and Pavaresia, which subsequently ceased publication, approximately $10,800 (9 thousand euros) for election-period violations committed in September and October 2004.

On August 9, the TMC fined ethnic Serb newspaper Jedinstvo $13,200 (11 thousand euros) for publication of false articles denigrating a specific ethnic group and failure to publish a timely correction. The fine was later reduced to $8,400 (7 thousand euros).

On June 3, unknown persons shot and mortally wounded the editor of Bota Sot, Bardhyl Ajeti. The temporary commissioner's office reported that the attack followed contacts between Ajeti and the commissioner's office during which Ajeti stated that he disagreed with the Bota Sot editorial positions and intended to leave the newspaper with other staff members to start a new publication. Police investigation of the killing continued at year's end.

The Association of Professional Journalists of Kosovo (APJK) reported that, on March 30, KPS officers physically assaulted Behxhet Begu and Bardh Bekteshi from RTK in Vushtrri for allegedly parking their car illegally on municipal property. An internal KPS investigation was ongoing at year's end.

The APJK reported that, on October 19, KPS officers assaulted and arrested journalists at a demonstration by members of the Self-Determination movement. In an October 25 letter to the UN special representative, Kosovo Ombudsperson Marek Nowicki called for an independent investigation of the KPS action in the incident, alleging that the KPS arrested two journalists who were photographing the demonstration, mistreating one. Some eye-witnesses stated that the journalists were participants in the demonstration. An internal KPS investigation was ongoing at year's end.

The APJK reported other incidents of harassment of the media during the year. In February the association accused the KPC of blocking filming of Serbian President Boris Tadic's visit to Kosovo. The APJK also reported that unknown persons made telephone death threats to the editor in chief of radio Top Ilira in February to stop reporting on the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) party.

There were no UNMIK, KFOR, or PISG restrictions on the Internet or academic freedom.

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework provide for freedom of assembly, and UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG generally respected this right in practice.

UNMIK required demonstration organizers to notify it 48 hours in advance for police coordination. KPS and UNMIK police rarely used force to disperse demonstrations.

On October 19, members of the KPS allegedly physically abused demonstrators while arresting and detaining them following a demonstration in Pristina (see section 1.c.).

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework provide for freedom of association, and UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG generally respected this right in practice.

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework provide for freedom of religion, and UNMIK and the PISG generally respected this right in practice.

There are no specific licensing regulations for religious groups; however, religious organizations must register as NGOs with UNMIK and the Ministry of Public Services in order to purchase property or receive funding from UNMIK or other international organizations.

Religious identity and ethnicity were closely intertwined. Ethnic Serbs identified with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which influenced their cultural, historical, political, and religious views (see section 5). While significant parts of the ethnic Albanian community continued to view the Serbian Orthodox Church as a symbol of Serbian nationalism, relations between leaders of the ethnic Albanian community and the Serbian Orthodox Church improved slightly during the year as PISG officials and political figures met on several occasions with church clergy.

In April primary school authorities dismissed a student from class for wearing a headscarf. A similar case resulted in a June 2004 opinion from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-funded ombudsman that the ministry's prohibition of headscarves should only apply to school teachers and officials, not students. Both parties filed petitions with the Ministry of Education and formal complaints with the OSCE ombudsman; the investigations were ongoing at year's end.

On May 23, the media reported that a public school principal suspended a teacher for wearing a headscarf to class, citing a law that obligates public education institutions to adopt a neutral attitude towards religion. On May 29, the Pristina municipality department of education dismissed the teacher.

Protestants also reported that school authorities sometimes called in parents of pupils to deter their children from following Protestantism.

The Islamic community continued to allege that UNMIK's denial of a radio frequency for an Islamic radio station, the closing of a prayer room in the national library, and the refusal of Pristina municipality to grant public land to build a mosque were examples of a lack of religious freedom.

Protestants alleged discrimination in access to the media, particularly by the RTK, which had denied the protestant community's request for its own television broadcast.

Ethnic Albanian attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches and cemeteries during the March 2004 riots resulted in extensive property damage, including the destruction or damaging of 30 religious sites, some dating from the 14th century. A Council of Europe mission assessed that approximately $13.1 million (9.7 million euros) would be required to repair and restore the damaged sites. The riots halted the transfer of responsibility for protection of Serbian Orthodox churches and other religious symbols from KFOR to UNMIK police and the KPS; however, the transfer process has since continued for minor religious sites.

Security concerns prevented monks and nuns at some Serbian Orthodox monasteries from using parts of monastery properties, and ethnic Serb families reported fear in traveling between Kosovo and Serbia to join relatives for religious holidays or ceremonies. To lessen concerns about security, UNMIK police deployed 350 international police officers in January to 30 locations designated for returning displaced ethnic Serbs and inhabited by ethnic Serbs. Bishop Teodosije of the Serbian Orthodox Church asserted that, on December 31, the municipality of Gjakova erected a monument to ethnic Albanian members of the KLA on land owned by the church.

Approximately 40 individuals from two families in Prizren have some Jewish roots, but there are no synagogues or Jewish institutions. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework provide for freedom of movement; however, interethnic tensions and real and perceived security concerns restricted freedom of movement. During the year UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG generally improved protection of these rights for minority communities.

Sporadic incidents of violence and intimidation targeting minorities continued to limit freedom of movement for ethnic Albanians in northern Kosovo. The PISG and UNMIK enhanced efforts to facilitate minority travel throughout Kosovo, but real and perceived risks deterred many minorities from traveling outside of their neighborhood.

To reduce the risk of attack by making ethnic Serb and ethnic Albanian vehicles indistinguishable, UNMIK continued to offer Kosovo license plates at no fee to ethnic Serbs who had already registered their vehicles in Serbia.

On April 22, KFOR withdrew its armored vehicles and barricades from the Austerlitz bridge connecting ethnic Serb-majority northern Mitrovica with ethnic Albanian-majority southern Mitrovica. The KPS assumed control of the bridge on June 6; on July 18, it opened to all civilian traffic for the first time since 1999. However, very few persons drove vehicles with Kosovo license plates across the bridge for fear of attack in northern Mitrovica.

UNMIK regulations provide that the central civil registry may issue travel documents to any person registered as a habitual resident of Kosovo, and the registry routinely issued such documents in practice. On October 3, UNMIK transferred managerial and operational responsibility for the registry to the PISG, but retained its overall authority, including for the issuance of UNMIK travel documents and the security of the central registration database.

According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 225,487 persons remained displaced within Serbia and Montenegro at year's end from the 1999 conflict, while 1,364 of the 4,100 persons driven from their homes in the March 2004 riots, mostly from Mitrovica and Pristina, remained displaced. Few IDPs returned during the year due to uncertainty over Kosovo's future political status, lack of employment opportunities, security concerns, and property disputes. While some international agencies, NGOs, and the PISG continued to organize small-scale return projects, observers criticized the newly-created PISG Ministry of Communities and Returns for delaying disbursement of PISG funding for return projects. Municipalities hired staff and devised municipal return strategies without appreciative tangible results.

The UNHCR reported that 2,048 minorities returned to Kosovo during the year, including ethnic Albanians who returned to areas where they are a minority. Overall minority returns since 2000 stood at 14,433 at the end of the year. A slightly smaller number of ethnic Serbs returned compared to 2004, when more Bosniaks and Goranis returned. Ethnic Serbs made up approximately 35 percent of returnees during the year, compared with 33 percent in 2004. Roma (including Ashkalia and Egyptians) continued to return in slightly greater numbers, making up 45 percent of the overall number of returns. In Mitrovica ethnic Serbs in the north of the city and ethnic Albanians in the south continued to illegally occupy each others' properties, hindering potential returnees.

Although the PISG reconstructed more than 95 percent of the homes damaged or destroyed in the March 2004 riots, a number of the individuals displaced by the riots have not returned due to both a real and perceived lack of security, unemployment, and residents' complaints about the quality of reconstruction. The prospect for returns varied according to region and ethnic group.

During the year UNMIK began construction on a relocation facility to eventually accommodate approximately 531 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian IDPs living in three lead-polluted camps in northern Kosovo; however, all the IDPs remained in the polluted camps at year's end. World Health Organization testing showed dangerously high blood-lead levels in many camp residents. UNMIK began a concurrent donor funding campaign to rebuild the IDPs' original neighborhood in south Mitrovica, which was destroyed in 1999 by ethnic Albanians, who accused Roma of being Serb collaborators, but completed only limited clearing of rubble by year's end. Limited funding slowed the return project. On September 2, the European Roma Rights Center filed an appeal to the Kosovo prosecutor's office to initiate a criminal investigation into the matter; no formal charges had been filed at year's end.

The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol; however, UNMIK granted displaced persons with status as "persons with temporary protection in Kosovo." In practice, UNMIK provided protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution; however, UNMIK did not grant refugee status or asylum. UNMIK cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

UNMIK regulations and the constitutional framework provide residents with the right to change their government peacefully, and they exercised this right in practice through periodic and generally free and fair elections on the basis of universal suffrage.

Kosovo continued to be administered under the civil authority of UNMIK. UNMIK and its chief administrator, the SRSG, established an international civil administration in 1999 following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Serbian forces. In 2001 UNMIK promulgated the constitutional framework for the PISG. Under the constitutional framework, a 120-member Kosovo Assembly selects a president, a prime minister, and other ministers and PISG officials. Kosovo's leaders continued to criticize UNMIK for the slow pace of transfer of powers to the PISG; however, the international mission retained a number of competencies, including security and relations with foreign governments

International and domestic observers determined that the October 2004 Assembly elections were generally free and fair, although less than five percent of ethnic Serbs participated, largely due to Serbian government pressure not to vote. Kosovo has a multiparty system dominated by four virtually monoethnic Albanian parties with several minority parties and coalitions.

Under UNMIK regulations, individuals may nominate themselves as candidates to their parties, which must hold open and transparent internal elections to select candidate lists. The largest party, the LDK, all but ignored this requirement at its party convention in 2004. Party affiliation played an important role in access to government services and social opportunities. Traditional social arrangements and clan loyalties also played an important, although unofficial role, in political organizations.

There were reports of attacks and threats against ethnic Albanian political and institutional figures (see section 1.c.).

There were 36 women in the 120-seat Assembly. Women must occupy every third spot on each political party's candidate list. There were no women on the eight-member Assembly directive body and only one female minister. Women represented 28 percent of the elected municipal representatives. On September 20, 34 female Assembly members established an informal women's caucus with an eight-person, multi-ethnic board.

There were 21 ethnic minority members in the 120-seat Assembly, including 10 ethnic Serbs and 11 members of other groups, including ethnic Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. There were two minority PISG ministers, one ethnic Serb and one Bosniak, and three minority deputy ministers. One Bosniak and one ethnic Turk held a rotating seat on the Assembly presidency; the Serb boycott left empty the set-aside seat for one ethnic Serb. At year's end ethnic Serbs in the largest Kosovo Serb political party had not claimed their set-aside cabinet posts and continued to boycott the Assembly; however, members of Slavisa Petkovic's political party took up 2 of the set-aside seats and led a ministry. The constitutional framework requires that the Assembly reserve 10 seats for ethnic Serbs and 10 for members of other ethnic groups, but ethnic minorities were underrepresented at the municipal level.

There was a widespread public perception of corruption in both the PISG and UNMIK. There were credible reports of irregularities involving the PISG's handling of its first international tender for a mobile phone license. UNMIK voided the PISG-selected winner, requesting the tender be reissued. The main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, continued to criticize the government for corruption and presented its allegations to UNMIK for investigation; at year's end UNMIK stated that its investigation was continuing.

In 2003 UNMIK promulgated a law on the access to official documents; however, the law exempts UNMIK documents and was rarely used. According to OSCE reports, the PISG did not provide public access to documents during the year.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG were generally cooperative and responsive to their views.

Domestic NGOs proliferated with the large influx of donor funding immediately following the 1999 conflict, resulting in a robust civil society and multiple, competing NGOs. Domestic NGOs complained that donor funding is no longer as available. Religious NGOs complained about the lack of a tax exemption on some items imported into Kosovo; some religious NGOs reported faith-based discrimination.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) coordinated training and projects for the KPC in collaboration with other NGOs. Human rights observers, including those of the OSCE and some local NGOs, were active in documenting ethnically or politically motivated killings, attacks, and incidents of intimidation.

An OSCE-funded ombudsperson investigated allegations of government abuses of international human rights laws. While the ombudsperson's office actively issued reports and recommendations, its recommendations were rarely followed by UNMIK, particularly UNMIK police. Most cases investigated by the office concerned property rights, abuse of official authority, administrative acts or omissions by public authorities, issues involving the fairness and length of court proceedings, employment-related disputes, and impunity.

UNMIK, KFOR, and the PISG generally cooperated with the ICTY regarding crimes committed during the 1999 conflict. On March 10, the ICTY indicted then-prime minister Ramush Haradinaj and co-defendants Idriz Balajand Lahi Brahimaj. On November 30, the ICTY concluded the trial of Fatmir Limaj, PDK caucus leader, and two other ethnic Albanians, Haradin Balaj and Isak Musliu, begun in November 2004. In its first decision with respect to the Kosovo conflict, the tribunal sentenced Balaj to 13 years' imprisonment and acquitted Limaj and Musliu.

UNMIK regulations specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnic origin, disability, or language; however, violence and discrimination against women, persons with disabilities, and ethnic minorities persisted.

Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, remained a serious and persistent problem. UNMIK regulations prohibit domestic violence and convictions carry prison terms of 6 months to 5 years. When victims did press charges, the KPS conducted investigations and brought the cases to court. According to UNMIK, family loyalties and close-knit communities and the backlog of cases in both civil and criminal courts added to a low rate of prosecution.

The Center for Protection of Women and Children, a local NGO, received approximately 3,650 requests for assistance from
victims of violence during the year. Through October, UNMIK victim advocates were involved in 1,468 domestic violence cases. The judicial system processed 77 protection orders from January to October; authorities arrested 341 persons, resulting in the opening of 1,045 cases. A total of 52 of the 53 cases completed by October resulted in convictions, with sentences ranging from judicial reprimands to imprisonment. Traditional social attitudes towards women in this male-dominated society contributed to the high level of domestic abuse and low number of reported cases.

There were no governmental agencies dedicated solely to dealing with family violence. Four shelters assisted victims of domestic violence and trafficking, two run by local NGOs and two by international NGOs. The KPS reported that 66 victims of domestic violence received shelter during the year. Several domestic and international NGOs pursued activities to assist women; however, they were constrained by a tradition of silence about domestic violence, sexual abuse, and rape.

During the year the OSCE, the prime minister's office, and UNMIK established an anonymous hotline to report domestic abuse. In addition, the KPS training school offered special courses on domestic violence and rape in its curriculum.

UNMIK regulations criminalize rape; however, spousal rape is not specifically addressed. Under Kosovar law, rape is punishable by 1 to 10 years in prison; statutory rape (sexual intercourse with a girl under 14) is punishable by 1 to 5 years in prison.

Rape was significantly underreported due to the cultural stigma attached to victims and their families. According to UNMIK, victim advocates provided services to victims in approximately 30 cases of rape. By October courts processed approximately 50 cases of rape resulting in 60 convictions; some cases involved multiple defendants.

The law prohibits prostitution, but prostitution remained prevalent. The UNMIK police trafficking and prostitution investigation unit investigated cases of prostitution and suspected trafficking in persons.

Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation was a serious problem (see section 5, Trafficking).

There was no specific law against sexual harassment, which was a common problem. Social awareness of sexual harassment remained low, and few cases were reported.

Women have the same legal rights as men, but traditionally not the same social status, which affected their treatment within the legal system. Despite a lack of legal impediments, relatively few women obtained upper-level management positions in commerce, the KPS, or government. While the number of women with jobs continued to increase, female unemployment remained high at around 70 percent, compared with 40 to 70 percent unemployment in the general population. Traditional social attitudes toward women resulted in discrimination. In some rural areas, women often had little ability to make decisions involving their children or to exercise control over property. While women and men have an equal legal right to inherit property, family property customarily passes only to men. Albanian widows, particularly in rural areas, risked losing custody of their children due to a custom calling for children and property to pass to the deceased father's family, while the widow returns to her birth family.

In August the prime minister's office created an office for gender equality, which began coordinating gender outreach efforts with the UNMIK office of gender affairs. During the year the office for gender equality assumed responsibility over 26 ethnic Albanian and 4 ethnic Serb municipal gender officers previously under the office of good governance. In October the Assembly established a functional subcommittee on Human Rights, Gender Equality, Petitions and Public Claims.

To combat discrimination against women, UNMIK integrated antidiscrimination, antitrafficking, and human rights into the legal curriculum at the University of Pristina during the year.

UNMIK and the PISG were generally committed to the welfare and rights of children.

UNMIK regulations require children between the ages of 6 and 15 to enroll in public school; however, a few children from minority (excluding ethnic Serb) communities did not attend PISG-run public school due to security concerns. Primary education is free. According to UNICEF, 97.5 percent of ethnic Albanian and 99 percent of ethnic Serbian children were enrolled in primary school, while only 77 percent of children between the ages of 7 and 14 from non-Serb minority communities (Roma, Ashkalia, Egyptian, Turkish, Bosniak, Gorani, and others) were in school. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that less than 52 percent of the children who completed primary education continued to secondary school; 43 percent of these were female. There were lower rates of secondary school attendance and completion for ethnic Albanian girls than for ethnic Albanian boys or ethnic Serb girls. Some children were forced to leave school early to work (see section 6.d.).

UNMIK regulations require equal conditions for school children and provide the right to native-language public education through secondary level for minority students. Schools teaching in Serbian, Bosnian, and Turkish operated during the year. Both ethnic Serb and ethnic Albanian children attended schools with inadequate facilities that lacked basic equipment. A few schools housed both ethnic Serb and ethnic Albanian pupils, who studied different curricula and rotated class schedules.

Romani, Ashkali, and Egyptian children attended mixed schools with ethnic Albanian children but reportedly faced intimidation in some majority Albanian areas. Romani children tended to be disadvantaged by poverty, leading many to start work both at home and in the streets at an early age to contribute to family income. Some Bosniak children in predominantly Bosniak areas were occasionally able to obtain primary education in their language, but those few outside such areas received instruction in the majority Albanian language.

The government provided medical care, and boys and girls had equal access to it.

There were reports of child abuse, although it was not believed to be widespread; however, high unemployment and family dislocation resulted in a high rate of child abandonment. Since domestic adoptions and foster family programs did not keep pace with the rate of abandonment, authorities sometimes housed infants and children in group homes with few caregivers. Since the end of war in 1999, parents reportedly abandoned five hundred children. Children with disabilities were often hidden away without proper care, particularly in rural areas.

During the year the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare operated 32 social welfare centers welfare that assisted 1,250 orphans, 1,075 delinquent children, 50 abused children, 68 abandoned children, and 120 children with behavioral problems. The ministry also managed foster homes and coordinated with NGOs to place children in temporary shelters. According to the Center for Social Work, 19 abandoned disabled children, ranging from 3 to 18 years of age were living in government-funded homes under 24-hour care; 15 of these attended specialized schools.

Child marriage was reported to occur, especially among the ethnic Romani, Ashkali, Egyptian, and Albanian communities, although UNMIK did not compile statistics on the problem.

Children were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation (see section 5, Trafficking).

UNMIK regulations criminalize trafficking in persons; however, trafficking of women and children remained a serious problem. There was evidence of both international and local official involvement in trafficking.

Conviction for trafficking is punishable by 2 to 20 years' imprisonment. Engaging or attempting to engage in trafficking is punishable by 2 to 12 years' imprisonment, or up to 15 years if the victim is a minor; organizing a group to engage in trafficking is punishable by 5 to 20 years' imprisonment; facilitating trafficking through negligence is punishable by 6 months to 5 years imprisonment. A client engaging in sex with a trafficking victim may be sentenced for up to 5 years, while sex with a trafficked minor carries penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment. Voluntary prostitution is punished as a minor offence; prostitutes can be punished, but not clients, unless the police can prove that a client knowingly used the services of a trafficking victim. Prostitution constitutes grounds for deportation.

During the year the UNMIK/KPS joint antitrafficking unit conducted 2,025 bar checks (25 of which were covert), 60 raids, and 2,386 inspections, resulting in the closing of 76 premises suspected of involvement in trafficking. UNMIK/KPS arrested 92 persons for trafficking in persons and made another 32 arrests for trafficking related offenses, resulting in 70 trafficking cases filed by the office of the prosecutor and 22 convictions. In July three Albanian citizens were convicted of trafficking, prostitution, and rape and sentenced to prison terms of 10 to 12 years; clients in the prostitution ring included KPS officers. Factors that contributed to a low number of prosecutions included the increasing sophistication of organized crime efforts to avoid direct links between the victims and senior crime figures, the lack of a witness protection program (although anonymity is provided during trial through written testimony), inadequate training for judicial personnel, and failure of police to adapt to new techniques employed by traffickers.

UNMIK, the KPS, the border police, the OSCE, the office of good governance, and the ministries of health, education, public services, and labor and social welfare are responsible for combating trafficking. The PISG's action plan to combat trafficking was released in May with the purpose of consolidating government efforts to combat trafficking.

Kosovo was a source, transit, and destination point for trafficked persons. Internal trafficking was a growing problem. As in previous years, the vast majority of victims were women and children trafficked almost exclusively from Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union into Kosovo, primarily for sexual exploitation but also for domestic servitude or forced labor in bars and restaurants and through Kosovo to Macedonia, Albania, and Western Europe. During the year 30 of the 55 identified victims of trafficking were repatriated or returned to their community.

The Center for Protection of Women and Children assisted 59 victims of trafficking during the year, of whom 52 were female, 41 were minors, 50 were residents, and 46 were ethnic Albanians. According to the IOM, of the victims from outside Kosovo it has assisted since 2000, over 45 percent were from Moldova, 19 percent from Romania, 12 percent from Ukraine, and the rest from Bulgaria, Albania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, and Nigeria. The majority of these victims were between the ages of 18 and 24 years. IOM figures indicated that 64 percent of Kosovar victims were internally trafficked, while approximately 15 percent were trafficked to Macedonia, and 13 percent to Albania and Italy. The IOM assisted 19 victims—all minors—during the year, 8 of whom were Kosovars.

The overall number of trafficking cases involving minors increased from 2004. Children and young girls from rural areas were particularly at risk of being trafficked, as were those from urban areas with a high level of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. The IOM reported that 73 percent of Kosovars who had been trafficked had completed only primary education.

Trafficking victims worked primarily in the sex industry, mostly in brothels and nightclubs but increasingly in private residences. Less than 20 percent reported that they were aware that they would be working in the sex industry when they left their homes. Trafficking victims reported that they were regularly subjected to beatings, rape, denial of access to health care, and confiscation of their travel and identity documents. Victims were often found in poor health and poor psychological condition.

UNMIK reported that traffickers often worked as part of a coordinated effort between ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian organized crime elements, with Serbia and Montenegro acting as a transit hub for trafficking victims from Eastern Europe into and through Kosovo. Bar and brothel owners purchased victims from organized crime rings.

Methods of trafficking increased in sophistication. In reaction to an aggressive eradication campaign by the UNMIK antitrafficking unit, traffickers shifted the commercial sex trade out of public bars and clubs and into private homes, where operations were more difficult to detect. Traffickers increasingly used financial incentives to encourage victims to refuse assistance. The IOM reported that, of the 476 mainly international victims it has assisted since 2000, 40 percent fell prey to traffickers after accepting a bogus job offer abroad, 30 percent claimed to have been kidnapped, and 17 percent were promised marriage. In 83 percent of cases, recruiting was through personal common contacts; the recruiter was an acquaintance of the victim in 45 percent of the cases and a friend or family friend in approximately 10 percent. Recruiters were most often female.

There was anecdotal evidence during the year that some UNMIK and PISG employees condoned trafficking and that a complex set of financial relationships and kinship ties existed between political leaders and organized crime networks that had financial interests in trafficking. In addition some local prosecutors reported instances in which the same lawyer represented an accused trafficker as well as the victim.

During the year UNHCR official Rasheed Khoon was placed on trial before an international judge for having sexual intercourse with a minor trafficked female and providing narcotics to other trafficked minors between September and December 2004. On November 2, Khoon was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for one count of abusing a person under age 16 and falsifying an official document. An Albanian female accomplice was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

While UNMIK regulations provide a defense for trafficking victims against criminal charges of prostitution and illegal border crossing, a few local judges sometimes incorrectly sentenced trafficking victims to prison. Some local judges also wrongly issued deportation orders against women convicted of prostitution or lack of documents; however, UNMIK did not enforce such orders. Cultural taboos and the threat of social discrimination caused most repatriated Kosovar victims to remain silent about their experiences.

International and local NGOs were the main source of assistance to trafficking victims. Local NGOs, such as United Methodist Committee on Relief and the Center for Protection of Women and Children, operated shelters that provided medical care and psychological counseling services to trafficking victims in cooperation with UNMIK, the OSCE, and the IOM. An interim secure facility also provided temporary shelter to victims while they considered whether to be repatriated or to testify against traffickers. Police often referred suspected trafficking victims to the IOM through OSCE regional officers.

The PISG became involved in treating victims of trafficking in January when the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, in cooperation with UNMIK and OSCE, opened a semi-independent supported housing unit for minors who were victims of trafficking, abuse, and domestic violence. Five young adults received room, board, education, and job training at the facility.

International organizations, particularly the IOM and NGOs, organized prevention campaigns to prevent trafficking. In July the IOM began a 12-month campaign to increase public awareness of the problem. The prime minister's office of good governance, the Ministry of Education, and the IOM distributed antitrafficking educational materials for use in primary and secondary schools. In September the office of good governance began a public relations campaign directed at deterring potential clients of prostitutes who were trafficking victims.

UNMIK regulations prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, and in the provision of other state services; however, there was considerable discrimination in practice. The law did not meet international standards, and there was no expertise on the issue of the rights of persons with disabilities. There are no guardianship laws with appropriate due process protections, and the law does not recognize the placement of individuals with mental disabilities in institutions and involuntary treatment as separate legal issues. The law mandates access to official buildings; however, it was not enforced in practice.

According to the NGO Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI), patients with mental disabilities continued to be detained in isolated conditions with no legal basis, since there is no law to regulate the process of committing persons to psychiatric or social care facilities or to protect rights within institutions. On occasion, individuals in need of mental health treatment were convicted of fabricated or petty crimes and sent to prisons that lacked resources for adequate treatment.

At year's end neither UNMIK nor the PISG had filed criminal charges or taken other legal action in response to a 2002 report by MDRI that found extensive evidence of physical abuse, sexual assault, neglect, and arbitrary detention by staff and patients in mental health care facilities at the Shtimje Institute, the Pristina Elderly Home, and the Pristina University Hospital.

The ministries of education, health, social welfare, and public services were responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.

There were an estimated 14 thousand persons with mental disabilities. In response to a December 2004 MDRI report that institutional care of persons with mental disabilities left them isolated, arbitrarily detained, and vulnerable to physical violence and sexual abuse, the PISG expanded options for independent living by such persons and spent $144 thousand to $240 thousand (120 thousand to 200 thousand euros) each on 14 integration homes endorsed by MDRI. UNMIK reported that the Ministry of Health had taken steps during the year to develop administrative instructions for mental health care institutions that resulted in the corrected transfer of prisoners with mental disabilities to mental health clinics. The CDHRF reported that prisoners with mental disabilities were often kept in prison facilities, because of lack of availability of mental health treatment.

Official and societal discrimination with respect to employment, social services, language use, freedom of movement, the right to return, and other basic rights and harassment of members of minorities improved over the previous year, although discrimination persisted, particularly against ethnic Serbs and Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. Violence and crimes against property directed at minorities lessened, but remained a problem.

UNMIK police recorded approximately 184 ethnically motivated crimes through the third quarter. However, according to UNMIK, incidents targeting minorities were generally underreported due to distrust of the KPS and the legal system. In the first half of the year, NGOs recorded approximately 6 incidents per week of such crimes as stoning, assaults, and harassment of Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, as well as property crimes such as arson and vandalism.

During the year police and KFOR commenced large-scale operations to apprehend persons responsible for the March 2004 interethnic riots that resulted in the deaths of 8 ethnic Serbs and 12 ethnic Albanians, injury of more than 900 persons, severe damage or destruction of more than 900 ethnic Serb, Romani, and Ashkali houses and 30 Orthodox churches or monasteries. In its July report on follow-up actions after the riots, UNMIK stated that 348 individuals had been brought before the courts for riot-related offenses. Of these, 179 cases were completed, 71 were awaiting trial, and 98 were under investigation. At least 57 serious cases were prosecuted by international lawyers and resulted in sentences of up to 16 years in prison. Kosovo judges handed down more than 85 convictions, with punishment ranging from court reprimands and fines up to $240 (200 euros) to imprisonment for periods ranging from two months to two years. On May 19, an international panel of judges of the Gjilan/ Gnjilane district court convicted six ethnic Albanians in connection with the killing of two ethnic Serbs during the riots and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 3.5 to 16 years.

Of the seven persons originally detained on suspicion of organizing or leading the riots, criminal investigations were ongoing in the cases of four: KPC reserve commander, Naser Shatri; chairman of the KLA war veterans association in Peja, Nexhmi Lajci; chairman of the KLA war veterans association in Gjilan, Shaqir Shaqiri; and chairman of the KLA war veterans Association in Vushtrri, Salih Salihu.

At year's end the PISG had reconstructed more than 95 percent of the houses damaged or destroyed in March 2004 and started church reconstruction (see section 2.c.).

Ethnic Albanians destroyed, often by arson, private property belonging to ethnic Serbs; some cases of violence against Serbs may have been attempts to force them to sell their property. A UNMIK regulation prevents the wholesale buy-out of many ethnic Serb communities in an effort to prevent the intimidation of minority property owners in certain areas; however, it was rarely enforced. The ombudsperson and human rights groups criticized the regulation as limiting the ability of ethnic Serbs to exercise their property rights.

Discrimination continued against ethnic Serbs in the provision of education and health care services by the PISG. Minority employment in the PISG continued to be low and was generally confined to lower levels of the government. Members of minorities occupied 11 percent of posts in the PISG ministries, despite a PISG target of more than 16 percent.

Authorities made no progress during the year investigating or prosecuting 2003 cases of violence against ethnic Serbs.

Roma lived in dire poverty, and those who lived in Mitrovica were viewed as ethnic Serb collaborators by many ethnic Albanians; as a result, in 1999, their houses were destroyed and they were forced to live in IDP camps, where they still reside. Roma throughout Kosovo were subject to pervasive social and economic discrimination and often lacked access to basic hygiene, medical care, and education and were heavily dependent on humanitarian aid. Although there were some successful efforts to resettle Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians in the homes they occupied prior to the 1999 conflict in Vushtrri, security concerns remained.

Bosniak leaders continued to complain that thousands of their community members had left Kosovo because of discrimination and a lack of economic opportunity.

In September authorities began a process of local government reform (decentralization) with the opening of pilot projects in the monoethnic areas of Hani I Elezit (Albanian), Mamushe (Turkish), and Junik (Albanian). The process was delayed as opposition parties continued to oppose the government's working program, the government moved slowly, and ethnic Serbs left discussions following their inability to reach consensus on the boundaries for two ethnic Serb-majority pilot projects in Gjilan and Gracanica.

The law prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation; however, the law was not applied during the year.

Traditional societal attitudes about homosexuality intimidated most gays and lesbians into concealing their sexual orientation. Gays and lesbians generally felt insecure, with many reporting threats to their personal safety. The print media previously reinforced these attitudes by publishing without retraction negative articles about homosexuality that characterized gays and lesbians as mentally ill and prone to sexually assaulting children. Individual homosexuals also reported job discrimination. At least one political party, the Islamic-oriented Justice Party, included a condemnation of homosexuality in its political platform.

On December 31, local media reported that KPS officers and a treating physician verbally abused and mistreated two young men after an unknown assailant had attacked them with a knife. The KPS suspended two officers without pay pending investigation.

UNMIK regulations allow workers to form and join unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements, and workers exercised this right in practice.

The only significant union, the Association of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK), claimed over 120 thousand members; only 50 thousand of its members (approximately 10 percent of the workforce) were employed. UNMIK regulations prohibit antiunion discrimination; however, some union officials reported discrimination in practice. The BSPK reported that only a small number of companies respected the regulation preventing antiunion discrimination and claimed that worker rights were abused in every sector, including international organizations, where staff did not have security insurance or pensions.

UNMIK regulations allow unions to conduct their activities without interference, and UNMIK protected this right in practice. UNMIK regulations also provide for the right to organize and bargain collectively without interference, and the government did not restrict this right in practice; however, collective bargaining took place on only one occasion. UNMIK regulations do not recognize the right to strike; however, strikes were not prohibited in practice, and strikes occurred during the year.

UNMIK regulations prohibit forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred (see sections 5 and 6.d.).

UNMIK regulations and policies prohibit exploitation of children in the workplace, including a prohibition of forced or compulsory labor, provide for acceptable working conditions; however, UNMIK and the PISG rarely challenged these practices when they occurred.

The pre-1989 labor laws that remain in force set the minimum age for employment at age 16 and at age 18 for any work likely to jeopardize the health, safety, or morals of a young person but permit children to work at age 15, provided it is not harmful or prejudicial to school attendance.

In villages and farming communities, younger children typically worked to assist their families. Urban children often worked in a variety of unofficial retail jobs, such as washing car windows or selling newspapers, cigarettes, and phone cards on the street; the numbers of such children grew in the last year, although statistics were not kept by either UNMIK or the PISG. Some children were also engaged in physical labor, such as transporting goods.

Trafficking of children was also a serious problem, primarily for sexual exploitation (see section 5).

The Ministry for Labor and Social Welfare, in cooperation with UNMIK, coordinated child protection policies, and the ministry's department of social welfare had responsibility for ensuring the protection of children; however, the ministry did not conduct inspections or otherwise enforce child labor laws during the year.

Although UNMIK regulations provide for a minimum wage, one has not been adopted. While many international agencies and NGOs paid adequate wages, the average full-time monthly public sector wage of $181 (151 euros) and the average private sector wage of $250 (208 euros) were inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.

UNMIK regulations provide for a standard 40-hour work week, require rest periods, limit the number of overtime worked to 20 hours per week and 40 hours per month, require payment of a premium for overtime work, and prohibit excessive compulsory overtime. A labor inspectorate within the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for enforcing labor standards. The inspectorate primarily advised employers and fined only one employer during the year for violation of the standards. Employers often failed to implement these regulations due to the high underemployment and unemployment in Kosovo.

The labor inspectorate was responsible for enforcing health and safety standards but lacked trained staff and did not do so effectively. The law does not permit employees to remove themselves from dangerous workplaces without jeopardizing their continued employment.

Montenegro, with a population of approximately 673 thousand, is a constituent republic of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. The republic has a presidential and a parliamentary system of government. The 2003 presidential elections were conducted generally in line with international standards. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security services, there were a few instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority.

The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens and demonstrated a heightened concern for the protection of human rights; however, there were problems in some areas. The following human rights problems were reported:

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

The law prohibits such practices; however, police occasionally beat suspects during arrest or while suspects were detained for questioning.

On September 1, the police raided the main penitentiary following the August 30 killing of the chief of the criminal police. During the raid police reportedly beat the prisoners with the intent to cause severe internal injury without leaving visible marks. Between 18 and 31 prisoners were injured, some severely. The minister of interior and the supreme state prosecutor both promptly announced investigations into the police action; the investigation was ongoing at year's end.

The local prosecutor, after an investigation, dropped charges against the police officers responsible for the alleged 2003 beating of Igor Zindovic.

The local state prosecutor brought criminal charges against police inspector Dobrasin Vulic for the 2003 beating of Nikola Popovic. The trial was ongoing at year's end.

Prison conditions generally met international standards; however, some problems remained. Prison facilities were antiquated, overcrowded, poorly maintained, and had inadequate hygiene.

The law mandates that juveniles be held separately from adults and pretrial detainees be held separately from convicted criminals; however, this did not always occur in practice due to overcrowding.

The government permitted prison visits by human rights observers, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Both the ICRC and the Helsinki Committee of Montenegro made several visits during the year. The ombudsman's office routinely visited prisons, meeting with detainees and inmates without prior notice.

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions.

The interior ministry controls both national and border police. Although these services generally were effective in maintaining basic law and order, their effectiveness in fighting organized crime was limited. A sizable percentage of the police force consisted of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), many of whom were deployed in the Sandzak, a predominantly Muslim area in the north. Impunity was a problem. The government investigated police abuses, but criminal procedures and sentences against police were rare.

Corruption was a problem; the small, close-knit society discouraged reporting corruption and provided criminals access to law enforcement officers.

Arrests require a judicial warrant or "high suspicion that the suspect committed an offense." A suspect could be detained for up to 48 hours before being arraigned and charged before a judge. Detainees are informed of the charges against them at the arraignment, where the judge makes the initial judicial determination of the legality of the detention. In practice arraignment generally occurred in the legally allowed time of 48 hours after arrest. The law provides for access to an attorney in this initial period, but this often did not occur. Detainees were allowed prompt access to family members. There is a system of bail; however, it was not widely used because citizens could rarely raise money for bail.

Long trial delays, combined with difficulty in meeting conditions for bail, occasionally led to lengthy pretrial detention. Approximately two-thirds of the prison population were pretrial detainees, whose average length of detention was five months.

The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, lack of cooperation between police and prosecutors, a backlog of cases, often primitive courtroom facilities, and judicial corruption remained problems. The government at times influenced prosecutors for political reasons. There were reports that judges issued tainted decisions out of fear of reprisals or loss of position if they ruled against particular parties.

The court system consists of municipal courts, higher (or district) courts, and a Supreme Court at the republic level. The law mandates formation of an Appeals Court and an Administrative Court to reduce the burden on the Supreme Court; these courts were established during the year. Cases are assigned to the court which has legal and physical jurisdiction.

Criminal trials are public; juries are not used. Defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner. Defendants have a right to access to an attorney; however, an attorney is provided at public expense only if the possible sentence is greater than five years' imprisonment. Defendants and their attorneys have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Defendants enjoy the presumption of innocence and the right of appeal; although the government at times influenced the judiciary, these rights were generally respected in practice.

The law prohibits such actions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions in practice. In September the law was changed to require the national security agency (NSA) to obtain court authorization for a wiretap. Some observers believed that police selectively used wiretapping and surveillance against opposition parties and other groups. Many individuals and organizations operated on the assumption that they were, or could be, under surveillance.

Eviction of Roma from illegal settlements, and sometimes legal residences, was a problem (see section 5).

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, there were some restrictions of freedom of the press in practice.

There were a small number of credible allegations of political and business pressure on the media. In December the radio and television (RTCG) council dismissed the director of public television broadcaster TVCG (TV Montenegro), justifying the action as a response to the director's failure to submit the TVCG program plan. The TVCG editorial staff resigned in protest. The dismissal was viewed by some observers as an attempt to bring the TVCG editorial board closer in line with government positions.

The independent media was active and generally expressed a wide variety of political and social views without government restriction.

There were no reports that journalists practiced self-censorship; however, some NGOs warned that the possibility of bringing criminal libel charges against journalists, accompanied by potentially large fines up to $16,800 (14 thousand euros), could deter journalists from reporting candidly on events.

Despite some steps to move away from government control of the media, certain media retained close ties to the government. Only one out of a dozen local, government-owned newspapers was privatized.

The print media consisted of private news outlets and one national state-owned newspaper, which published a wide variety of domestic and foreign articles.

There were a wide variety of public and private broadcasting media, including public radio and television broadcaster RTCG, as well as 16 private television and 39 private radio stations. Domestic radio and television stations regularly rebroadcast some programs from Belgrade's BK and Serbian National Television, as well as from a number of foreign services.

The trial of one person for the May 2004 killing of Dusko Jovanovic, the director and editor-in-chief of the leading opposition daily, Dan, was still in progress at year's end. While the motive of the killing remained unknown, Dan and other media outlets called the killing a major attack on freedom of the press and journalistic safety. On August 30, unknown persons shot and killed the chief police official investigating the Jovanovic and other major unresolved killings.

Officials sporadically brought or threatened libel suits against media organizations when accused of wrongdoing. There were no publicized cases of direct government censorship of the media. Unlike in previous years, only a few new libel suits were filed by state officials against media organizations. A government minister and the leadership of a municipal government sued the opposition daily newspaper Dan for libel and publication of false information. On January 17, the basic court in Podgorica fined the publisher of the defunct daily newspaper Publika in a libel suit brought by the chief of the former state security service (SDB). Despite some pending court cases and the continued risk of libel suits, there was a modest increase in the willingness of the media to criticize the government during the year.

The law mandates regulatory structures designed to insulate former state-owned media from direct party control; these include a radio and television (RTVCG) council that took over editorial oversight of the national public radio and television from the government. The RTVCG council was established in 2003, with members selected by a variety of NGOs and professional groups; however, some observers noted that many RTVCG members had close ties to the government. In December the council's decision not to accept a program plan proposed by the TVCG director resulted in his dismissal and the subsequent resignation of the entire editorial staff.

Since 2003 radio and television stations received broadcast licenses from an independent regulatory body, which assumed such authority from the government. During the year the regulatory body allocated frequencies for 16 television and 39 radio stations in its first public tender.

There were no government restrictions on the Internet or academic freedom; however, a group of professors and other educational professionals in Niksic protested their dismissal by the government for refusing to teach the "mother tongue," claiming they were only licensed to teach the "Serbian" language. The government had recently relabeled "Serbian" as the "mother tongue", asserting the change reflected the existence of various dialects in use. The professors claimed the government's action was politically motivated. The government asserted the dismissals were justified by the educators' subsequent strike, which the government held to be a breach of contract (see section 6.b.).

The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights in practice.

The law provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respected this right in practice. There was no state religion, although the republic constitution mentions the Orthodox Church, the Islamic community, and the Roman Catholic Church as equal and separate from the state; however, the Serbian Orthodox Church received some preferential treatment in practice.

While there was no formal registration requirement for religions, religious groups had to register as citizen groups with the republic's Ministry of the Interior and Department of Statistics to gain status as a legal entity, which is necessary for real estate and other administrative transactions. There were no problems with registration reported in practice.

There was no progress noted during the year on restitution of previously seized church property. The Serbian Orthodox Church claimed the government applied the restitution law in a discriminatory manner. During the year the church filed a suit with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), alleging that delays in addressing its claims for property taken by the government after World War II were politically motivated. The ECHR had not acted on the filing at year's end.

Religion and ethnicity were closely intertwined, and in many cases it was difficult to identify discriminatory acts as primarily religious or ethnic in origin. Minority religious communities reported better cooperation with government organizations, leading to increased ability to operate normally; however, some elements in society continued to discriminate against such communities.

Tensions continued between the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In June the erection of a prefabricated Serbian Orthodox chapel on a prominent mountain in the southwestern part of the republic, with the assistance of a state union military helicopter, antagonized nonmembers of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who viewed it as a political act.

There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts. A September 2004 survey by the government statistics office concluded that there was no organized Jewish community. A small, scattered number of adherents of Judaism likely lived in the republic.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The law provides for these rights, and the government generally respected them in practice.

There were approximately 17 thousand IDPs from Kosovo. The majority of these IDPs were ethnic Montenegrins or Serbs; however, there were also approximately 1,300 Roma and others. The Romani IDP population lived in collective centers with limited access to health care and education. Discrimination and harassment against Roma remained a serious problem (see section 5).

The law does not provide for the granting of asylum of refugee status to persons in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. The state union has adopted a law on asylum that gives a framework but does not mention procedures or implementation. In practice the government provided some protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution. The government granted refugee status but not asylum. According to established procedures, potential refugee cases would be referred to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Belgrade for determination. During the year no persons applied to either the Montenegrin government or UNHCR for refugee status.

The government was also prepared to provide temporary protection to individuals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol; however, no persons requested such protection during the year.

The government generally cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers. Conditions for refugees varied; those with relatives or property in the country were able to find housing and, in some cases, employment.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The law provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage.

Filip Vujanovic was elected president in 2003 elections that an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election observer mission found were conducted generally in accordance with international standards, as were parliamentary elections held in 2002. In rural areas husbands commonly directed their wives' voting.

There were 11 members of ethnic minorities in the 75-seat parliament and 3 members of ethnic minorities in the cabinet. Ethnic Albanians and Bosniaks participated in the political process, and their parties, candidates, and voters participated in all elections; Roma were significantly underrepresented in the government.

There was a widespread perception of government corruption, particularly in the executive and judicial branches. In September a leading NGO issued a comprehensive case study, which reported that unclear legislation and broad discretion in the exercise of government power institutionalized corruption as the "most efficient way of operations." There also were widespread allegations of corruption affecting the privatization of industry; observers noted that a lack of transparency prevented determining the validity of those allegations. There were reports that officials restructured firms eligible for privatization to make them unattractive to outside buyers, thereby leaving them in the officials' control.

On November 8, parliament adopted a law on free access to information; early implementation of the law was mixed but generally positive, with the authorities providing increased access to government information in practice. Citizens could inspect secret files kept on them by the SDB (the precursor of the NSA) from 1945 to 1989.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were cooperative and responsive to their views.

There were a number of NGOs investigating human rights cases, including Helsinki Committee of Montenegro and the Center for Democracy and Human Rights. NGOs were credited with helping to reduce police brutality and other abuses. The government generally cooperated with international organizations.

The government cooperated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in allowing access to witnesses.

The ombudsman for human rights does not have authority over the work of the courts, except in cases of prolonged procedure, obvious abuses of procedure, and failure to execute court decisions. The office of the ombudsman operated without government or party interference and was provided with adequate resources by the government. The ombudsman was generally considered to be effective. Upon finding a violation of human rights or freedoms, the ombudsman may initiate disciplinary procedures or dismissal of the violator. Failure to comply with the ombudsman's request for access to official data, documents, or premises, or to the ombudsman's request to testify at a hearing is punishable by fines of 10 to 20 times the minimum monthly wage of $600 to $1,200 (500 to 1 thousand euros). No fines were imposed during the year, as in practice essentially all its recommendations were respected. In March the ombudsman office released its first annual report to parliament.The greatest number of complaints related to delays in the courts and the work of local governments; only a few complaints involved police misconduct. In general the government and the courts implemented the ombudsman's recommendations.

A parliamentary committee on human rights continued to exist but was inactive during the year.

The law prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language, or social status; however, the government did not effectively enforce it in practice. Violence and discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in persons, and discrimination against ethnic minorities were problems.

Although violence against women, including spousal abuse, is illegal, it was widespread, particularly in rural areas. During the year official agencies, including the police, improved their response to domestic violence; however, efforts were still inadequate. Domestic violence is a crime punishable by a fine or prison sentence of up to 10 years, depending on the seriousness of the offense or, if death results, by a sentence of 3 to 12 years' imprisonment. Victims of domestic violence rarely filed complaints with the authorities. According to a 2004 survey conducted by an NGO, only 30 percent of victims reported domestic violence incidents to police; however, domestic violence-related offenses made up 30 percent of all police arrests. The government prosecuted a small number of domestic violence cases; however, NGOs reported that judges refused to impose jail sentences, although prosecutors routinely asked that convicted abusers be imprisoned; most convictions resulted in probation.

Rape, including spousal rape, is illegal. The government sought to enforce the law, but deeply ingrained societal attitudes continued to stigmatize rape victims, and judges frequently allowed such stigmatization of victims during court procedures. As a result victims were reluctant to report rape, including spousal rape. Punishment for rape, including spousal rape, is 1 to 10 years' imprisonment; however, the crime only can be prosecuted if the victim brings charges. According to a local NGO, 80 percent of domestic violence cases against women involved spousal rape; however, there were no reports of indictments of alleged rapists.

Prostitution is a crime, as are soliciting and procuring. The government took active measures to suppress prostitution, soliciting and procuring. Prostitution existed but was not widespread.

Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation was a problem (see section 5, Trafficking).

Sexual harassment was a problem. Sexual harassment is illegal but tolerated by society at large. While victims were hesitant to report harassment, police were usually effective in intervening when requested to do so.

Women did not enjoy equal status with men, and few women held senior management positions in government or commerce, although an increasing numbers of women served as judges, and there were many women in professional fields such as law, science, and medicine. Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender maintained that women should be subservient to male members of their families and continued to subject women to discrimination in the home. In rural areas, particularly among minority communities, women could not always exercise their right to control property, and husbands commonly directed wives' voting.

Legally, women were entitled to equal pay for equal work; however, they did not always receive it in practice. The government's Office for Gender Equality was charged with ensuring the legal and economic rights of women.

The government was committed to the health and educational needs of children; however, insufficient resources impeded achievement of this goal.

The educational system provided eight years of free, mandatory universal schooling. There was no difference in the treatment and attendance of boys and girls at the primary and secondary levels. Although ethnic Albanian children had access to instruction in their native language, some Albanians criticized the government for not developing a curriculum in which Albanians could learn about their ethnic culture and history. Most Romani children received little or no education beyond the primary school level; however, in an effort to address this problem, the government provided 13 thousand textbooks in the Romani language during the year.

Child abuse was an underreported problem that the government took little action to address. The law does not allow a juvenile to make an allegation of a crime without a parent or guardian present; consequently, there was almost no reporting of child abuse or incest to authorities.

Child marriage was particularly a problem among Roma. In the Romani community, boys and girls generally married at an early age, with girls marrying somewhat earlier than boys.

Trafficking in girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation was a problem (see section 5, Trafficking).

The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, there were reports that persons were trafficked to, from, and within the republic. There were reports that police and other officials were involved in trafficking; however, there were significantly fewer reports than in previous years.

The law sets the punishment for all trafficking in persons violations at up to 10 years' imprisonment. During the year, six persons were arrested and charged on suspicion of trafficking in persons. Several cases from previous years were still in the courts. Prosecutors filed seven new trafficking cases during the year and secured the convictions of six individuals in cases filed in previous years. The average length of sentences imposed for trafficking rose during the year, from six months in prison to an average of two and one-half years in prison.

The state-union level national coordinator, appointed by the Ministry of Interior, chairs the antitrafficking working group composed of relevant ministries (interior, health, labor, and education), social services, the OSCE, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and NGOs. The government coordinated its antitrafficking efforts with other countries in the region, particularly through the Southern European Cooperative Initiative Center in Bucharest.

The republic remained primarily a transit point for trafficked persons, particularly women and children, and, to a lesser extent, a destination. According to police, victims came from Serbia and often continued to Italy and other West European countries. The police and NGOs reported a larger number of cases of internal trafficking, particularly involving victims from Serbia. Statistics on trafficking were difficult to obtain, as traffickers increasingly stopped holding their victims in public locales such as bars and nightclubs. Victims were generally women with less education and usually, but not always, poor. The IOM reported that 6 of 15 trafficking victims housed in the local shelters during the year were minors.

Traffickers were often citizens who sometimes worked with foreign partners and were principally involved in organized crime. They usually used fraud to entice their victims and resorted to force and coercion to keep victims from leaving.

There were reports that police and other officials were involved in trafficking, for example, border police and customs officials who corruptly facilitated border crossings by traffickers and their victims.

The law provides procedures for protecting trafficking victims by distinguishing them from prostitutes and illegal migrants, as well as by establishing procedures for referring victims to appropriate social services; however, according to local NGOs, law enforcement authorities continued to mismanage some cases involving potential victims. The government repatriated victims with assistance from the IOM.

International organizations sponsored police training in methods of dealing with human trafficking. International organizations sponsored training for police (including border police), prosecutors, and judges in methods of dealing with trafficking. Local NGOs, with funding from international donors, operated a shelter in Podgorica and hotlines throughout the republic; the government assumed responsibility for funding a second shelter that opened in 2004. Public awareness campaigns, sponsored by the government with international support, continued to be conducted throughout the republic.

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, or in the provision of other state services; however, there was societal discrimination against persons with disabilities. The law mandates access to new official buildings for persons with disabilities, and the government generally enforced these provisions in practice; however, facilities for persons with disabilities were inadequate, including at polling stations.

The government provided mobile voting for handicapped or ill voters who could not come to polling stations.

The ministries of health, labor and social welfare, and education are responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.

Societal discrimination against ethnic minorities was a problem. Prejudice against Roma was widespread, and local authorities often ignored or tacitly condoned societal intimidation or mistreatment of Roma, some of whom were IDPs from Kosovo. According to a local NGO, 70 percent of Roma were illiterate, 70 percent did not speak the local language, 95 percent were officially unemployed, 40 percent had no access to public utilities, and 90 percent lived below the poverty level.

Romani IDPs, who lived primarily in collective centers and scattered settlements throughout the republic, often lacked identity documents and access to basic human services (see section 2.d.). Eviction from illegal settlements and, sometimes, legal residences was a serious problem. During the year there was limited official recognition of the problem, with authorities in the capital providing land and utility connections for an international NGO project to replace illegal and inadequate Romani housing.

Society generally showed antipathy towards homosexuals, leading most homosexuals to conceal their identity. Violence against homosexuals was rare and not condoned by the government.

The law entitles workers, except for the uniformed military and police personnel, to form and join unions of their choice, without previous authorization or excessive requirements, and workers exercised this right in practice. Approximately 95 percent of the workforce in the formal economy was unionized.

The law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, and the government protected this right in practice. The law provides for the right of collective bargaining; however, collective bargaining remained at a rudimentary level. Under the law the registered workforce is covered by collective bargaining agreements.The law provides for the right to strike, and workers generally exercised this right by conducting legal strikes; however, the law prohibits strikes by military and police personnel.

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred (see section 5).

The government had laws and policies to protect children from exploitation in the workplace, including prohibition of forced or compulsory labor, and policies regarding acceptable working conditions, and the government generally enforced these laws and policies effectively.

The official minimum age for employment is 15 years, although in farming communities it was common to find younger children assisting their families. Romani children also could be found in a variety of unofficial retail jobs, typically washing car windows or selling small items such as newspapers. Some such children worked in the "gray zone" between voluntary and forced labor; however, there were no reports that such practices occurred systematically.

Children were trafficked for sexual exploitation and child prostitution (see section 5).

Inspectors from the state labor inspectorate were responsible for enforcing the child labor laws.

The national minimum wage of $62 (52 euros) per month did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. There were no reports of employers failing to pay the minimum wage, which was enforced by the Ministry of Labor.

The law requires a 30-minute rest period daily, limits hours worked to 40 per week except in specified unusual circumstances, and requires an unspecified premium for work in excess of 40 hours per week. There is no specific prohibition on excessive compulsory overtime. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforced the regulations on hours of work.

The government did not give high priority to the enforcement of occupational safety and health regulations. Workers did not have the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardy to their employment.

*The report on Serbia and Montenegro is divided into three sections addressing the human rights situations in Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Discussion of state union-level activities and institutions affecting human rights is included in the Serbia section.

** For this report, Kosovo's population of 2.1 million is included as part of Serbia's population.

Predgovor

Izveštaji o stanju ljudskih prava po zemljama za 2005. godinu
Objavila Kancelarija za demokratiju, ljudska prava i rad
8. mart 2006.

Svi muškarci i žene žele i zaslužuju da žive dostojanstveno i slobodno. Kao što je predsednik Buš rekao: «Unapređenje slobode je velika priča našeg doba.» Promocija ljudskih prava i demokratije je svetski fenomen, a na globalnom nivou se sve više raspravlja o demokratiji i univerzalnim vrednostima koje štiti demokratska vlast.

Sve veći zahtevi za demokratskim valstim odražavaju spoznaju da je najbolji garant ljudskih prava napredna demokratija sa predstavničkim, odgovornim institucijama vlasti, jednakim pravima pod vladavinom prava, snažnim građanskim društvom, političkim pluralizmom i nezavisnim medijima.

Sjedinjene Države i ostale slobodne države imaju obavezu da brane ljudska prava i pomognu u širenju blagodeti demokratije. Moramo pomoći zemljama da stvore demokratske institucije koje će obezbediti dugoročno poštovanje ljudskih prava. Moramo pomoći krhkim demokratijama da svojim građanima obezbede bolji život. Moramo pozvati na odgovornost zemlje kada zanemare međunarodne obaveze u pogledu ljudskih prava. I uvek moramo ispoljiti solidarnost sa hrabrim muškarcima i ženama širom planete koji žive u strahu, ali sanjaju o slobodi.

Braneći i unapređujući ljudska prava i demokratske principe, nastavljamo da podržavamo najdragocenije vrednosti naše zemlje i postavljamo temelje trajnom miru. Za ispunjenje obećanja izraženog u Univerzalnoj deklaraciji Ujedinjenih nacija o ljudskim pravima i izgradnju snažnih demokratija širom sveta potrebne su generacije, ali je to posao od najveće hitnosti koji se ne može odlagati.

Dok o ovome razmišljam, imam zadovoljstvo da Kongresu Sjedinjenih Država dostavim Izveštaje Ministarstva inostranih poslova o ljudskim pravima po zemljama za 2005. godinu.

Izveštaji o stanju ljudskih prava po zemljama za 2005. godinu
Objavila Kancelarija za demokratiju, ljudska prava i rad
8. mart 2006.

Ovi izveštaji sadrže opise prakse koja se u sto devedeset šest zemalja sprovodi prema međunarodnim obavezama preuzetim u pogledu ljudskih prava. Ova osnovna prava, izražena u Univerzalnoj deklaraciji Ujedinjenih nacija o ljudskim pravima, prihvatili su ljudi svih kultura i boja, porekla i vera, i predstavljaju ono što predsednik Buš naziva "nespornim zahtevima ljudskog dostojanstva".

Stejt department je, u skladu sa kongresnim mandatom, 1977. godine prvi put objavio godišnje izveštaje o stanju ljudskih prava po zemljama i oni su postali suštinski element napora koje Sjedinjene Države ulažu u promovisanje poštovanje ljudskih prava šitom sveta. Gotovo tri decenije, izveštaji služe kao referentni dokument i osnova za saradnju među vladama, organizacijama i pojedincima koji nastoje da okončaju zloupotrebe i ojačaju kapacitete zemalja da bi se zaštitila osnovna prava svih ljudi.

Zalaganje za ljudska prava u celom svetu nije samo pokušaj da se nametnu strane vrednosti građanima drugih zemalja niti mešanje u njihove unutrašnje poslove. Univerzalna deklaracija poziva "svakog pojedinca i svaki društveni organ... na promociju poštovanja ovih prava i sloboda i da se, putem naprednih mera, nacionalnih i međunarodnih, obezbedi univerzalno i delotvorno priznanje i poštovanje ovih prava…"

Predsednik Buš je obavezao Sjedinjene Države na saradnju sa drugim demokratijama i ljudima dobre volje širom sveta da bi se postigao dugoročan istorijski cilj – "kraj tiranije u našem svetu".

Nesumnjivo, kršenje ljudskih prava i nepravde mogu se naći i događaju se i u demokratskim zemljama. Nijedan sistem uprave nije nepogrešiv. Stanje ljudskih prava u demokratijama širom sveta veoma se razlikuje, a ovi izveštaji po zemljama odražavaju tu činjenicu. Mladi demokratski sistemi oskudnih sredstava pogotovo mogu značajno podbaciti u izvršavanju važnih obaveza prema svojim građanima, uključujući i obaveze o ljudskim pravima. Demokratske tranzicije mogu biti burni i bolni procesi. Raširena korupcija može unazaditi demokratski razvoj, izvitoperiti sudske procese i uništiti poverenje javnosti. I pored toga, uopšte uzev, zemlje sa demokratskim sistemima obezbeđuju daleko veću zaštitu protiv kršenja ljudskih prava nego nedemokratske države.

Put Sjedinjenih Država ka slobodi i pravdi je za sve bio dug i težak i još uvek nije završen. Ipak, vremenom, naši nezavisni ogranci vlade, slobodni mediji, otvorenost prema svetu, i, što je najvažnije, građanska hrabrost nestrpljivih američkih patriota pomaže nam da podržavamo utemeljene ideale i obaveze u pogledu ljudskih prava.

Ovi izveštaji po zemljama daju činjeničnu osnovu po kojoj će se oceniti napredak učinjen u oblasti ljudskih prava i preostali izazovi. Izveštaji razmatraju praksu svake zemlje tokom 2005. godine, ali se praksa jedne zemlje ne poredi sa drugom. Iako izveštaj svake zemlje sam po sebi dovoljno govori, mogu se napraviti međuzavisna opažanja. Niže u tekstu navedeno je šest opštih zapažanja, uz odgovarajuće primere iz određenih zemalja. Primeri su ilustrativni a ne detaljni.

Prvo, u zemljama gde je vlast koncentrisana u rukama neodgovorne vlasti postoji tendencija ka najsistematičnijem kršenju ljudskih prava u svetu. Ove države se kreću od zatvorenih, totalitarnih sistema čijim se građanima naveliko uskraćuju osnovna ljudska prava do diktatorskih sistema gde su ljudska prava strogo ograničena.

Demokratska Narodna Republika Koreja (Severna Koreja) je u 2005. godini bila jedna od najizolovanijih zemalja u svetu. Sistematski represivan režim nastavio je da kontroliše gotovo sve aspekte građanskog života, uskraćujući slobodu govora, vere, štampe, okupljanja, udruživanja i kretanja, kao i prava radnika. Decembra 2005. režim je zapao u još veću izolaciju tražeći da se značajno smanji prisustvo nevladinih organizacija u zemlji.

U Burmi gde hunta vlada diktatom, obećanja da će se sprovesti demokratske reforme i poštovati ljudska prava nastavile su da služe kao fasada za brutalnost i represiju. Prinudni rad, trgovina ljudima, upotreba dece vojnika i verska diskriminacija i dalje su razlozi za veliku zabrinutost. Neprestane zloupotrebe koje vojska vrši uključivale su sistematska silovanja, mučenja, pogubljenja i prinudno preseljenje građana pripadnika etničkih manjina. Režim održava gvozdenu kontrolu nadgledanjem, uznemiravanjem i zatvaranjem političkih aktivista, među kojima i dobitnicu Nobelove nagrade i vođu opozicije Aung San Sju Kjui, koja je je i dalje u kućnom pritvoru bez optužbe.

Ionako nepovoljan izveštaj o Vladi Irana i stanju ljudskih prava i demokratije za 2005. još je nepovoljniji. Na predsedničkim izborima u junu, lokalni nadzorni savet je iz nadmetanja proizvoljno izbacio nešto više od hiljadu registrovanih kandidata – uključujući i sve žene kandidate. Novoizabrani konzervativni predsednik negirao je postojanje holokausta i pozivao na ukidanje Izraela. Vladajuće sveštenstvo i predsednik nadgledali su pogoršanje uslova u zatvorima za stotine političkih zatvorenika, dalja ograničenja slobode štampe i nastavljeno smanjenje društvenih i političkih sloboda. Nastavljeno je sa teškim zlodelima kao što su pogubljenja po kratkom postupku, ozbiljna kršenja verske slobode, diskriminacija na osnovu etničke i verske pripadnosti, nestanci, ekstremističko uzimanje zakona u svoje ruke, i primena mučenja i drugih ponižavajućih postupaka.

U Zimbabveu je Vlada nastavila sa upornim napadima na ljudsko dostojanstvo i osnovne slobode povećavajući pritisak na građansko društvo i nevladine organizacije za ljudska prava i izvodeći manipulacije na martovskim parlamentarnim izborima. Pripadnici opozicije izlagani su zlostavljanju, uključujući mučenje i silovanje. Novim ustavnim amandmanima Vladi je dozvoljeno da ograniči izlaz iz zemlje, sva zemlja preraspodeljena u programu zemljišne akvizicije prešla je u vlasništvo Vlade, i ukinuto je pravo da se odluke u okviru zemljišne akvizicije ispitaju u sudskom postupku. U Vladinoj Operaciji uspostavljanja reda, pokrenutoj da bi se uništile navodno nezakonite kuće i poslovi, raseljena su ili uništena domaćinstva više od 700.000 osoba što je još više opteretilo ionako slabu i neuspešnu ekonomiju zemlje.

Na Kubi je režim nastavio da kontroliše sve aspekte života preko komunističke stranke i masovne organizacije pod državnom kontrolom. Režim je suzbijao pozive na demokratsku reformu kao što je Projekat Varela koji predlaže nacionalni referendum. Vlasti su hapsile, pritvarale, novčano kažnjavale i pretile aktivistima Varele, a vlasti su zadržale najmanje 333 politička zatvorenika i pritvorenika.

Stanje ljudskih prava u Kini i dalje je loše, a vlasti su nastavile da vrše ozbiljne zloupotrebe. One koji su javno propagirali protiv politike i stavova kineske Vlade i učestvovali u protestima protiv vlade, organi vlasti i bezbednosti su uznemiravali, pritvarali i zatvarali. Remećenje javnog reda i protesti na kojima je traženo da se isprave nepravde znatno su učestali, a nekoliko incidenata nasilno je suzbijeno. Zaustavljene su ključne mere za povećanje sudske vlasti i smanjenje samovolje policije i snaga bezbednosti. Nastavljeno je ograničavanje medija i interneta. Nesmanjeno je nastavljena represija manjinskih grupa, posebno Ujgura i Tibetanaca. Usvojene su nove uredbe za verske poslove kojima je povećana zaštita određenih aktivnosti registrovanih verskih grupa, ali je nastavljeno sa represijom neregistrovanih verskih grupa kao i duhovnog pokreta Falun Gong.

U Belorusiji je predsednik Lukašenko nastavio da svu vlast prisvaja za sebe i svoj diktatorski režim. Prodemokratski aktivisti, uključujući opozicione političare, vođe nezavisnih sindikata, studente i novinske urednike, pritvarani su, novčano kažnjavani i zatvarani zbog kritikovanja Lukašenka i njegovog režima. Njegova vlada je sve više koristila poreske inspekcije i postavljala nove uslove za registraciju da bi komplikovala ili uskratila mogućnost legalnog rada nevladinim organizacijama, nezavisnim medijima, političkim strankama i manjinskim i verskim organizacijama.

Drugo, ljudska prava i demokratija su tesno povezani i obe ove oblasti su ključne za dugoročnu stabilnost i bezbednost. Slobodne i demokratske države koje poštuju prava građana pomažu da se postave temelji trajnog mira. Nasuprot tome, države koje ozbiljno i sistematski krše ljudska prava svojih građana verovatno će predstavljati pretnju susednim zemljama i međunarodnoj zajednici.

Burma je primer za ovo. Osnovna prava burmanskog naroda se mogu ostvariti samo ako se Burma vrati na demokratski put s kojeg je skrenula. Hunta odbija da prizna rezultate istorijskih slobodnih i pravičnih zakonskih izbora iz 1990. Okrutna i destruktivna, loša vladavina režima nanela je ogromne patnje burmanskom narodu i pogoršala ili stvorila probleme svojim susedima, od priliva izbeglica do širenja zaraznih bolesti i trgovine ljudima i narkoticima. Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija je 16. decembra održao izuzetno važnu raspravu o situaciji u Burmi.

Demokratska Narodna Republika Koreja je još jedan primer. Kada je Korejsko poluostrvo podeljeno, Severna Koreja i Republika Koreja (Južna Koreja) bile su u približno jednakoj ekonomskoj situaciji i obe su bile pod diktatorskom vladom. Razliku između dveju Koreja napravila je politička i ekonomska sloboda. Danas je Severnim Koreancima uskraćena većina osnovnih sloboda, a režim diktatorske vladavine za posledicu je imao desetine hiljada izbeglica. Vlada je do čvrste valute došla nezakonitim aktivnostima, uključujući trgovinu narkoticima, falsifikovanje novca i roba kao što su cigarete, i krijumčarenje. Pjongjang se ne obazire na uporne zahteve međunarodne zajednice da ukloni nuklearne programe.

Iranska Vlada je nastavila da zanemaruje želju iranskog naroda za sposobnom, odgovornom vladom i nastavlja sa opasnom politikom razvoja nuklearnog naoružanja, pruža pomoć terorističkim organizacijama i propagira uništenje jedne države članice Ujedinjenih nacija, što je u nekoliko navrata izraženo u govorima novog predsednika. Iran je do veće izolacije u svetu dovelo uskraćivanje osnovnih prava svojim građanima, mešanje u iračku situaciju, podrška Hezbolahu, Hamasu i drugim terorističkim organizacijama, i odbijanje da konstruktivno radi na ovim pitanjima.

Slično ovome, Vlada Sirije odbila je međunarodne zahteve da poštuje osnovne slobode svog naroda i prekine mešanje u poslove svojih suseda. Sirija je nastavila da podržava Hezbolah, Hamas i druge palestinske otpadničke grupe i nije u potpunosti sarađivala sa Nezavisnom istražnom komisijom Ujedinjenih nacija u slučaju atentata koji je u Bejrutu izvršen na bivšeg libanskog premijera Al Haririja. U izveštaju glavnog istražitelja zaključeno je da dokazi ukazuju na umešanost sirijskih vlasti i jasno pokazuje da su sirijski zvaničnici, iako su govorili da sarađuju, namerno obmanjivali istražitelje.

Nasuprot ovome, na Balkanu primećeno sveukupno poboljšanje u pogledu ljudskih prava, demokratije i vladavine prava, za poslednjih nekoliko godina dovelo je do veće stabilnosti i bezbednosti u regionu. Na vlasti su sve više demokratske vlade, ratnim zločincima se sve više sudi, znatan broj raseljenih lica se vratio kućama, izbori su više u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima, a susedne zemlje produbljuju saradnju na rešavanju postkonfliktnih i regionalnih problema. Mnoge zemlje bivše Jugoslavije ostvarile su napredak u izvođenju lica optuženih za ratne zločine pred domaće sudove, što je važno za nacionalno pomirenje i regionalnu stabilnost. Krajem 2005. dva najtraženija lica osumnjičena za ratne zločine, Radovan Karadžić i Ratko Mladić, i dalje su bila na slobodi.

Treće, u kontekstu unutrašnjih i/ili pograničnih oružanih sukoba, vlasti čine neke najteže slučajeve kršenja ljudskih prava. Pokušaj sudanske Vlade 2003. godine da uguši manju pobunu afričkih ustanika u Darfuru naoružavajući pripadnike Điđavid milicije i dozvoljavajući im da pustoše po regionu, doveo je do žestokog sukoba. Stejt department je septembra 2004. utvrdio da je u Darfuru izvršen genocid. Nastavljen je i 2005. Krajem 2005. godine, najmanje 70.000 civila je poginulo, gotovo dva miliona raseljeno zbog borbi, a više od 200.000 izbeglica izbeglo je u susedni Čad. Tortura je u Darfuru bila širokog i sistematskog karaktera, kao i nasilje nad ženama, uključujući silovanja koja su korišćena kao ratno oružje. Bilo je izveštaja da su žene odvođene u pustinju i da im se sudbina ne zna. Sveobuhvatni mirovni sporazum koji su potpisali Vlada Sudana i Sudanski narodnooslobodilački pokret omogućio je usvajanje ustava u julu i osnivanje vlade nacionalnog jedinstva koja će biti na vlasti do izbora 2009. Afrička unija je postavila 7.000 vojnika u Darfur, čije prisustvo pomaže da se nasilje suzbije u izvesnoj meri ali ne i u potpunosti. Krajem 2005. na civile su nastavljeni napadi pripadnika Đinđavida, koji vlada podržava.

Nepovoljna ocena stanja ljudskih prava u Nepalu pogoršana je. Vlada je nastavila da vrši mnoga teška zlodela i i za vreme i posle vanrednog stanja, koje je uvedeno od februara do aprila, tokom kojeg su suspendovana sva osnovna prava izuzev habeas corpus. U mnogim slučajevima vlada je odbacila naloge Vrhovnog suda u smislu habeas corpus i često hapsila vođe studenata i političkih stranaka. Maoistički pobunjenici takođe su nastavili sa torturom, ubistvima, bombaškim napadima, regrutovanjem dece, otmicama, iznudama i prinudnim zatvaranjem škola i poslovnih prostora.

Politička kriza u Obali Slonovače, koja i dalje deli zemlju, dovela je do novih zlostavljanja 2005. uključujući silovanja, mučenja i vansudska ubistva koja su počinile vlasti i pobunjeničke snage bezbednosti. Bilo je manje izveštaja o tome da pobunjenici regrutuju decu vojnike a mnogi su pušteni. Nastavljeno je nasilje nad opozicijom kao i pretnje nasiljem. Uprkos neprestanim naporima međunarodne zajednice i Afričke unije, zaustavljen je politički proces ustanovljavanja vlade koja bi imala zajedničku vlast. Krajem septembra, malo toga je urađeno na pripremama za izbore najavljene za 30. oktobar, a nije započelo ni razoružavanje pobunjeničke grupe Nove snage. Afrička unija je 6. oktobra odlučila da na godinu dana produži mandat predsednika Lorana Gbagbo.

U Čečeniji i drugde u regionu ruskog Severnog Kavkaza, savezne snage i promoskovske čečenske snage vršile su zlostavljanja koja uključuju mučenje, pogubljenja po kratkom postupku, nestanke i proizvoljna pritvaranja. Povremeno se činilo da promoskovske čečenske paravojne snage deluju nezavisno od ruske komande, a nije bilo znakova da savezne vlasti čine delotvorne napore da ih obuzdaju ili pozovu na odgovornost za nečuvena zlodela. Snage suprostavljene vladi takođe su nastavile sa terorističkim bombaškim napadima i teškim kršenjem ljudskih prava u Severnom Kavkazu. Tokom 2005. godine nastavljeno je širenje nasilja i zlodela u regionu gde vlada opšta klima bezakonja i korupcije.

Oblast Velikih Jezera u Centralnoj Africi, koja obuhvata Demokratsku Republiku Kongo, Ruandu, Burundi i Ugandu, zahvaćena je već više od decenije građanskim ratom, masovnim međuetničkim nasiljem i ozbiljnim kršenjem ljudskim prava. Međutim, uopšte uzev bilo je manje nasilja 2005. a stanje ljudskih prava je znatno poboljšano, što je ohrabrilo desetine hiljada raseljenih lica, posebno stanovnika Burundija, da se vrate kućama. Burundi je okončao četvorogodišnji tranzicioni proces, a u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo došlo je do istorijskog napretka na izborima. Vlade u oblasti Velikih Jezera ostvarile su značajan napredak u demobilizaciji hiljada dece vojnika u vojnim snagama i onih koji su pripadali raznim pobunjeničkim grupama. U isto vreme, razne naoružane grupe stacionirane u Istočnom Kongu nastavile su da destabilizuju region i međusobno se nadmeću za strateške i prirodne resurse, uprkos kongoanskim vojnim operacijama koje podržavaju Ujedinjene nacije u cilju raspuštanja oružanih grupa u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo. Hiljade pobunjenika iz Ruande, Ugande i Burundija, uključujući pobunjenike iz Ruande koji su 1994. izvršili genocid u Ruandi, i dalje su u sukobu sa svojim vladama, napadaju civile u Demokratskoj Republici Kongu i čine brojne teške zločine, posebno nad ženama i decom. Vlade Ruande i Ugande nastavile su da ilegalno doturaju oružje naoružanim grupama koje operišu i vrše zlodela na istoku Demokratske Republike Kongo.

U Kolumbiji je nastavljeno kršenje ljudskih prava povezano sa četrdesetjednogodišnjim unutrašnjim oružanim sukobom. Međutim, vladina uporna vojna ofanzivu protiv ilegalnih oružanih grupa i stalna demobilizacija paravojnih grupa dovela je do smanjenja broja ubistava i otmica. Kolumbija je takođe započela četvorogodišnji proces primene novog antagonističkog krivičnog zakonika na bazi optužbi. Međutim, nekažnjavanje je i dalje glavna prepreka, pogotovo u slučajevima zvaničnika optuženih za kršenje ljudskih prava u prošlosti, kao i za određeni broj pripadnika vojske koji su sarađivali sa paravojnim grupama.

Četvrto, gde su građansko društvo i nezavisni mediji pod opsadom, podrivene su osnovne slobode izražavanja, udruživanja i okupljanja. Snažno građansko društvo i nezavisni mediji pomažu da se stvore uslovi za napredak ljudskih prava tako što javnost upoznaju sa njihovim pravima, otkrivaju zlodela, traže reforme i pozivaju vlast na odgovornost.

Vlade treba da brane – a ne da zloupotrebljavaju – mirno ostvarivanje osnovnih sloboda pripadnika medija i građanskog društva čak i kad se ne slažu sa njihovim stavovima i aktivnostima. Ograničenja zakonom nametnuta u ostvarivanju tih sloboda mogu biti opravdana samo dotle dok su konzistentna sa obavezama zemlje u pogledu ljudskih prava a nisu samo izgovor za ograničavanje takvih prava.

Kada države koriste zakon kao političko oružje ili instrument represije protiv građanskog društva i medija, onda vladaju po zakonu a ne podržavaju vladavinu prava. Vladavina prava predstavlja proveru državne vlasti, odnosno, to je sistem stvoren za zaštitu ljudskih prava pojedinca od državne vlasti. Nasuprot tome, vladanje po zakonu može značiti zloupotrebu vlasti, to jest, manipulaciju zakonom i sudskim sistemom da bi se održala moć onih koji su na vlasti nad onima kojima se vlada.

Tokom 2005. uznemiravajuće veliki broj zemalja širom planete doneo je ili selektivno primenio zakone protiv medija i nevladinih organizacija. Na primer:

Kambodžanska vlada je koristila postojeći krivični zakon o kleveti da bi tokom godine zastrašivala, hapsila i krivično gonila kritičare i opozicionare.

Kina je povećala ograničenja medija i interneta što je dovelo do dva poznata slučaja hapšenja.

Vlada Zimbabvea uhapsila je osobe koje su kritikovale predsednika Mugabea, uznemiravala i proizvoljno hapsila novinare, zatvorila jedne nezavisne novine, prisilno rasterala demonstrante i hapsila i pritvarala opozicione vođe i njihove pristalice.

U Venecueli su novi zakoni o kleveti, uvredi i sadržaju objavljenom u medijima, povezani sa pravnim uznemiravanjem i fizičkim zastrašivanjem, doveli do ograničenja medijskih sloboda i klime autocenzure. I dalje je bilo izveštaja da predstavnici i pristalice vlade zastrašuju i prete članovima političke opozicije, nekolikim nevladinim organizacijama koje se bave ljudskim pravima i drugim grupama građanskog društva.. Neke nevladine organizacije su takođe optužile vladu da koristi sudstvo da bi ograničila političku opoziciju.

Lukašenkova vlada u Belorusiji je pojačala suzbijanje opozicionih grupa i nametnula nova ograničenja građanskom društvu. Bilo je politički motivisanih hapšenja, nekoliko nezavisnih novina je zatvoreno, rad drugih je ometan, a nevladine organizacije su uznemiravane.

U Rusiji su racije u prostorijama nevladinih organizacija, problemi pri registraciji, zastrašivanje vođa i osoblja nevladinih organizacija, te problemi sa vizama za strane radnike nevladinih organizacija imale negativan uticaj, kao i to što je u skupštini usvojen novi zakon o nevladinim organizacijama koji sadrži stanovite restrikcije. Kremlj je takođe radio na ograničavanju kritičkih stavova izraženih u medijima. Vlada je smanjila raznolikost radiodifuznih medija, posebno televizije, što je glavni izvor informacija za većinu Rusa. Krajem 2005. sve nezavisne nacionalne televizijske stanice preuzela je ili država ili organizacije naklonjene državi.

Peto, demokratski izbori sami po sebi ne obezbeđuju poštovanje ljudskih prava, ali mogu usmeriti zemlju na put ka reformi i postaviti temelje institucionalizaciji zaštite ljudskih prava. Demokratski izbori, međutim, prekretnica su na dugom putovanju demokratizacije. Ključni su za osnivanje odgovorne vlade i vladinih institucija koje se pridržavaju vladavine prava i zadovoljavaju potrebe građana.

U Iraku je 2005. bila godina napretka za demokratiju, demokratska prava i slobodu. Postojan je bio rad nevladinih organizacija i drugih udruženja građandskog društva koja promovišu ljudska prava. Zakonski izbori 30. januara označili su veliki korak ka učvršćivanju vladinih institucija u zaštiti ljudskih prava i slobode u zemlji čija je istorija obeležena nekim od najgorih kršenja ljudskih prava u nedavnoj prošlosti. Na referendumu 15. oktobra i izborima 15. decembra, irački birači su usvojili stalni ustav i izabrali članove novog zakonodavnog tela u zemlji, Saveta predstavnika, i tako konsolidovali demokratske institucije koje mogu obezbediti okvir za demokratsku budućnost. Iako su istorijski izbori i nove institucije demokratske vlade obezbedili strukturu za stvarni napredak, građanski život i društveno tkivo i dalje je izloženo jakom pritisku rasprostranjenog nasilja koje uglavnom nameću pobunjenički i teroristički elementi. Pored toga, elementi sektaške milicije i bezbednosne snage često deluju nezavisno od vlasti. Ipak, vlada je stvorena i pridržava se legalnog i izbornog kursa zasnovanog na poštovanju političkih prava.

Iako su im godinama uskraćivana osnovna ljudska prava, Afganistanci su nastavili da ispoljavaju hrabrost i posvećenost budućnosti slobode i poštovanja ljudskih prava. Posle gotovo tri decenije, 18. septembra održani su prvi parlamentarni izbori. Žene su oduševljeno glasale na izborima na kojima je među kandidatima bilo 582 žene. Šezdeset osam žena su izabrane u Donji dom na poslanička mesta koja su po Ustavu iz 2004. rezervisana za žene. Sedamnaest od ovih šezdeset osam žena bile bi izabrane po svom pravu čak i bez ovih mesta koja su za njih odvojena. U Gornjem domu, za žene je rezervisano 17 od 34 mesta koja imenuje predsednik; pokrajinski saveti izglasali su još pet žena tako da ih ukupno ima dvadeset dve. Parlamentarni izbori održani su 18. septembra uprkos okolnostima u kojima se vlada još bori da proširi vlast na centre u unutrašnjosti zbog i dalje prisutne nesigurnosti i žestokog otpora u nekim četvrtima.

U Ukrajini su primećena poboljšanja u poštovanju ljudskih prava posle Narandžaste revolucije koja je dovela do izbora nove vlade koja odražava volju naroda. Tokom 2005. povećana je odgovornost policijskih službenika, a masovni mediji su postali nezavisniji. Ometanje slobode okupljanja uglavnom je prestalo, a većina ograničenja slobode udruživanja ukinuta je. Širok spektar domaćih i međunarodnih grupa za ljudska prava takođe radi bez uznemiravanja vlasti.

Indonezija, najmnogoljudnija zemlja sa većinskim muslimanskim stanovništvom, ostvarila je značajan napredak u jačanju sastava demokratskog sistema. U nizu istorijskih lokalnih izbora, Indonežani su prvi put bili u prilici da neposrednim putem biraju vođe na gradskom, namesničkom i pokrajinskom nivou. Stanje ljudskih prava je poboljšano iako i dalje postoje značajni problemi i nastavila su se ozbiljna kršenja. Kritični događaj je bila prekretnica u vidu mirovnog sporazuma 15. avgusta sa pokretom Slobodni Aceh koji je okončao višedecenijski oružani sukob. Vlada je takođe inaugurisala papuansku Narodnu skupštinu i preduzela korake za ispunjavanje Posebnog zakona o autonomiji Papue iz 2001.

Liban je ostvario značajan napredak u okončavanju dvadesetdevetogodišnje sirijske vojne okupacije i povratku suvereniteta pod demokratski izabranim parlamentom. Međutim, problem je i dalje prisutni sirijski uticaj.

Liberija se pojavila na međunarodnoj demokratskoj sceni dramatično odstupajući od nasilne prošlosti i približavajući se slobodnoj i demokratskoj budućnosti. Za pobednika na višestranačkim predsedničkim izborima 23. novembra proglašena je Elen Džonson Sirlif, koja je tako postala prva žena predsednik države u Africi što je označilo prekretnicu u prelasku ove zemlje iz građanskog rata u demokratiju. Prelazna vlada je uglavnom poštovala ljudska prava građana i donela zakone u cilju osnaživanja ljudskih prava. Međutim, policijsko zlostavljanje, korupcija zvaničnika i drugi problemi nastavljeni su i pogoršani nasleđem četrnaestogodišnjeg građanskog rata, uključujući teško oštećenu infrastrukturu i rasprostranjeno siromaštvo i nezaposlenost.

Šesto, napredak demokratskih reformi i ljudskih prava nije ni linearan ni garantovan. Neke države još imaju slabe institucije demokratske uprave i nastavljaju da se bore, dok druge tek treba da se potpuno posvete demokratskom procesu. Napredak može biti obeležen nepravilnostima. Može doći do ozbiljnih zastoja. Kad dođu na vlast, demokratski izabrane vlade ne vladaju uvek na demokratski način.

Mnoge zemlje koje su posvećene demokratskim reformama, 2005. su ostvarile neujednačen napredak, a neke su nazadovale.

Značajno je popravljeno stanje ljudskih prava u Republici Kirgiziji posle promene rukovodstva u periodu od marta do jula, mada su problemi ostali. Predsednik Akajev pobegao je iz zemlje nakon što su opozicioni demonstranti preuzeli glavnu vladinu zgradu u prestonici u znak protesta protiv nepravilnih izbora. Predsednički izbori u julu i novembarski parlamentarni izbori predstavljaju poboljšanje u nekim oblastima u odnosu na prethodne izbore. Međutim, ustavna reforma je zaustavljena a korupcija predstavlja ozbiljan problem.

U Ekvadoru, kongres je u aprilu uklonio demokratski izabranog predsednika Lucija Gutiereza posle masovnih protesta i javnog povlačenja podrške rukovodstva vojske i nacionalne policije. Potpredsednik Alfredo Palacio je nasledio Gutiereza, a izbori su predviđeni za 2006. godinu.

Mada je prelazna vlada Demokratske Republike Kongo odložila opšte nacionalne izbore do 2006. godine, u zemlji je održano prvo demokratsko nacionalno glasanje posle četrdeset godina. Ogromnom većinom, birači su glasali za novi ustav na uglavnom slobodnom i pravičnom nacionalnom referendumu uprkos određenim nepravilnostima.

Vlada Ugande je u junu usvojila sporni amandman za ukidanje ograničenja predsedničkog mandata, stvarajući mogućnost da se predsednik Museveni po treći put kandiduje. Međutim, građani su na nacionalnom referendumu glasali za usvajanje višestranačkog sistema uprave, a parlament je doneo amandmane na izborne zakone uključivši učešće opozicione stranke na izborima i u vlasti.

Egipatska vlada je donela amandmane na ustav da bi u septembru mogli da se održe prvi višestranački predsednički izbori u zemlji. Deset političkih stranaka dalo je kandidate, a period kampanje obeležen je žestokom javnom raspravom i većom političkom svešću i angažmanom. Međutim, izlaznost na izbore je bila mala, a bilo je verodostojnih izveštaja o rasprostranjenoj krađi glasova. Drugom po broju glasova na predsedničkim izborima, Ajmanu Nuru ukinut je skupštinski imunitet u januaru, a u decembru je osuđen zbog optužbi za prevaru na pet godina zatvora posle šestomesečnog suđenja koje nije održano u skladu sa osnovnim međunarodnim standardima. Kandidati iz redova zakonom zabranjenog Muslimanskog bratstva dobili su značajan broj glasova na novembarskim i decembarskim parlamentarnim izborima. Ovi izbori su bili obeleženi preteranom upotrebom sile koju su primenile bezbednosne snage, malom izlaznošću i nepravilnostima u glasanju. Vlada je odbila da primi međunarodne posmatrače i na predsedničkim i na parlamentarnim izborima. Nacionalni savet za ljudska prava, koji je osnovala egipatska skupština, objavio je prvi godišnji izveštaj koji otvoreno opisuje zloupotrebe vlade.

Tokom etiopskih parlamentarnih izbora u maju, međunarodni posmatrači su uočili brojne nepravilnosti i zastrašivanje glasača. Snage bezbednosti su ubile mnoge demonstrante koji su protestovali protiv izbora. Vlasti su pritvarale, tukle i ubijale članove opozicije, radnike nevladinih organizacija, etničke manjine i novinare.

Azerbejdžanski parlamentarni izbori u novembru nisu bili u skladu sa mnogim međunarodnim standardima. Postojali su brojni verodostojni izveštaji o mešanju lokalnih zvaničnika u kampanje i zloupotrebi državnih sredstava, ograničenoj slobodi okupljanja, nesrazmernoj upotrebi sile koju je policija primenjivala da rastera skupove, i prevarama i nepravilnostima u brojanju glasova i spiskovima. Dosada u dodatnim aktivnostima preduzetim tokom postizbornog žalbenog procesa nisu u potpunosti obrađene manjkavosti izbornog procesa.

Kazahstan je ostvario napredak u predizbornom periodu za decembarske predsedničke izbore, ali generalno nije primenio međunarodne standarde za slobodne i pravične izbore. OEBS-ova Kancelarija za demokratske institucije i ljudska prava primetila je ozbiljna ograničenja političkog govora koji zabranjuje određenu vrstu kritike na račun predsednika, nejednak pristup medijima za opoziciju i nezavisne kandidate i nasilna ometanja događaja koje je opozicija organizovala u okviru kampanje. Zakoni usvojeni tokom 2005. a posebno zakon o ekstremizmu, amandmani o nacionalnoj bezbednosti kao i amandmani na izborni zakon narušili su pravnu zaštitu ljudskih prava i proširili moć izvršne vlasti na regulisanje i kontrolu građanskog društva i medija. Ali, Ustavni sud je restriktivni zakon o nevladinim organizacijama ocenio kao neustavan.

Nepovoljno stanje ljudskih prava u Uzbekistanu, ionako već loše, tokom 2005. pogoršano je. Nasilna pobuna u gradu Andidžanu u maju dovela je do nesrazmerne upotrebe sile koju su vlasti primenile i talasa represivnih mera vlade koje su dominirale do kraja godine. Pobuna je počela nakon niza dnevnih mirnih protesta u znak podrške poslovnim ljudima kojima je suđeno od februara od maja zbog islamskog ekstremizma. U noći između 12. i 13. maja, nepoznata lica su iz policijske kasarne uzela oružje, uletela u gradski zatvor gde su bili optuženi, ubila nekoliko stražara i oslobodila nekoliko stotina zatvorenika među kojima i optužene. Potom su zauzeli zgradu regionalne administracije i uzeli taoce. Prema svedočenju očevidaca, 13. maja su vladine snage neselektivno pucale na masu ljudi uključujući i nenaoružane građane što je za posledicu imalo stotine mrtvih. Kao posledica svega ovoga, vlada je uznemiravala, tukla i zatvorila desetine aktivista koji se bave ljudskim pravima, novinara i drugih koji su govorili o događajima, i osudila brojne ljude na zatvorske kazne na suđenjima koja nisu održana u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima. Vlada je prisilila brojne domaće i međunarodne nevladine organizacije na zatvaranje i strogo ograničila one koji su nastavili sa radom.

U Rusiji su nastavljeni napori da se vlast koncentriše u Kremlju i demokratijom upravlja s vrha. Sa ovakvim ciljevima, Kremlj je ukinuo neposredne izbore guvernera u korist predsedničke nominacije i usvajanja zakona. U trenutnim ruskim okolnostima, gde se u najmanju ruku sve ne slaže, ovaj sistem ograničava odgovornost vlade prema biračima a dalje koncentriše vlast u njenom izvršnom delu. Amandmani na izborni zakon kao i na zakon o političkim strankama, predloženi kao da se namerava dugoročno osnaživanje nacionalnih političkih stranaka, moglo bi zapravo smanjiti sposobnost opozicionih stranaka u nadmetanju na izborima. Ovakav trend, skupa sa stalnim ograničavanjem medija, korupcija i selektivna primena zakona, politički pritisak na sudstvo i uznemiravanje nekih nevladinih organizacija za posledicu su imali smanjenje odgovornosti vođa vlasti prema narodu.

Stanje ljudskih prava u Pakistanu i dalje je loše uprkos deklarativnom zalaganju predsednika Mušarafa za demokratsku tranziciju i "prosvećenu umerenost". I dalje su ograničene slobode kretanja, izražavanja, udruživanja i vera. Napredak u demokratizaciji je neznatan. Tokom izbora za lokalnu vlast 2005. godine, domaći i međunarodni posmatrači su ustanovili ozbiljne greške, uključujući ometanje koje su vršile političke stranke što je uticalo na ishod glasanja u nekim delovima zemlje. Policija je pritvorila oko 10.000 aktivista Pakistanske narodne stranke u aprilu pre dolaska na skup supruga Benazir Buto, Asifa Ali Zardarija. Snage bezbednosti su počinile vansudska ubistva, nasilje u sudskim postupcima, proizvoljna hapšenja i torturu. Korupcija je prožimala sve slojeve vlade i policijskih snaga, a vlada je učinila neznatne napore u borbi protiv ovog problema. Zvaničnici bezbednosnih snaga koji su kršili ljudska prava, uglavnom uživaju de facto legalni imunitet.

Uprkos surovoj realnosti i velikim preprekama, u svetu postoje sve veći zahtevi za veće lične i političke slobode i širenje demokratskih principa. Na primer, u širem području Bliskog Istoka i Severne Afrike (region BMENA), poslednjih godina se primećuju začeci političkog pluralizma, dosad neviđeni izbori, nova zaštita žena i manjina, i poziv lokalnog stanovništva na mirnu, demokratsku promenu.

Novembra 2005. na Forumu za budućnost održanom u Manami, u Bahreinu, četrdeset lidera, predstavnika organizacija za građansko društvo iz šesnaest zemalja regiona BMENA, učestvovali su zajedno sa ministrima za spoljne poslove iz svojih zemalja. Lideri organizacija za građansko društvo dali su nacrt skupa prioriteta s posebnim akcentom na vladavinu prava, transparentnost, ljudska prava i osnaživanje uloge žena. Među članovima delegacija za građansko društvo bili su predstavnici Demokratske pomoći za dijalog, koji su izneli zaključke razgovora i rasprava održanih tokom godine između lidera organizacija za građansko društvo i njihovih kolega u vladi o ključnim temama za izbornu refermu i razvoj legitimnih političkih stranaka. Sve veća mreža Demokratske pomoći za dijalog uključuje stotine lidera organizacija za građansko društvo iz regiona BMENA. Da bi se snažnije podržali rastući reformski napori u regionu, na Forumu su takođe osnovani Fondacija za budućnost za pružanje neposredne podrške građanskom društvu i Fond za budućnost za podršku ulaganju u region. Nivo i stepen učešća organizacija za građansko društvo na Forumu za budućnost bio je istorijski i pozitivan i predstavlja važan presedan za iskreni dijalog i partnerstvo između građanskog društva i vlasti o pitanjima političke reforme.

Forum za budućnost je samo jedan od mnogih mehanizama kroz koje Sjedinjene Države, još jedna grupa od osam zemalja i regionalne vlasti podržavaju želju domaćeg stanovništva za reforme šire oblasti Bliskog Istoka i Severne Afrike.

U svetu sve veći zahtev za ljudska prava i demokratiju prikazan u ovim izveštajima nije rezultat bezličnog rada nekakve rasprave ili orkestracija stranih vlada. To je, zapravo, poziv koji potiče iz snažne ljudske želje da se živi dostojanstveno i slobodno i iz lične hrabrosti i istrajnosti muškaraca i žena svih uzrasta u svim društvima koji rade i žrtvuju se za slobodu.

Srbija i Crna Gora je državna zajednica koja se sastoji od relativno veće Republike Srbije i mnogo manje Republike Crne Gore.* Državna Zajednica je po uređenju parlamentarna demokratija. Dužnosti vlade Državne Zajednice ograničene su na spoljne poslove, nacionalnu bezbednost, ljudska i manjinska prava, i unutrašnje i spoljne ekonomske i trgovinske odnose. Zemlja ima 10.8 miliona stanovnika.** Na čelu države je predsednik Svetozar Marović, koga je 2003. godine izabrala skupština.

Republika Srbija je po uređenju parlamentarna demokratija sa otprilike 10.2 miliona stanovnika. Premijer Vojislav Koštunica predvodi srpsku višestranačku vladu počev od marta 2004. godine. Juna 2004. godine, Boris Tadić je izabran za predsednika na izborima za koje su posmatrači ocenili da su uglavnom u skladu sa međunarodnom standardima. Dok je civilna vlast održavala efikasnu kontrolu bezbednosnih snaga, bilo je nekoliko slučajeva kada su elementi snaga bezbednosti delovali nezavisno od upravne vlasti.

Vlasti su generalno poštovale ljudska prava građana i nastavile napore na utvrđivanju slučajeva kršenja ljudskih prava; međutim, brojni problemi iz prethodnih godina i dalje su postojali. Problemi prijavljeni u pogledu ljudskih prava su sledeći:

Povećani napori vlasti na utvrđivanju kršenja ljudskih prava za posledicu su imali primetno poboljšanje. Vlasti su u značajnoj meri sarađivale sa Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom na isporučivanju lica optuženih za ratne zločine, potencijalnih svedoka i dokumenata; pokazale da mogu efikasno voditi postupke u važnim krivičnim predmetima pred domaćim specijalnim sudovima; posvetile veću pažnju slučajevima kršenja ljudskih prava manjina; i ostvarile program za zaštitu svedoka u cilju pomoći borbi protiv trgovine ljudima.

Vlasti i njihovi predstavnici nisu počinili nijedno politički motivisano ubistvo; međutim, snage bezbednosti su ubile dve osobe.

Dana 7. januara, pripadnici oružanih snaga su pucali i ubili šesnaestogodišnjeg etničkog Albanca dok je pokušavao da ilegalno pređe državnu granicu sa Makedonijom. Istraga Ministarstva odbrane utvrdila je da je vojska reagovala u skladu sa zakonom.

Dana 21. oktobra, jedan muškarac je preminuo nakon što ga je policajac pretukao u Kikindi. Dva dana kasnije, vlasti su podnele tužbu protiv policajca Saše Mijina pred Okružnim sudom u Zrenjaninu i suspendovale ukupno osam policajaca u vezi sa ovim slučajem. Mijin je bio u pritvoru i čekao na suđenje krajem godine na koju se ovaj izveštaj odnosi. Još jednoj pripadnici policije, Tatjani Radišić smanjena je plata i čin.

Dugo odgađana suđenja za politička ubistva iz prethodnih godina nastavljena su tokom ove godine, a u nekima je postignut vidan napredak.

Na kraju godine na koju se ovaj izveštaj odnosi, u Specijalnom sudu za organizovani kriminal u Beogradu nastavljen je sudski proces protiv trideset šest osoba osumnjičenih za atentat koji je 2003. godine izvršen na predsednika vlade Zorana Đinđića. Komandant bivše tajne policijske jedinice za specijalne operacije (JSO) Milorad Ulemek optužen je za organizaciju atentata, bivši zamenik komandanta JSO Zvezdan Jovanović-Zveki optužen je za ubistvo, a još dvanaest lica je optuženo za organizaciju i učestvovanje u ubistvu. Nekoliko drugih osoba optuženo je za lakša krivična dela u vezi sa atentatom.

Dana 18. jula, Specijalni sud za organizovani kriminal u Beogradu okončao je sudski postupak protiv Ulemeka i ostalih za ubistvo bivšeg predsednika Srbije Ivana Stambolića izvršeno 2000. godine. Sud je osudio Milorada Ulemeka i još tri lica pod njegovom komandom na četrdeset godina zatvora, dva lica na petnaest godina, a jednu osobu na četiri godine zatvora. U presudi se kao glavni podstrekač ovog političkog atentata navodi bivši predsednik Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i Srbije Slobodan Milošević, kome se sudi pred Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju.

Dana 29. juna, Okružni sud u Beogradu je završio obnovljeni sudski proces protiv Milorada Ulemeka i pet drugih pripadnika JSO za pokušaj ubistva vođe Srpskog pokreta obnove Vuka Draškovića 1999. godine. Sud ih je osudio na kaznu zatvorom u trajanju od šest do petnaest godina i takođe izrekao zatvorske kazne bivšem šefu obaveštajne službe i bivšem načelniku uprave carina za njihovo učešće.

Vlasti još nisu završile istragu o nestanku i potonjem ubistvu braće Jilija, Mehmeta i Agrona Bitićija, američkih državaljana koji su ubijeni u Srbiji 1999. godine. Tela ove trojice otkrivena su 2001. godine u masovnoj grobnici u Petrovom Selu, nedaleko od srpskog policijskog objekta. Tela su pronađena sa zavezanim rukama dok su na glavama nađene rane od vatrenog oružja. Krajem godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi, optužnice za ova ubistva nisu podignute.

Domaći sudovi i Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju nastavili su sudske procese u predmetima proisteklim iz zločina počinjenih u sukobima u periodu 1991-1999. na području Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Kosova (vidi odeljak 1.e i 4).

Nekoliko vojnih obveznika preminulo je tokom ove godine dok su bili na straži u udaljenim oblastima, a njihove porodice su dovele u pitanje tvrdnje Vojske da se radi o samoubistvima. Tokom godine, službena istražna komisija odbacila je nalaz Vojske da su dva vojnika, koja su preminula oktobra 2004. godine na straži u Topčideru, žrtve ubistva i samoubistva bez umešanosti treće strane. Vlasti su predmet uputile na rešavanje sudovima; međutim, nijedan sudski postupak nije pokrenut do kraja godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi.

Meseca jula, stručnjak za uklanjanje mina poginuo je u Nišu tokom operacije uklanjanja neaktivirane eksplozivne naprave.

Tokom godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi, vlasti nisu uspele da sprovedu istragu o navodima grupa za ljudska prava po kojima su, početkom godine a zatim i u julu, pojedini pripadnici Bezbednosno-informativne agencije pretili svedocima navodne umešanosti vlasti u spaljivanje tela kosovskih Albanaca u postrojenju Mačkatica tokom 1999. Takođe, vlasti nisu sprovele istragu o masovnim grobnicama na posedima srpskog Ministarstva unutrašnih poslova, koje su otkrivene 2001.

Vlasti Državne Zajednice i Srbije nastavile su da sarađuju sa susednim zemljama, Međunarodnom komisijom za nestala lica i drugim međunarodnim organizacijama na identifikaciji nestalih lica i istragama o grobnicama otkrivenim u Srbiji. Međutim, napredovalo se sporo, a povremeno vlasti nisu želele da se informacije stave na uvid javnosti. Tokom godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi, vlasti su identifikovale 560 tela ekshumiranih iz masovnih grobnica iz perioda kosovskog sukoba i vratile ih na Kosovo. Vlasti nisu završile identifikaciju i povratak svih posmrtnih ostataka izvađenih do kraja godine. Ostalo je nerešeno 2.494 predmeta u vezi sa nestalim osobama.

c. Mučenje i drugi surovi, nehumani i ponižavajući oblici ponašanja ili kažnjavanja

Zakon zabranjuje takvu praksu; međutim, policija povremeno batina pritvorenike i maltretira lica obično za vreme hapšenja ili prilikom privođenja za lakša krivična dela.

Centar za humanitarno pravo (HLC) sa sedištem u Beogradu izvestio je da su 16. februara sedamnaestogodišnjoj devojci naneti udarci u predelu stomaka u policijskoj stanici u centru Beograda gde je nekoliko časova bila lisicama vezana za radijator nakon što je privedena pod sumnjom da je izvršila krađu. Do kraja godine, vlasti nisu preduzele ništa u vezi sa izveštajem.

Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava u Srbiji (HCS) prijavio je da je 30. juna saobraćajna policija naterala članove jedne porodice da legnu na pod njihove kuće u selu u blizini Niša gde su ih tukli i pretili im da će ih ubiti. Policija je porodicu uhapsila i odvela u policijsku stanicu, a da ih niko nije upoznao sa njihovim pravima niti razlogom za hapšenje hapšenja, gde je nastavljeno sa pretnjama i maltretiranjem članova porodice. Vlasti nisu preduzele ništa u vezi sa ovim slučajem do kraja godine, dok su članovi porodice prijavili da ih policija i dalje maltretira.

HLC je prijavio da je 5. jula policija bez dozvole ušla u stan jednog Beograđanina gde je pretukla i njega i njegovog prijatelja. Policajci su navodno razvalili vrata, pesničili i šutirali dvojicu muškaraca, a zatim ih odveli u policijsku stanicu ne obavestivši ih za šta ih terete. Vlast ništa nije preduzela u vezi sa ovom prijavom do kraja godine.

Dana 31. jula, advokat iz Komisije za ljudska prava u Leskovcu prijavio je da ga je u Leskovcu pretukao policajac Goran Veličković. Advokat je zastupao klijenta koga je Veličković teško pretukao 2003. godine. Krajem godine, istraga o ovom slučaju bila je u toku.

Advokatska komisija za ljudska prava (YUCOM) prijavila je da su 28. septembra novosadski policajci pretukli jednog čoveka u vozu koji je saobraćao između Beograda i Novog Sada jer su ga greškom zamenili za izgrednika – fudbalskog navijača. YUCOM-u je tokom godine takođe prijavljivano da policija koristi prekomernu silu na fudbalskim utakmicama i drugim sportskim događajim u Beogradu. Žrtve u ovim slučajevima opredelile su se da ne podnose tužbe protiv policajaca.

Tokom godine, dve sudske odluke odnosile su se na ranije slučajeve nepravilnog rada policajaca. U februaru je Opštinski sud u Vrbasu naložio srpskoj Vladi da plati oko 3.700 dolara (260.000 dinara) Draganu Šijačkom na ime policijskog zlostavljanja koje je pretpeo 2000. godine. U martu je Prvi opštinski sud u Beogradu naredio srpskoj Vladi da plati oko 14.000 dolara (milion dinara) roditeljima pokojnog Milana Ristića nakon što je istraga pokazala da je ponašanje policije verovatno prouzrokovalo njegovu smrt. Sud je smatrao da vlasti nisu efikasno i sveobuhvatno istražile uzrok smrti i da se naprečac zaključilo da se radi o samoubistvu.

Nema informacija da li su tokom godine preduzete ikakve dalje radnje u sledećim slučajevima navodnih nepravilnosti u radu pripadnika policije: nerešena tužba iz 2004. protiv policajaca Zorana Gogića i Dragana Bojanića za batinanje jednog čoveka u Zrenjaninu dok su bili na dužnosti januara 2004. godine, i nerešena tužba iz 2004. protiv tri policajca za batinanje jednog pritvorenika 2003. godine. Sudija je odbacio privatnu tužbu koju je podlneo HLC, za koju je 2004. izvešteno da je na rešavanju kod istražnog sudije, a koja je podneta protiv pripadnika policijske stanice u Čačku koji su 2003. godine navodno tukli jednog muškarca i pretili mu da bi ga prisilili da prizna krađu.

Uslovi u zatvorima generalno odgovaraju međunarodnim standardima; međutim, uslovi se bitno razlikuju od ustanove do ustanove, a neki čuvari takođe zlostavljaju zatvorenike.

U nekim zatvorima, među kojima je najistaknutija zatvorska bolnica u Beogradu u kojoj su smešteni osuđenici sa psihijatrijskim oboljenjima, zatvorenici su se žalili na prljavštinu i nehumane uslove. Hrana je različitog kvaliteta - od slabog do jedva prihvatljivog, a zdravstvena nega je često neodgovarajuća. Čuvari nisu adekvatno obučeni za pravilno postupanje sa zatvorenicima. Maloletnici bi trebalo da budu smešteni odvojeno od odraslih; to, međutim, nije uvek slučaj u praksi.

Država je dozvolila Međunarodnom komitetu Crvenog krsta i lokalnim nezavisnim posmatračima za ljudska prava, uključujući HCS, da posete zatvore i razgovaraju sa zatvorenicima bez prisustva stražara.

Zakon zabranjuje proizvoljno hapšenje i pritvor i vlasti načelno poštuju ove zabrane sa izuzetkom nekih poznatih slučajeva.

Oko četrdeset tri hiljade policajaca u Srbiji deo su Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova. Policija je podeljena u trideset tri regionalna sekretarijata kojima upravlja republička vlada. Oružane snage su pod kontrolom vlade Državne Zajednice i odgovorne su za nacionalnu bezbednost. Tokom godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi, odgovornost za bezbednost granica formalno je prebačena na Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova; međutim, u praksi odgovornost za granične položaje nije prebačena sa Ministarstva odbrane na Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, i pripadnici Vojske i dalje obavljaju ove dužnosti.

Efikasnost policije bila je neujednačena i generalno ograničena. Iako su policajci uglavnom Srbi, pripadnici policije su i Bošnjaci (bosanski Muslimani), etnički Mađari, mali broj etničkih Albanaca i drugih etničkih manjina. Multietničke policijske snage na jugu Srbije sastavljene su prvestveno od etničkih Albanaca i Srba.

Korupcija i nekažnjivost policijskih snaga predstavljali su probleme, a u pogledu nadzora i kontrole policijskih postupaka postojala su samo ograničena institucionalna sredstva. Kancelarija generalnog inspektora nije imala samostalnost da istražuje i koriguje slučajeve zloupotrebe. Iako je od svog nastanka Kancelarija preporučila brojne disciplinske postupke protiv radnika Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova, nije imala načina da prati odvijanje tih postupaka, a neki sekretarijati su u potpunosti ignorisali ovakve preporuke.

Tokom godine, Kancelarija generalnog inspektora pri Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova preporučila je disciplinske mere protiv radnika Ministarstva što je dovelo do 856 slučajeva koji su za rezultat imali novčane kazne, premeštaje i otpuštanja. Kancelarija je podnela 29 krivičnih tužbi protiv 48 radnika sa optužbama za falsifikovanje, zloupotrebu javnih fondova, korupciju, primanje mita, napade i nenadležnost.

Centar za javnu bezbednost takođe je preduzeo disciplinske mere protiv zaposlenih u Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova, između ostalog, podvrgnuli su jednog službenika predkrivičnoj istrazi, otpustili sedmoro, otvorili prekršajnu istragu u slučaju jednog zaposlenog, izvršili premeštaj dvadeset tri službenika, a u slučaju devet radnika smanjene su plate. U šezdeset tri predmeta, Centar je podneo izveštaj načelnicima odeljenja, koji su otpustili 33 službenika, 45 premestili na niži položaj dok su dva premeštena na dužnosti istog nivoa, a plate smanjene 141 licu.

Tokom godine, vlasti i Organizacija za bezbednost i saradnju u Evropi (OEBS) obučavali su policiju između ostalog i u oblasti odnosa u zajednici. Jedna strana vlada je takođe sponzorisala pograme policijske obuke na polju zaštite svedoka i korupcije.

Hapšenja se generalno obavljaju na osnovu naloga mada je policija ovlašćena da izvrši hapšenje bez naloga pod određenim okolnostima, uključujući i postojanje osnovane sumnje da je lice počinilo teško krivično delo. Zakon nalaže da istražni sudija odobri svaki pritvor duži od 48 časova i u praksi se ovaj uslov poštuje. Kaucija je dozvoljena ali se retko koristi; pritvorenici kojima preti tužba za delo za koje je zaprećena kazna zatvora do pet godina često su bili puštani na slobodu uz lično novčano jemstvo.

Zakon predviđa da policija mora odmah upoznati uhapšenike sa njihovim pravima. Iako policija ovo i sprovodi u praksi, prijavljene su izvesne zloupotrebe (vidi odeljak 1.c).

Po zakonu, pritvorenici imaju pravo na advokata, čije troškove, ukoliko je potrebno, snosi država, i ovo pravo se u praksi generalno poštuje. Za razliku od prethodne godine, nema informacija da je policija vršila pritisak na advokate u cilju ograničavanja kontakta sa pritvorenicima. Članovima porodice je uobičajeno bilo dozvoljeno da posećuju pritvorenike. Pritvor osumnjičenih može trajati do šest meseci, a da optužnica ne bude podignuta.

Zakonom je zabranjena upotreba sile, pretnji, obmane i prisile, kao i upotreba dokaza na sudu koji su dobijeni takvim sredstvima; međutim, ponekad policija upotrebljava ovakva sredstva da bi dobila iskaze.

Vlasti su koristile proizvoljno hapšenje i selektivnu primenu zakona u političke svrhe, naročito da bi se podrio kredibilitet i ugled osoba koje imaju kritički odnos prema vladi.

Dana 22. marta, vlasti su uhapsile tadašnjeg šefa beogradske policije Milana Obradovića pod optužbom da je dozvolio batinanje osobe osumnjičene za ubistvo. Mediji su uspeli da saznaju detalje optužbe i posmatrači su smatrali da je ovo hapšenje bilo politički motivisano. Vlasti su Obradovića oslobodile posle šezdeset dana pritvora i odustale od krivične istrage; međutim, krajem godine istraga je i dalje bila otvorena, a Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova je preduzelo disciplinske mere protiv Obradovića i prvo ga suspendovalo na četiri meseca, plata mu je smanjena za 20% i premešten je na nižu poziciju u unutrašnjosti, da bi mu zatim dodatno smanjili platu, a njegov položaj označili kao neraspoređen.

Dana 28. septembra, vlasti su uhapsile bivšeg ministra pravde Vladana Batića pod optužbom koja se odnosi na puštanje člana takozvane Jotkine grupe iz zatvora 2003. godine. Batić je rekao da je postupao po odluci Ustavnog suda po kojoj je zadržavanje ovih zatvorenika bilo neustavno. Organizacije za ljudska prava su kritikovale hapšenje kao politički motivisano i proisteklo iz Batićeve redovne i javne kritike vlasti. Optužnica nije podignuta, a Batić je pušten u roku od 48 sati.

Ubrzo nakon hapšenja Batića, policija je uhapsila Dragana Vulića, bivšeg pomoćnika ministra zaduženog za kaznene ustanove, takođe u vezi sa oslobađanjem člana Jotkine grupe. Organizacije za ljudska prava su ponovo osudile ovo hapšenje i pritvor kao selektivnu primenu zakona sa ciljem kažnjavanja saradnika bivšeg predsednika vlade Đinđića. Vulić je bio pušten nakon trideset dana pritvora.

U većini slučajeva, pritvor pred suđenje od trenutka podizanja optužnice do završetka suđenja zakonom je ograničen na dve godine, ali predviđa pritvor do četiri godine za krivična dela za koja je zaprećena maksimalna kazna (četrdeset godina zatvora). Zakonom je utvrđeno da je period od dve godine najduži pritvor dozvoljen nakon što apelacioni sud poništi odluku suda koji je doneo presudu. I pored toga, bilo je slučajeva produženog pritvora pred suđenje. Zakon vlastima zabranjuje prekomerna odgađanja kod podnošenja formalnih tužbi protiv osumnjičenih kao i kod otvorenih istraga; međutim, takva odlaganja su se redovno dešavala. Usled nedelotvornosti sudova, bilo je potrebno preterano mnogo vremena da predmeti uđu u sudsku proceduru, a i kad bi suđenje počelo, trajalo bi predugo (vidi odeljak 1.e).

Do podnošenja krivične prijave, osumnjičeni za teška krivična dela provodili su u pritvoru punih šest meseci.

Zakon predviđa nezavisno sudstvo; međutim, sudstvo je i dalje podložno korupciji i političkom uticaju.

Korupcija sudstva još uvek predstavlja problem. Bilo je izveštaja da su vladini službenici pokušali da oslabe politički osetljive tužbe, između ostalog i tako što je vršen pritisak na tužioce. Dana 16. septembra, vlasti su uhapsile sudiju Vrhovnog suda Slavoljuba Vučkoviča i optužile ga za primanje mita u predmetu Jotkine organizovane kriminalne grupe.

Dana 14. oktobra, nastavljeno je suđenje bivšem zameniku javnog tužioca Milanu Sarajliću, koji je optužen 2004. godine za primanje novca od zemunskog organizovanog kriminalnog klana; suđenje je odloženo 2004. zbog Sarajlićevog lošeg zdravstvenog stanja.

Privatni sektor je i dalje smatrao da je korupcija u trgovinskim sudovima široko rasprostranjena. Pored toga, procesi prenosa zemljišta su često bili izuzetno teški, što su mnogi u privatnom sektoru objašnjavali kao posledicu korupcije administracije.

Sudovi su bili izuzetno nedelotvorni i rešavanje predmeta može trajati godinama.

Sud Državne Zajednice odgovoran je za koordinaciju pravosuđa Državne Zajednice i rešava pravosudne sporove između srpskih i crnogorskih institucija, donosi odluke u predmetima navodnog kršenja prava garantovanih Ustavnom poveljom Državne Zajednice, i rešava sporove koje zajednička kancelarija za carine Državne Zajednice ne može da reši. Sud je ustanovljen 2004. godine, ali do kraja godine se nijedan predmet nije našao pred ovim sudom.

Srpski sudski sitem se sastoji od opštinski sudova, okružnih sudova, Vrhovnog suda i Ustavnog suda. Pored toga, zakon predviđa specijalne sudove za ratne zločine i organizovani kriminal, koji su tokom godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi radili u okviru Okružnog suda u Beogradu. Ustavni sud donosi odluke o ustavnosti zakona i zakonske regulative. Iako su zakonom predviđeni administrativni apelacioni sud i drugostepeni apelacioni sud u cilju smanjenja obima posla Vrhovnog suda, Narodna skuština je odložila osnivanje ovih sudova do 2007. godine.

Država je 1. januara rasformirala vojne sudove. Specijalni ogranak pri svakom okružnom sudu preuzeo je nadležnost u vojnim predmetima.

Suđenja su generalno javna, ali su zatvorena za vreme svedočenja svedoka optužbe. Porota ne postoji. Zakon predviđa da su optuženi nevini dok se ne dokaže suprotno i da imaju pravo da ih advokat zastupa na državni trošak ukoliko je potrebno, kao i da prisustvuju suđenju. I tužba i odbrana imaju pravo žalbe na presudu. Optuženi imaju pravo pristupa dokaznom materijalu u posedu države kao i da ispituju svedoke. Ova prava su generalno poštovana u praksi.

Specijalni sud za ratne zločine nastavio je sa suđenjima za ratne zločine, od kojih su neka završena dugo očekivanim optužnicama i presudama. Dana 17. juna, Sud je okončao obnovljeni sudski proces protiv Aleksandra Cvjetana za ubistvo devetnaest etničkih Albanaca na Kosovu 1999. godine. U martu 2004. godine, Sud je Cvjetana osudio na 20 godina zatvora, ali je nakon toga Vrhovni sud naložio da se suđenje obnovi. Sud za ratne zločine je potvrdio prvobitnu presudu na dvadeset godina zatvora; međutim, na ovu odluku je uložena žalba Vrhovnom sudu koja do kraja godine nije rešena.

Okružni sud u Beogradu je takođe vodio sudski postupak protiv Dejana Demirovića in absentia za ubistva u Podujevu i postigao da bude izručen iz Kanade; Demirović se krajem godine nalazio u pritvoru.

Dana 15. jula. Specijalni sud za ratne zločine završio je obnovljeno suđenje, po odluci Vrhovnog suda iz 2004. godine, u predmetu ratnog zločina u Sjeverinu koji obuhvata mučenje i ubistvo šesnaest Muslimana 1992. Sud je potvrdio prvobitnu presudu i osudio Dragutina Dragičevića, Olivera Krsmanovića i haškog optuženika Milana Lukića na dvadeset godina zatvora, dok je Đorđe Šević osuđen na petnaest godina zatvora. Do kraja godine sudska odluka nije postala izvršna zbog žalbe koja je uložena pred Vrhovnim sudom. U avgustu su vlasti u Argentini uhapsile Lukića, a do kraja godine još ga nisu izručili Međunarodnom krivičnom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju.

Specijalni sud za ratne zločine je tokom godine započeo nekoliko suđenja. Dana 12. oktobra, počeo je sudski postupak protiv Antona Lekaja, optuženog za ubistvo i mučenje romskih svatova na Kosovu 1999. Dana 12. decembra, Sud je doneo prvu presudu u slučaju Ovčara (takođe poznatom pod nazivom «Vukovarski masakr»), osudivši 14 Srba za ubistvo, mučenje i nehumano postupanje prema 200 hrvatskih ratnih zarobljenika 1991. Na presude se može uložiti žalba Vrhovnom sudu.

Specijalni sud za ratne zločine je obavio pripreme za još dva suđenja. U avgustu je sud podigao optužnice protiv sedam lica u predmetu «Zvornik» koji se odnosi na proterivanje i ubistva bosanskih Muslimana 1992. godine. U oktobru je Sud podigao optužnice protiv šest osoba u predmetu «Škropioni» za ubistvo bosanskih Muslimana civila iz Srebrenice iz 1995. godine.

Tokom godine, državna komisija je započela pripreme za popis imovine oduzete počev od 1945. godine, ali nije ostvarila nikakav napredak na donošenju zakona o povraćaju imovine niti vraćanju imovine.

Zakon zabranjuje ovakvo delovanje; međutim, država je ometala privatnost i korespondenciju. Iako zakon propisuje da Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova mora nabaviti sudski nalog pre početka praćenja potencijalne kriminalne aktivnosti kao i da policija mora pribaviti nalog pre ulaska u posed izuzev u slučajevima spasavanja ljudi i imovine, policija povremeno nije poštovala ove odredbe u praksi.

Većina posmatrača je smatrala da vlasti selektivno nadziru komunikacije, prisluškuju razgovore, čitaju običnu i elektronsku poštu, i ozvučavaju telefone. Čelnici organizacija za ljudska prava često su prijavljivali da se njihova komunikacija nadzire.

Dana 20. oktobra, srpska pošta je konfiskovala promotivni materijal (kao što su prospekti, upaljači, olovke) Pokreta za nezavisnu Crnu Goru dok je grupa boravila u Beogradu na konferenciji za štampu. Objašnjenje koje su vlasti ponudile jeste da je u materijalu bio «politički neprihvatljiv sadržaj», ali je grupa tvrdila da je poštanska ustanova pregledala poštu bez sudskog naloga i protivzakonito konfiskovala materijal.

Zakon predviđa slobodu govora i štampe; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da su vlasti ometale ove slobode te o represivnim merama protiv osoba koje su kritikovale vladu.

Uopšte uzev, nezavisne medijske organizacije su bile aktivne i izražavale raznovrsne stavove; međutim, neke medijske organizacije doživele su pretnje i represije zbog objavljivanja stavova u kojima se kritikuje vlada, a mnogim novinarima nedostaje profesionalnost u pogledu navođenja izvora i tačnosti podataka.

Država je objavljivala dnevni list «Borbu» i u posedu je jedne od najznačajnijih štamparija u zemlji koja se takođe zove «Borba». Najstariji nacionalni dnevni list «Politika» je u suvlasništvu države i jedne nemačke kompanije ali ga vodi nekoliko deoničarskih kompanija.

Državna Radio-televizija Srbija (RTS) imala je najveću zastupljenost sa tri televizijska kanala i radio programom. Država je imala znatan uticaj, mada ne i formalnu kontrolu, nad drugim velikim televizijskim stanicama, uključujući TV Politiku i TV Novi Sad, kao i tri programa Radio Beograda. Osim toga, mnoge televizijske stanice se u pogledu vesti oslanjaju na državnu novinsku agenciju TANJUG. Iako su izveštaji RTS-a uopšte uzev bili objektivni, povremeno se čini da postoji pristrasan odnos prema vladi.

Avgusta meseca, Skupština je donela amandman na zakon o radiju i televiziji da bi se odložila privatizacija lokalnih radio i televizijskih kuća do kraja 2008. i obezbedio šestogodišnji mandat članovima radio i televizijskog saveta koje je naimenovala vlada, dok će angažman lica koje su naimenovale nevladine i profesionalne organizacije trajati četiri godine.

Medijske organizacije, posebno Radio stanica B92, bile su žrtve vandalskog ponašanja, pretnji bombama i zastrašivanja zbog prenošenja stavova nepopularnih kod vlasti.

Vođe lokalnih vlasti u Vranju su navodno uznemiravali novinare OK radija, a nekoliko novinara je dobilo pretnje smrću, nakon što je ovaj radio u septembru 2004. izvestio da je 2.500 glasačkih listića nezakonito štampano za tamošnje lokalne izbore. Izveštaj je potvrdio i Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju.

Kleveta je krivično delo. U septembru je srpska Skupština usvojila novi kazneni zakonik kojim se kazna zatvora zamenjuje novčanim kaznama u iznosu od 552 do 13.800 dolara (460 do 11.500 eura) na ime kazne za klevetu.

U martu je vranjanski odbor Socijalističke partije Srbije (SPS) optužio Gorana Vladkovića, glavnog i odgovornog urednika OK radija, za širenje lažnih informacija i klevetu u vezi sa prilogom koji je ovaj radio objavio u septembru 2004. o nelegalno štampanim glasačkim listićima za opštinske izbore. SPS je tražio preko 343.000 dolara (24 miliona dinara) kao nadoknadu za navodnu štetu. Krajem godine suđenje je bilo u toku, a OK radio je prijavio brojne pretnje i obijanja njihovih prostorija.

Novinari su povremeno primenjivali autocenzuru zbog mogućih tužbi za klevetu i u strahu od vređanja javnog mnjenja, posebno kad su u pitanju teme koje se tiču ratova u bivšoj Jugoslaviji.

Mada država nije ograničavala pristup internetu niti akademske slobode, bilo je izveštaja da država selektivno prati elektronsku poštu.

Zakon dozvoljava slobodu okupljanja i država to obično i poštuje u praksi; međutim, vlasti su povremeno sprečavale javne proteste.

Dana 30. marta, policija je sprečila protest oko trista članova Udruženja slobodnih i nezavisnih sindikata ispred zgrade srpske Skupštine.

Dana 10. jula, pripadnici organizacije «Žene u crnom» okupili su se u Beogradu da obeleže desetu godišnjicu ubistva u Srebrenici u Bosni i Hercegovini. Iako je vlast pružila obezbeđenje i nije ometala događaj, koji je organizovao otvoreni kritičar vlasti, neke grupe za ljudska prava su kritikovale policiju zbog neadekvatne reakcije na pretnje i gas suzavac koje su druge grupe upotrebile protiv učesnika događaja.

Zakon predviđa slobodu veroispovesti i država ovo pravo generalno poštuje u praksi; međutim, srpska država je vodila diskriminacionu politiku u pogledu poreza na imovinu.

Iako ne postoji državna religija, većinska Srpska pravoslavna crkva je uživala povlašćeni položaj. Na primer, Vojska je i dalje obezbeđivala samo srpsko pravoslavno bogosluženje iako je dozvolila da pripadnici drugih verskih zajednica prisustvuju verskim službama izvan vojnih pošta. Takođe je bilo žalbi da srpska vlada finansira izgradnju velike srpske pravoslavne crkve prikupljanjem novca od poštanskih usluga. Srpska vlada subvencioniše plate srpskog pravoslavnog sveštenstva na Kosovu.

Iako ne postoji formalna obaveza da se verske organizacije registruju, svaka grupa koja planira održavanje skupova mora se prijaviti u lokalnoj policiji. Verske organizacije se mogu registrovati kao građanske grupe u Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova da bi stekle pravni status neophodan za posedovanje nepokretnosti i obavljanje drugih transakcija.

Srpski poreski zakon oporezivanja oslobođa sedam verskih grupa (Srpska pravoslavna crkva, Islamska zajednica, Rimokatolička crkva, Slovačka evangelistička crkva, Jevrejska verska zajednica, Hrišćanska reformatska crkva i Evangelistička hrišćanska crkva), ali propisuje da se porez plaća na imovinu u posedu svake od 182 drugih verskih zajednica koje postoje u zemlji. Neke verske zajednice dobijale su tokom godine poreske opomene; očekivalo se da će porez najviše uticati na manje, nepriznate verske zajednice kao što je Adventistička crkva, koja u zemlji ima oko dvesta imanja.

Izvestan broj verskih zajednica prijavio je probleme u radu sa lokalnim vlastima.

Nepravoslavne verske organizacije su nastavile da prijavljuju teškoće u pribavljanju dozvola od lokalnih vlasti u Srbiji za izgradnju novih verskih objekata. Islamska zajednica u Beogradu i dalje ima poteškoće sa nabavkom zemljišta i dobijanjem državne dozvole za islamsko groblje u gradu.

Tokom godine, opštinski savet za prevenciju narkomanije i verskih sekta u gradu Leskovcu označio je adventiste, baptiste, pentekostalce, Evangelističku crkvu, Jehovine svedoke i «sataniste» kao sekte i propagirao protiv njih.

Lokalne vlasti su naredile rušenje rumunske pravoslavne crkve sagrađene na privatnom zemljištu u selu Malajnici. Vlasti su navodno reagovale jer lokalno sveštenstvo Srpske pravoslavne crkve nije odobrilo crkvu. Predmet se krajem godine našao pred Vrhovnim sudom Srbije. U maju je lokalni rumunski pravoslavni sveštenik koji je vodio versku procesiju bez dozvole policije optužen za podsticanje verske mržnje ali je oslobođen.

Srpski zakon obavezuje učenike osnovnih i srednjih škola ili da pohađaju nastavu jedne od sedam tradicionalnih verskih zajednica, ili da idu na časove građanskog vaspitanja. Poglavari verskih grupa isključenih iz ovog programa nastavili su da izražavaju svoje nezadovoljstvo zbog ograničene definicije veroispovesti prema tumačenju vlasti.

Crkva Isusa Hrista svetaca poslednjih dana (mormoni) prijavila je jedan slučaj gde su vlasti ograničile uvoz verskog materijala. Pripadnici crkve su pokušali da unesu verske materijale iz Bugarske, ali im granična policija nije dozvolila ulazak u zemlju dok iz vozila nisu uklonili materijale.

Tokom godine, nije primećen napredak na povraćaju ranije oduzete crkvene imovine. Vlada je obavestila da je završavanje registra oduzete crkvene imovine u završnoj fazi. Kao privremenu meru, nekim verskim zajednicama dozvoljena je besplatna upotreba objekata koji su im bili oduzeti. Napretka nije bilo ni u pogledu nacrta zakona o povraćaju crkvene imovine u Srbiji.

Vera i etnička pripadnost su tesno povezane; u mnogim slučajevima je bilo teško odrediti da li su motivi u slučajevima diskriminacije prevashodno verskog ili etničkog karaktera. Manjinske verske zajednice izveštavaju o kontinuiranim problemima vandalskog uništavanja crkvenih zgrada, groblja i drugih verskih objekata. Mnogi napadi uključuju sprejom ispisane grafite, kamenovanja, ili oštećenja nadgrobnih spomenika, a u nekoliko slučajeva radi se mnogo većim oštećenjima. Reakcija policije često nije bila odgovarajuća.

Pripadnici Crkve Isusa Hrista svetaca poslednjih dana (mormoni) u Beogradu prijavili su policiji nekoliko incidenata tokom godine u kojima su ih fizički napali mladi ljudi; u jednom od ovih incidenata, jedan vernik ove crkve je izgubio svest nakon što je pretučen u parku. Policija je saopštila vernicima da se ništa ne može učiniti pošto su počinioci maloletni.

Tokom godine, sudovi su postigli napredak u nekoliko sudskih procesa povezanih sa napadima na džamije u Beogradu i Nišu što je bila reakcija na nasilje nad srpskom zajednicom na Kosovu marta 2004.

U aprilu je na tri meseca zatvora osuđena jedna osoba uhapšena zbog paljenja beogradske džamije; sudski postupak protiv još deset lica optuženih za ovaj napad nije završen do kraja godine. Srpska vlada je popravila spoljni deo ali još ne i unutrašnjost džamije.

U julu je Opštinski sud u Nišu osudio osam osoba na kazne zatvora u trajanju od tri do pet meseci za paljenje Islam-agine džamije u Nišu marta 2004. Islamski poglavari su osudili presude smatrajući da su kazne blage.

Jevrejska zajednica broji nešto manje od četiri hiljade osoba. Predstavnici Zajednice jevrejskih opština Srbije i Crne Gore izvestili su o kontinuiranim slučajevima antisemitizma ali nije bilo fizičkog nasilja nad pripadnicima jevrejske zajednice. Zabeleženo je nekoliko slučaja grafita antisemitske sadržine i vandalskog ponašanja na nekim jverejskim grobljima. Pored toga, objavljivanje strane antisemtiske literature prevedene na srpski jezik često je dovodilo do verske netrpeljivosti iskazane kroz pisma mržnje ili neki drugi način izražavanja antisemitskih osećanja.

Više detalja videti u Međunarodnom izveštaju o slobodi veroispovesti za 2005.

d. Sloboda kretanja unutar zemlje, putovanja u inostranstvo, iseljavanje i repatrijacija

Zakon predviđa ova prava i vlada ih uopšte uzev poštuje u praksi. Zakonom je zabranjeno prisilno proterivanje i vlada ga ni ne primenjuje.

Prema zvaničnim podacima Kancelarije Visokog komesara za izbeglice pri Ujedinjenim nacijama (UNHCR), u Srbiji je registrovano otprilike 208.000 interno raseljenih lica sa Kosova, uglavnom Srba, Roma i Bošnjaka, što je posledica događaja na Kosovu iz 1999. godine. Oko devet hiljada i dalje je u kolektivnim centrima koji ne odgovaraju nijednoj drugoj nameni izuzev kao prihvatilište u krajnjoj nuždi.

Vlada Državne Zajednice nije se postarala niti preuzela odgovornost za šest hiljada interno raseljenih lica kojima Međunarodni komitet Crvenog krsta ne pruža pomoć po isteku mandata 2004; međutim, nastavila je da isplaćuje plate interno raseljenim licima koja se do juna 1999. bili članovi kosovske vlade. Za dobijanje privremenog boravka u Srbiji, po zakonu je potrebno da se interno raseljena lica prvo vrate na Kosovo i odjave sa prethodne adrese. Ukoliko ovaj postupak ne poštuju, interno raseljena lica ne dobijaju zdravstveno osiguranje, socijalnu pomoć i mogućnost školovanja u državnim obrazovnim ustanovama.

Srpska vlada je u 2004. godini potpisala sporazume sa trinaest zemalja. Tokom 2005. godine, potpisala je sporazume sa još dve zemlje o prihvatanju neuspešnih iseljenika i osoba sa nezakonitim boravkom u tim zemljama, što su prvenstveno bili Romi. Crveni krst Srbije otvorio je kancelariju na beogradskom aerodromu u cilju pomoći Romima povratnicima.

UNHCR procenjuje da je između četrdeset i pedeset hiljada raseljenih Roma pristojno živi u Srbiji; polovina njih nije registrovana usled nepostojanja dokumenata. Mnogi Romi sa Kosova smatrani su srpskim kolaboracionistima tokom sukoba na Kosovu i tamo se nisu mogli bezbedno vratiti. Životni uslovi Roma u Srbiji izuzetno su loši. Lokalne opštine često nisu voljne da im obezbede smeštaj nadajući se da će, ukoliko ne mogu da obezbede smeštaj, Romi napustiti zajednicu (vidi odeljak 5). Ukoliko su se Romi nastanili, to je često bilo u kolektivnim centrima sa minimumom pogodnosti ili, što je češće slučaj, u improvizovanim kampovima u većim gradovima i opštinama ili u njihovoj blizini.

Bilo je sporadičnih slučajeva napada i vandalskog ponašanja prema interno raseljenim licima, posebno etničkim Aškalijama. Nekoliko aškalijskih kuća u Vojvodini oštećeno je u vandalskim napadima u Vojvodini tokom godine.

Zakon ne predviđa davanje azila niti izbegličkog statusa u skladu sa Konvencijom Ujedinjenih nacija iz 1951. koja se odnosi na Status izbeglica i protokol iz 1967. Državna Zajednica je usvojila Zakon o azilu koji daje okvir ali ne spominje postupke i sprovođenje. Na republičkom nivou vlada nije donela zakon niti ustanovila sistem za pružanje zaštite izbeglicama. U praksi vlada možda pruža zaštitu od ponovnog proterivanja, tj. vraćanja osoba u zemlju u kojoj strahuju od progona, a UNHCR odobrava izbeglički status. Četrdeset četiri osobe su tokom godine na koju se izveštaj odnosi dobile izbeglički status.

Vlada obezbeđuje privremenu zaštitu pojedincima iz Bosne i Hercegovine i iz Hrvatske koji se po Konvenciji iz 1951. i protokolu iz 1967. godine ne mogu okarakterisati kao izbeglice.

Prema procesu ponovne registracije izbeglica 2005. godine, u Srbiji je registrovano otprilike 140.000 izbeglica iz drugih država koje su nastale raspadom bivše Jugoslavije, prvenstveno iz Hrvatske (100.000) i Bosne i Hercegovine (40.000). Uz pomoć UNHCR-a, vlada je radila na zatvaranju preostalih kolektivnih centara za izbeglice ustanovljavajući kriterijume za osobe koje ostaju u centrima i tražeći drugi smeštaj za ostale. Na kraju godine je u kolektivnim centrima u Srbiji ostalo otprilike šest hiljada izbeglica.

Zakonom je građanima obezbeđeno pravo da promene vladu mirnim putem i građani su ovo pravo koristili u praksi na povremenim izborima održanim na osnovu opšteg prava glasa.

Državna Zajednica i Republika Srbija imaju parlamentarni sistem vlasti. Skupština Državne Zajednice bira predsednika Državne Zajednice dok se predsednik Republike Srbije bira direktnim glasanjem. Dana 2. juna, Narodna skupština Srbije (parlament) usvojila je amandmane na Ustavnu povelju Državne Zajednice kojima su odloženi direktni izbori za skupštinu Državne Zajednice i određeno da će se parlamentarni izbori za Državnu Zajednicu i Republiku Srbiju održati odvojeno.

Posmatračka misija OEBS-a i Saveta Evrope, koja je pratila izbore, izvestila je da su predsednički izbori u Republici Srbiji 2004. godine bili mirni i sprovedeni uglavnom u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima. Misija je kao probleme navela nepostojanje centralnog biračkog spiska, nedostatak prostorija za glasače koji žive u Crnoj Gori a imaju pravo na glasanje, kao i dokaze o izvesnom stepenu uskraćivanja prava glasa u romskoj zajednici. Glasanje je obavljeno na Kosovu, gde je registrovano 97.000 birača; međutim, ograničena sloboda kretanja Srbe je onemogućila u glasanju, dok etničko albansko stanovništvo, izuzev neznatnih izuzetaka, nije učestvovalo na izborima, čak ni u područjima gde su neki bili na biračkim spiskovima.

Posmatračka misija OEBS-a koja je pratila izbore izvestila je da su parlamentarni izbori Republike Srbije u decembru 2003 protekli uglavnom u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima.

U Parlamentu Državne Zajednice od 126 poslanika, trinaest su žene, dok u srpskoj Skupštini od 250 poslanika, dvadeset tri su žene. U petočlanoj vladi Državne Zajednice žene nisu zastupljene uopšte, a u Vladi Republike Srbije koja broji šesnaest članova radi jedna žena.

U Parlamentu Državne Zajednice od 126 poslanika, ima 7 pripadnika manjinskih zajednica dok ih u srpskoj Skupštini od 250 poslanika ima jedanaest. U petočlanoj vladi Državne Zajednice postoji jedan pripadnik manjinskih zajednica, a u Vladi Republike Srbije koja broji šesnaest članova nema ih uopšte.

Srpski zakon izuzima stranke zasnovane na etničkom principu od pravila po kojem politička stranka mora osvojiti najmanje pet posto glasova da bi ušla u srpski parlament. Romi su nastavili sa dobro poznatom praksom slabog odziva. Lokalne lideri etničkih Albanaca na jugu Srbije bojkotovali su nacionalne izbore uprkos svom aktivnom učešću u lokalnoj upravi.

U javnosti je uvreženo mišljenje o korumpiranosti vlade koje se pojavljuje na svim nivoima. Istraživanje Galupa objavljeno u martu pokazalo je da 60% ispitanih Srba veruje da je korumpiranost vlade veliki problem.

Vlada je u junu najavila da će postepeno ukinuti postojeći Savet za borbu protiv korupcije, ali je do kraja godine ostalo nejasno da li će ga zameniti neko drugo telo. Tokom godine Savet nije uspeo da istraži veliki broj slučajeva korupcije, uključujući ugovore koje je potpisala vlada, sumnjiv uvoz električne energije i upotrebu i prodaju komercijalnog kancelarijskog prostora u vlasništvu države.

Vlasti su imale nedosledan pristup prema korupciji zvaničnika. Istrage su često izgledale politički motivisane, a bilo je brojnih primera za neuspeh vlasti da preduzmu mere u skladu sa detaljnim izveštajima o slučajevima gde je postojala sumnja za korupciju uključujući i veliki broj zvaničnika. Medijski izveštaji o korupciji često su bili senzacionalistički. Zvanični organi zaduženi za borbu protvi korupcije su reagovali i postigli izvestan uspeh; međutim, bilo je slučajeva gde su njihovi napori zaustavljeni.

Dana 8. septembra ministar odbrane Prvoslav Davinić objavio je ostavku nakon kritike ministra finansija da je ugovor na 360 miliona dolara (300 miliona eura) za nabavku opreme, potpisan u avgustu, suvišan, neopravdan i da se radi o mogućoj korupciji. Ugovor se navodno odnosio na kupovinu 74.000 šlemova i 69.000 zaštitnih prsluka za vojsku koja ima svega 28.000 vojnika. Posmatrači su smatrali da su optužbe politički motivisane i da su proistekle iz rivalskog odnosa dva ministra. Okružni sud u Beogradu nije ustanovio krivično delo u vezi sa ovom nabavkom, ali je krajem godine istraga vođena po manjim tužbama za zloupotrebe službenog položaja dok je Davinić bio ministar odbrane. Tužbe se odnose na olakšice omogućene njegovim telohraniteljima pri iznajmljivanju stanova.

Vlasti nisu preduzele dalje korake tokom godine protiv zvaničnika Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova koje je septembra 2004. ministar finansija optužio za protivpravno prisvajanje državnog novca; posmatrači su smatrali da su optužbe politički motivisane i nepotkrepljene dokazima.

Zvaničnici su takođe bili umešani u sumnjive postupke u nekoliko veoma uočljivih slučajeva privatizacije i mediji su objavili da je političko vođstvo prešlo preko toga i da su službenici Ministarstva pravde ignorisali nezakonite transfere novca upućene ministrima u vladi.

Srpska vlada je sporo primenjivala Zakon o dostupnosti informacija iz novembra 2004, i generalno u praksi nije omogućila pristup. Zakon predviđa dostupnost informacija od «legitimnog javnog značaja» (uz mnoge izuzetke) i uspostavlja mesto nezavisnog komesara, koga bira Narodna skupština, s ciljem da se on bavi žalbama građana ukoliko neka vladina agencija odbije zahtev za informacije. Nevladine organizacije su izvestile da su njihovi zahtevi za informacije ostali bez odgovora.

Odeljak 4 Stav vlade o istragama međunarodnih i nevladinih organizacija o navodnim slučajevima kršenja ljudskih prava

Brojne nezavisne domaće i međunarodne oganizacije za ljudska prava uglavnom su obavljale svoju delatnost, u čemu ih vlasti nisu ograničavale, vršile su istrage i objavljivale svoje nalaze o pojedinim slučajevima u vezi sa ljudskim pravima. Međutim, ove grupe su često bile predmet uznemiravanja, pretnji i sudskih sporova zbog klevete zbog izražavanja kritičkih stavova o vladi. Istaknute organizacije za ljudska prava su Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Centar za humanitarno pravo, Advokatski komitet za ljudska prava, Fond za otvoreno društvo, Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava i Beogradski centar za ljudska prava.

Nakon što je 1. juna na televiziji prikazan video snimak ubistva šest srebreničkih muslimana koje je izvršila srpska paramilitarna grupa pod nazivom «Škorpioni», Socijalistička partija Srbije, Srpska radikalna stranka i Demokratka stranka Srbije optužili su Centar za humanitarno pravo, neke nevladine organizacije i medije da vode antisrpsku kampanju. Neki službenici nevladinih organizacija bili su izloženi pretnjama i napadima prvenstveno putem medijskih kampanja u kojima su ih demonizirali i objavljivanjem ličnih podataka kao štu su njihove adrese.

U Vladi Državne Zajednice ne postoji samostalni ombudsman za ljudska prava; međutim, tokom godine Vlada Srbije je ustanovila novu kancelariju za ombudsmana u Beogradu. U Pokrajini Vojvodini ombudsman postoji i radio je samostalno tokom godine. Kancelarija za pravnu pomoć pri Ministarstvu Državne Zajednice za ljudska i manjinska prava takođe je pomagala građanima u žalbama u vezi sa ljudskim pravima.

Vlade Državne zajednice i Srbije napravile su značajan napredak u saradnji sa Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju da bi se ratni zločinci uhvatili i izveli pred sud; međutim, dva najtraženija lica, osumnjičena za ratne zločine pred Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju i povezana sa Srbijom, Ratko Mladić i Radovan Karadžić, i dalje su na slobodi. Od januara do aprila, srpske vlasti su pomogle da se trinaest optuženika prebaci u Tribunal, a još jedan transfer je obavljen u septembru; međutim, šest Haških optuženika povezanih sa državom i dalje je na slobodi uključujući i glavnog optuženika Ratka Mladića. Vlade Državne Zajednice i Srbije takođe su ostvarile napredak u ispunjavanju zahteva koje je Tribunal imao u pogledu dokumentacije i olakšica vezanih za iskaze svedoka. Nacionalni savet za saradnju Državne Zajednice predao je otprilike 900 stranica dokumenata Tužilaštvu tribunala odgovarajući na zahtev kojim su informacije potraživane, ali postoje i zahtevi koji nisu ispunjeni. Nacionalni savet za saradnju je 46 svedoka oslobodio čuvanja državne tajne.

Zakon zabranjuje diskriminaciju na osnovu rase, pola, umanjenih sposobnosti, jezika i društvenog položaja; međutim, diskriminacija žena i etničkih manjina kao i trgovina ljudima i nasilje nad ženama i decom predstavljali su problem.

Nasilje nad ženama bio je problem, a visok stepen nasilja u porodici i dalje postoji. Viktimološko društvo Srbije u julu je objavilo da je jedna trećina žena izložena fizičkom nasilju dok je polovina žena izložena psihičkom nasilju.

Nasilje u porodici je krivično delo za koje je zaprećena zatvorska kazna u trajanju od šest meseci do deset godina u zavisnosti od težine prestupa, dok je u slučaju smrtnog ishoda predviđena kazna od najmanje deset godina zatvora. Takve slučajeve je teško krivično goniti usled nedostatka svedoka i dokaza, kao i činjenice da se svedoci i žrtve nerado javljaju. Studija o srpskim ženama koju je 2005. uradila Svetska zdravstvena organizacija navodi da su dve trećine žena izloženih fizičkom nasilju izjavile da nisu tražile pomoć jer su smatrale da je takvo maltretiranje normalno ili ga nisu smatrale ozbiljnim. Malobrojne zvanične agencije koje se bave nasiljem u porodici nemaju odgovarajuća sredstva.

Silovanje, uključujući i silovanje koje počini suprug, kažnjivo je zatvorskom kaznom u trajanju od jedne do četrdeset godina (što je i maksimalna kazna propisana zakonom) u lakšim slučajevima, dok je za teže slučajeve predviđena zatvorska kazna od najmanje tri godine, odnosno pet godina u slučaju smrtnog ishoda ili ukoliko je žrtva maloletna. Samo mali broj silovanja se prijavljuje jer se žrtve plaše da neće biti zaštićene, da će im se napadači osvetiti, ili da će doživeti poniženje na sudu. U retkim slučajevima, žrtve silovanja koje počini suprug podnose tužbu nadležnim organima. Ženske grupe su izvestile da su kazne često previše blage.

Centar za autonomna ženska prava u Beogradu otvorio je dežurnu telefonsku liniju za žrtve silovanja i supružničkog zlostavljanja i pokrovitelj je određenog broja samoorganizovanih grupa za pomoć. Centar takođe pruža pomoć ženama izbeglicama (uglavnom Srpkinjama), od kojih su mnoge pretrpele najteža zlostavljanja ili silovanja tokom sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Savetodavni centar protiv nasilja u porodici drži prihvatilište za žrtve nasilja u porodici koje vlada delimično finansira.

Trgovina ženama u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja i dalje je problem (vidi odeljak 5, trgovina ljudima).

Seksualno uznemiravanje je bilo uobičajeni problem, ali se o tome i dalje malo zna. Po zakonu je seksualno uznemiravanje krivično delo za koje je zaprećena kazna zatvorom u trajanju do šest meseci u lakšim slučajevima, odnosno do godinu dana kod zlostavljanja podređenog službenika ili štićenika.

Žene imaju jednaka prava kao i muškarci, uključujući ovde i jednakost po zakonu o porodici, zakonu o imovini i u sudskom sistemu. Da bi osigurali poštovanje prava žena, Vlada Srbije je 2004. godine ustanovila Savet za jednakost polova. Vlada Vojvodine takođe ima Sekretarijat za rad, zapošljavanje i jednakost polova. Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji pomogla je da se osnuju opštinska tela zadužena za jednakost polova u više od trideset opština.

Tradicionalna shvatanja uloge polova, posebno u seoskim sredinama, za posledicu imaju diskriminaciju žena. U zabačenim seoskim sredinama, posebno u nekim manjinskim zajednicama, žene nemaju pravo upravljanja imovinom. U seoskim sredinama i nekim manjinskim zajednicama, uobičajeno je da muž određuje ženi kako će glasati.

Društveni položaj žena se generalno smatra inferiornim u odnosu na onaj koji imaju muškarci, a zastupljenost žena u poslovanju nije velika. Žene po zakonu imaju pravo da za isti posao dobiju jednaku novčanu nadoknadu kao muškarci; međutim, prema Međunarodnoj helsinškoj federaciji za ljudska prava, prosečna plata žena je za 11% niža od one koju dobijaju muškarci.

Vlada je predano radila na pravima i dobrobiti dece. Obrazovni sistem predviđa obavezno i besplatno devetogodišnje školovanje. Međutim, etničke predrasude, kulturne norme, i ekonomska oskudica nepovoljno deluju na neku decu, posebno Rome, kad je u pitanju pohađanje škole. Po jednom vladinom izveštaju, otprilike 99.8% dece pohađa školu; međutim, vlada je potvrdila da izveštaj nije uključio mnoge Rome čergare.

Romsko obrazovanje je predstavljalo problem. Mnoga romska deca ne idu u osnovnu školu, ili iz porodičnih razloga, zato što su nadležni u školi ocenili da nisu zreli, ili zbog društvenih predrasuda. Usled nedostatka osnovnog obrazovanja, mnoga romska deca nisu naučila srpski jezik. Neka romska deca su greškom smeštena u škole za decu sa posebnim potrebama jer im je bilo teško da uspešno rešavaju standardizovane testove na srpskom jeziku zbog romskog jezika i kulturnih normi. Uz pomoć Vlade, UNHCR je za Rome organizovao zdravstvene obrazovne programe, a za romsku decu dopunske i dodatne obrazovne programe. Tokom godine, u četrdeset osam osnovnih i srednjih škola jednom nedeljno je nastava održavana na romskom jeziku, a predavanja o romskoj kulturi pohađalo je 1.336 učenika.

Besplatna medicinska nega bila je omogućena u državnim bolnicama, a postoji i spisak ograničenog broja lekova koji su takođe besplatni. Dečaci i devojčice imaju podjednako pravo na zdravstvenu zaštitu.

Zlostavljanje dece je široko rasprostranjen problem. Iako je nastavnom osoblju naloženo da prijave slučajeve u kojima sumnjaju da se radi o zlostavljanju dece, to se često ne radi. Policija je uglavnom reagovala na prijave i tokom godine su vođeni krivični postupci u slučajevima zlostavljanja dece. Psihološka i pravna pomoć je omogućena žrtvama, a takođe postoji i centar za traume od incesta.

Dečji brakovi su problem u nekim zajednicama, posebno među Romima i u seoskim sredinama na jugu i istoku Srbije. U romskoj zajednici, dečaci i devojčice generalno stupaju u brak između četrnaeste i osamnaeste godine, prosečno u šesnaestoj godini života, a dečaci se načelno žene nekoliko godina kasnije od devojčica. Dečji brakovi su najčešći kod Roma muslimana, od kojih je većina sa Kosova, a žive u drugim delovima zemlje kao interno raseljena lica.

Trgovina decom u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja je i dalje problem (vidi odeljak 5, trgovina ljudima). Neka romska deca prodavana su unutar romske zajednice i Romima u inostranstvu gde se koriste za prosjačenje i krađe.

Zakon zabranjuje trgovinu ljudima; međutim, trgovina ljudima preko i, u manjoj meri, u i iz Srbije (bez Kosova) predstavljala je problem. Za trgovinu ljudima predviđena je kazna zatvora u trajanju od jedne do deset godina za jedan prestup, odnosno od tri do četrdeset godina za više prestupa i od pet do četrdeset godina ukoliko je u pitanju maloletnik ili ubistvo.

Vlada je slučajeve trgovine ljudima krivično gonila mnogo efikasnije, a presude izrečene u predmetima trgovine ljudima bile su strožije nego prethodnih godina. Dana 30. septembra, specijalno odeljenje Okružnog suda u Beogradu završilo je dugotrajno i poznato suđenje u predmetu trgovine ljudima, gde su žrtve iz Ukrajine, i osudilo organizatora krivičnog dela na osam godina zatvora, dok su druga tri optuženika osuđena na kazne zatvora u trajanju od tri do šest godina.

Dana 28. decembra, Specijalni sud za organizovani kriminal završio je sudski postupak iz 2004. godine protiv deset lica kojima je suđeno za prodaju i prebacivanje žena u Italiju. Vođa grupe Dejan Stošić osuđen je na četiri godine zatvora; ostali su osuđeni na kazne zatvora u trajanju od pet do trideset meseci.

Tokom godine, vlasti su podnele trinaest krivičnih tužbi protiv dvadeset i jednog lica za trgovinu ljudima; grupe za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima radile su sa 113 žrtava trgovine ljudima i primili 1.712 telefonskih poziva upućenih na SOS telefonsku liniju za žrtve.

Napore srpske Vlade u suzbijanju trgovine ljudima predvodio je koordinator za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima, koji je bio načelnik pogranične policije, sa pridruženim vladinim agencijama, nevladinim i međunarodnim organizacijama. Ministarstva Državne Zajednice za inostrane poslove i ljudska i manjinska prava takođe su učestvovali. Vlada je pomagala u međunarodnim istragama o trgovini ljudima i učestvovala u regionalnim operacijama protiv trgovine ljudima.

Uz finansijsku pomoć i obuku međunarodne zajednice, jedinica za zaštitu svedoka postala je potpuno operativna tokom ove godine. Osim toga, iz izveštaja se saznaje da je policija sve više uspevala da odredi i pravilno pomogne žrtvama trgovine ljudima. Na primer, u februaru je policija na carinskom prelazu utvrdila da je maloletna devojka sa dvogodišnjim detetom deportovana bez pratnje iz Švedske, da nema dokumenta, te da je žrtva trgovine ljudima, pa joj je pružena pomoć.

Srbija je tranzitno područje, a u manjoj meri zemlja-izvor i odredište za trgovinu ženama i devojkama u cilju seksualne eksploatacije. Srbija je prvenstveno tranzitno područje za žene, žrtve međunarodne trgovine ljudima, koje idu na Kosovo kao i u Hrvatsku, Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Albaniju i Zapadnu Evropu. Primarne zemlje-izvori za trgovinu ljudima u Srbiju i iz nje jesu Moldavija, Ukrajina, Rumunija, Rusija i Bugarska. Tokom godine, u Srbiji je bilo ili je kroz nju prošlo otprilike dve hiljade žrtava trgovine ljudima, uključujući žene namenjene seksualnom iskorištavanju, decu namenjenu prosjačenju i eksploatisane sezonske poljoprivredne radnike.

Među osobama kojima se trgovalo u cilju seksualne eksploatacije bilo je maloletnih devojaka. U novembru su vlasti spasile četrnaestogodišnju devojčicu na slovenačkoj granici od međunarodne bande koja se bavi trgovinom ljudima, a koja je pokušala da je odvede u Holandiju da radi i bude seksualno iskorištena. Njena porodica u Prokuplju ju je prodala za 3.600 dolara (3.000 eura); roditelji su izjavili da su mislili da će njihova ćerka odsesti kod tetke i pohađati školu u Holandiji. Dva Hrvata i dva holandska državljana uhapšena su zbog ovog slučaja.

Iako Srbija tradicionalno nije veliki izvor trgovine ženama, usled loših ekonomskih uslova žene su postale podložnije uticaju trgovaca ljudima, posebno u romskoj zajednici. Problem je predstavljala i trgovina decom koju Romi koriste za prosjačenje i krađe.

Trgovci ljudima su žrtve privlačili putem oglasa u kojima se tražila pratnja, navodile bračne i poslovne ponude. Žene su često svesno odlazile da rade kao prostitutke da bi tek kasnije postale žrtve trgovine ljudima. U mnogim slučajevima, međunarodne organizovane kriminalne mreže obavljale su regrutaciju, prodaju i kontrolu žrtava. Glavne tačke za držanje i prebacivanje žena u Srbiji bila su predgrađa Beograda i Pančevo

Vlasti su žrtve ohrabrivale da učestvuju na suđenjima trgovcima ljudima i nisu krivično gonile žrtve.

Vladina agencija za koordinaciju i zaštitu žrtava radila je na pravilnoj identifikaciji žrtava i njihovom upućivanju službama za pomoć. Posebna prihvatilišta za domaće i strane žrtve trgovine ljudima radila su tokom godine. Nevladina organizacija «Astra» ima dežurnu telefonsku službu za žrtve trgovine ljudima. Nevladine organizacije i dobrovoljci žrtvama su pružali pravnu, medicinsku, psihološku i drugu pomoć.

Međunarodna organizacija za migracije (IOM) vodile su repatrijaciju stranih žrtava i pomagale u procesu reintegracije lokalnih žrtava. IOM je takođe upravljao regionalnim centrom za informacije o žrtvama trgovine ljudima. Održani su brojni edukativni programi, uključujući obuku za dobrovoljce pri dežurnim telefonskim linijama, prihvatilišta, socijalne radnike i policiju.

Srpska vlada i nevladine organizacije ulagale su napore da obaveste javnost u cilju borbe protiv trgovine ljudima tako što su održavane konferencije na ovu temu, širom Srbije prikazivani dokumentarni filmovi, a škole obuhvaćene programima.

Zakon zabranjuje diskriminaciju osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima prilikom zapošljavanja, obrazovanja, u pogledu dostupnosti zdravstvene zaštite ili u pružanju drugih državnih usluga, i vlada je generalno primenjivala ovaj zakon. Nije bilo izveštaja o diskriminaciji osoba sa umanjenim fizičkim ili mentalnim sposobnostima; međutim, objekti za njihovo obrazovanje i negu ne postoje ili su neadekvatni, a vlada u tom pogledu ništa nije učinila. Visoka stopa nezaposlenosti i nedostatak smeštaja otežavaju zapošljavanje osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima.

Zakonom je propisano omogućavanje pristupa osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima novim javnim zgradama i vlada je generalno primenjivala ovaj propis u praksi.

Manjine čine 25 do 30 posto stanovništva u Srbiji i podrazumevaju Mađare, Bošnjake, Rome, Slovake, Rumune, Vlahe, Bugare, Hrvate, Albance i druge.

Mada ne u velikoj meri, ipak je bilo slučajeva vandalskog ponašanja i nekih fizičkih napada na pripadnike manjina, uglavnom Mađara u Vojvodini. Broj napada na pripadnike manjina u Vojvodini smanjen je u odnosu na 2004. godinu.

U oktobru je Evropski parlament usvojio rezoluciju o kršenju manjinskih prava u Vojvodini u kojoj se navodi nekoliko slučajeva vandalskog ponašanja, verbalnog zlostavljanja i fizičkih napada na etničke Mađare. Dana 10. oktobra, nevladina organizacija «Hjuman rajts voč» objavila je izveštaj o nasilju protiv manjina u Srbiji u kojem su navedeni slični zaključci. Vlade Srbije i Državne Zajednice na ovo su reagovale povećanim radom sa vođama etničkih manjina u Vojvodini. Srpska vlada je prihvatila u deset tačaka izraženu strategiju za poboljšanje etničkih odnosa u pokrajini, uključujući edukaciju i kampanje namenjene javnosti i podršku većoj zastupljenosti pripadnika manjina u policiji i sudstvu.

Dana 9. novembra, jedna neonacistička grupa prekinula je antifašistički seminar na novosadskom univerzitetu u Vojvodini i maltretirala i šamarala učesnike. Vlasti su podnele krivične prijave protiv osamnaest muškaraca za podstrekivanje etničke, rasne i verske netrpeljivosti. U nedeljama koje su usledile nakon ovog incidenta, srpsko Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova identifikovalo je nekoliko neonacističkih grupa po nazivu.

Vođe etničkih Albanaca u južnim opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa nastavili su sa pritužbama u vezi sa nedovoljnom zastupljenosti etničkih Albanaca u strukturama vlasti. Nezadovoljstvo je postalo posebno izraženo u januaru nakon što su vojni graničari pucali i ubili šesnaestogodišnjeg etničkog Albanca dok je pokušavao da ilegalno pređe granicu sa Makedonijom. Radna grupa sastavljena od predstavnika Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova, OEBS-a, Koordinacionog tela za jug Srbije i opština radila je na otvorenim pitanjima između etničke albanske zajednice i policije.

Bilo je nekoliko izveštaja da policija nije preduzela korake da zaustavi oružane pljačke na autoputu koje su se događale od sredine 2004. Maskirani muškarci, koji su tvrdili da pripadaju Albanskoj nacionalnoj vojsci tražili su novac od vozača, većinom etničkih Albanaca koji su se sa rada u inostranstvu vraćali da bi letnji odmor proveli na Kosovu.

Romi su i dalje bili meta brojnih slučajeva policijskog nasilja, verbalnog i fizičkog maltretiranja koje su činili obični građani, kao i društvene diskriminacije. Policija je postigla skroman napredak u istragama slučajeva društvenog nasilja nad Romima. Dva puta u toku godine nepoznata lica su napala romska naselja na koja su bačeni Molotovljevi kokteli; policija je obavila istragu i podnela krivične prijave protiv napadača.

Mnogi Romi, uključujući interno raseljena lica sa Kosova, žive nezakonito u bespravnim naseljima u kojima ne postoje osnovne usluge kao što su školstvo, zdravstvena zaštita, vodovod i kanalizacija. Neka naselja se nalaze na vrednim industrijskim ili komercijalnim zemljištima gde su privatni vlasnici želeli da preuzmu kontrolu; neka se nalaze u prostorijama preduzeća u državnom vlasništvu. Tokom godine, beogradske vlasti ponovo su sprečile rušenje jednog naselja na privatizovanom zemljištu dok ne budu mogli da obezbede drugi smeštaj Romima koji ovde žive.

Krajem godine, kancelarija tužioca nije završila istragu u slučaju šest meštana sela Lužane koji su optuženi da su 2003. godine napali romsku porodicu.

Tokom godine, beogradske vlasti su ustanovile romski koordinacioni centar i kupile zemljište za izgradnju kompleksa stanova za Rome; do kraja godine izgradnja nije započela.

U cilju rešavanja otvorenih pitanja manjinskih zajednica, Ministarstvo Državne Zajednice za ljudska i manjinska prava otvorilo je dežurnu telefonsku liniju za probleme u vezi sa ljudskim pravima. Na ovoj liniji najčešće su prijavljivane pretnje, uvrede na etničkoj osnovi i siledžijsko ponašanje. Pod pokroviteljstvom Vlade takođe je održano nekoliko školskih programa za edukaciju dece na temu manjinskih kultura i promovisanja tolerancije.

Nasilje i diskriminacija homoseksualaca bila je problem. Mediji su prenosili sadržaje uvredljive za homoseksualce. Neke nevladine organizacije su izvestile da se homoseksualcima uskraćuju jednake mogućnosti pri zapošljavanju i obrazovanju. Ispitivanje koje je obavljeno u organizaciji Inicijative mladih za ljudska prava pokazuje da lezbijke, biseksualci, gej i transgender osobe u velikoj meri doživljavaju uvrede, govor mržnje, verbalne napade i fizičko nasilje.

Zakon propisuje da svi radnici, izuzev vojnog i policijskog osoblja, imaju pravo da se učlane ili osnivaju sindikate po svom izboru, što je uslovljeno restrikcijama u koje spada odobrenje Ministarstva za rad i izjava poslodavca da je vođa sindikata u stalnom radnom odnosu, a što se navodno svodi na to da je neophodna i dozvola poslodavca. Državni savez sindikata preovlađuje u organizovanom poslovnom sektoru pošto upravama državnih delatnosti koje dominiraju privredom više odgovaraju sindikati koji su članovi ovog saveza. Manji savezi nezavisnih sindikata konkurišu državnom savezu, ali su uspeha imali prevenstveno u relativno malom delu zvanične privrede koja ne uključuje poljoprivredu i nije u državnom vlasništvu. U državnom sektoru, 60 do 70 posto radnika učlanjeno je u sindikate. U privatnom sektoru, svega 4 do 6 procenata članovi su sindikata, dok je u poljoprivredi to slučaj kod 3% radnika.

Zakon ne zabranjuje diskriminaciju sindikata, a to i nije predstavljalo veći problem u toku godine.

Zakon dozvoljava da sindikati neometano obavljaju svoje aktivnosti, a vlada je to pravo štitila u praksi. Zakon štiti pravo na organizovanje i kolektivno pregovaranje, i to pravo se slobodno ostvarivalo u praksi. Novi zakon o radu, koji je stupio na snagu u martu, propisuje da svaka kompanija sa više od deset zaposlenih mora imati sporazum o kolektivnom pregovaranju. Međutim, da bi se sa poslodavcem pregovaralo, u sindikat mora biti učlanjeno 15 posto zaposlenih. Da bi se pregovaralo sa vladom, u sindikat mora biti učlanjeno 10 posto svih zaposlenih. Prema raspoloživim izveštajima, zaostaci u isplatama zarada su značajni i široko rasprostranjeni. Sporazumom o kolektivnom pregovaranju obuhvaćeno je otprilike 27 posto svih zaposlenih.

Zakon predviđa pravo na štrajk osim za osobe koje obezbeđuju neophodne usluge kao što su obrazovanje, električna struja i poštanske usluge. Ovi zaposleni čine otprilike 50 posto svih zaposlenih i štrajk moraju najaviti najmanje petnaest dana unapred i obezbediti «minimalni proces rada». Radnici su koristili pravo na štrajk.

Zakonom je zabranjen prinudni i obavezni rad, uključujući i rad dece; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da je takvih slučajeva bilo u praksi (vidi odeljak 5 i 6.d).

Vlada efikasno primenjuje zakone koji decu štite od eksploatacije pri radu. Donja starosna granica pri zapošljavanju jeste šesnaest godina, mada je u seoskim i poljoprivrednim zajednicama uobičajeno da mlađa deca pomažu svojim porodicama u poslu. Deca, naročito romska, takođe obavljaju razne neprijavljene sitne poslove, obično peru prozore na automobilima ili prodaju manje stvari kao što su novine. Romsku decu često njihove porodice prisiljavaju na fizički rad, teraju na prosjačenje, ili ih prodaju u inostranstvo gde se organizovano bave prosjačenjem ili krađom. Inspekcija rada pri Ministarstvu za rad, zapošljavanje i socijalna pitanja proveravala je tokom inspekcije da li postoji rad dece; međutim, Ministarstvo je izvestilo da tokom godine nije naišlo na kršenje zakona u ovom pogledu. Ministarstvo je takođe uvrstilo prevenciju zapošljavanja dece u svoje redovne programe za zaštitu dece i porodice.

U periodu juli-decembar u Srbiji je minimalnu mesečnu zaradu odredio Socijalno-ekonomski savet na otprilike 105 dolara (7.400 dinara). Minimalna zarada nije bila dovoljna za pristojan životni standard radnika i njegove porodice. U preduzećima gde postoje sindikati, minimalna zarada je uglavnom efikasno primenjena. Ovo nije bio slučaj u manjim privatnim preduzećima, a radnici se često plaše da će izgubiti posao jer mnogi od njih nisu prijavljeni kao zaposleni. Inspekcija rada je odgovorna za primenu minimalne zarade.

Standardna radna nedelja od 40 časova generalno se poštovala u državnim preduzećima ali ne i u privatnim firmama. Prema zakonu zaposleni ne može da radi prekovremeno duže od 4 sata dnevno ili više od 240 sati tokom jedne kalendarske godine. Za vreme osmočasovnog radnog dana, propisana je pauza od 30 minuta. Tokom radne nedelje između dve smene mora proći najmanje dvanaest časova, a tokom vikenda - najmanje 24.

Kolektivnim sporazumima regulisano je plaćanje prekovremenog rada. Međutim, novi zakon o radu propisuje da nadoknada za prekovremeni rad treba da bude u vrednosti od najmanje 26% od osnovne plate, kako je definisano relevantnim kolektivnim sporazumom. Sindikati u okviru preduzeća su primarni posrednici u primeni plaćanja prekovremenog rada; međutim, Inspekcija rada takođe snosi odgovornost u ovom pogledu. Inspekcija je imala mešovite rezultate pri pregledu primene propisa o radu usled raznih faktora, uključujući i politiku i korupciju.

Svako preduzeće je obavezno da oformi odeljenje za sigurnost i bezbednost koje treba da primenjuje sigurnosne i bezbednosne propise; međutim, u praksi ova odeljenja su često usredsređena na elementarne aspekte sigurnosti kao što je kupovina sapuna i deterdženata, a ne nabavkom sigurnosne opreme za radnike. Radnici nisu imali pravo da se sklone u situacijama kada su im zdravlje ili sigurnost bili ugroženi, a da pri tom ne budu u opasnosti da izgube posao.

Kosovo ima otprilike 2.2 miliona stanovnika i nalazi se pod upravom Privremene administrativne misije Ujedinjenih nacija na Kosovu (UNMIK) u skladu sa Rezolucijom 1244 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija. UNMIK donosi propise u vezi sa građanskim i pravnim obavezama vladinih organa i privatnih lica i ratifikuje zakone usvojene u Skupštini Kosova. UNMIK je doneo Ustavni okvir za privremenu samoupravu Kosova (ustavni okvir) kojim se definišu privremene institucije samouprave (PISG). Višestranački izbori za Skupštinu Kosova u oktobru 2004. bili su uglavnom slobodni i fer. Međunarodne civilne vlasti UNMIK-a i Mirovne snage na Kosovu (KFOR), koje, pod okriljem UN-a, predvodi NATO, uglavnom su održale efikasnu kontrolu nad snagama bezbednosti; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da su lokalni elementi snaga bezbednosti delovali nezavisno od svojih nadređenih.

UNMIK i PISG su generalno poštovali ljudska prava lokalnog stanovništva; međutim, bilo je ozbiljnih problema u određenim oblastima, posebno u vezi sa manjinskim stanovništvom. Sledeći problemi prijavljeni su u vezi sa ljudskim pravima:

Nije bilo izveštaja da su UNMIK, PISG, KFOR ili njihovi predstavnici počinili nezakonita ili proizvoljna ubistva.

Tokom godine, od neeksplodiranih naprava zaostalih iz sukoba 1999. ili nagaznih mina stradalo je dvoje dece, a teško ranjeno troje, dok je 2004. registrovana smrt jedne i teške povrede trinaest osoba. Neeksplodirane naprave su i dalje predstavljale opasnost za civile.

Jedan policajac je bio žrtva očigledno politički motivisanog ubistva. Dana 13. januara, nepoznate osobe su aktivirale bombu ispod službenog vozila UNMIK-a kada je stradao Omar Ali, pripadnik policije UNMIK-a.

Dana 7. aprila, vlasti su podnele krivičnu prijavu protiv Škumbina Mehmetija, Florima Ejupija, Džavita Kosumija i Faika Šaćirija za ubistvo jednog pripadnika Kosovske policijske službe (KPS) i jednog policajca UNMIK-a u opštini Podujevo posle martovskih nemira 2004. Krajem godine svi su u pritvoru čekali suđenje.

Dogodila su se očigledno politički motivisana ubistva etničkih Albanaca. Dana 31. januara, nepoznate osobe pucale su i ubile Sadika Musaja, svedoka u sudskom postupku protiv grupe Dukađini. Dana 6. aprila, nepoznata lica su ubila Muhameta Salaja, bivšeg pripadnika Oslobodilačke vojske Kosova (OVK). Dana 15. aprila, nepoznate osobe ubile su Envera Haradinaja, brata bivšeg premijera i predsednika Saveza za budućnost Kosova Ramuša Haradinaja; dana 25. jula, Tasim Osaja, osumnjičeni za ubistvo, predao se policiji nakon što je izdat nalog za njegovo hapšenje. Dana 4. juna, nepoznate osobe su iz automobila pucale na Bardila Ajetija, novinara dnevnog lista na albanskom jeziku «Bota Sot»; Ajeti je umro dvadeset dana kasnije od zadobijenih rana. Dana 12. jula, nepoznate osobe su iz automobila pucale i ubile Muhameta Džemajilija, višeg komandanta UCPMB-a, oružane grupe etničkih Albanaca koja je ranije delovala u Preševskoj dolini u Srbiji. Dana 5. septembra, u eksploziji automobila ubijeni su pripadnik Kosovskog zaštitnog korpusa, ranije pripadnik OVK, Naser Ramaj i njegov brat Jeton. Dana 10. oktobra, nepoznate osobe su pucale i ubile Hasana Rustemija, svedoka na nezavršenom suđenju za ratne zločine bivšeg komandanta OVK i (bivšeg komandanta Kosovskog zaštitnog korpusa) Selima Krasnićija.

Tokom godine događala su se očigledno etnički motivisana ubistva Srba. Dana 28. avgusta, nepoznate osobe pucale su i ubile Ivana Dejanovića i Aleksandra Stankovića i ranile dva putnika u njihovom automobilu u opštini Štrpce u kojoj živi većinsko srpsko stanovništvo.

U potencijalno politički motivisanom napadu, dana 11. oktobra, nepoznate osobe ubile su etničkog Turčina Ibiša Cakalija, člana turske Demokratske stranke Kosova.

Dana 18. maja, međunarodno veće sudija osudilo je šest etničkih Albanaca za ubistvo dva etnička Srbina u vreme martovskih nemira 2004: Nedžat Ramadani je osuđen na šesnaest godina, Dželadin Salihu na jedanaest, Scaip Ibrahimi na tri, a Agron Ibrahimi, Agim Abdulahu i Sadri Šabani na po dve godine zatvora.

Tokom godine sud je oslobodio Albanca Labinota Gašija, koga je KPS uhapsio zbog ubistva sedamnaestogodišnjeg etničkog Srbina Dimitrija Popovića u junu 2004. i teško ranjavanje još jednog srpskog dečaka na koje je pucano iz automobila. Suđenje drugom optuženiku etničkom Albancu Albertu Krasnićiju krajem godine je još bilo u toku.

Nije bilo pomaka u vezi sa ubistvom oca Avnija Elezaja, bivšeg borca OVK i telohranitelja bivšeg premijera i predsednika Saveza za budućnost Kosova Ramuša Haradinaja, koje je izvršeno marta 2004.

Nije bilo pomaka u vezi sa sledećim predmetima iz 2003. godine: ubistvo dva svedoka u predmetu grupe Dukađini, Tahira Zemaja i Ilira Selimaja, ubistvo snajperom policajca UNMIK-a Satiša Menona, i odvojena ubistva pripadnika KPS-a Hajdara Ahmetija i Agima Makolija. Bedri Krasnići je i dalje na slobodi, a osumnjičen je za ubistvo pripadnika KPS-a Sebahatea Tolaja i Isufa Haklaja iz 2003. godine.

Dana 7. aprila, vlasti su podigle optužnicu protiv Florima Ejupija koja ga tereti da je sa saučesnicima planirao i izveo bombaški napad na autobus iz Merdara 2001. godine u blizini Podujeva u kojem je poginulo jedanaest etničkih Srba, a ranjeno četrdeset. Druga optužnica, takođe od 7. aprila, tereti Ejupija, Škumbina Mehmetija, Džavita Kosumija i Faika Šaćirija za umešanost u napad na međunarodnu policiju i KPS marta 2004. na putnom kontrolnom punktu koji je ustanovljen nakon martovskih nemira 2004.

Nije bilo izveštaja o politički motivisanim nestancima; međutim, i dalje ima više od dve hiljade lica nestalih od sukoba 1999. čiji ostaci nisu identifikovani niti je utvrđeno gde se nalaze.

Radna grupa sastavljena od zvaničnika Prištine i Beograda za lica nestala od sukoba 1999. sastajala se pet puta tokom godine pod pokroviteljstvom Međunarodnog komiteta Crvenog krsta (ICRC). Tokom godine, grupa je identifikovala posmrtne ostatke 560 osoba i na spisak dodala 57 osoba koje ranije nisu bile uključene u spisak nestalih. Prema ICRC-u, u decembru su se 2.464 osobe vodile kao nestale, za razliku od preko 3.000 lica na početku godine. Od ovih još uvek nestalih lica, ICRC je izvestio da je 75 posto etničkih Albanaca, 17 posto etničkih Srba, 4 posto iz romske, aškalijske i egipatske zajednice, a 3 posto iz svih ostalih etničkih grupa.

Tokom godine, UNMIK-ova kancelarija za nestala lica i sudsku medicinu nastavila je sa identifikacijom posmrtnih ostataka nestalih osoba na Kosovu. Od svog osnivanja 2002. do kraja decembra, kancelarija je obavila 446 terenskih operacija i ekshumacija. Mnoga tela nestalih osoba su pronađena i pažnja je usmerena na utvrđivanje identiteta zemnih ostataka 1.389 osoba koji su otkriveni i primljeni počev od 2002. Do oktobra je Kancelarija za nestala lica i sudsku medicinu dostavila uzorke 2.655 kostiju na DNK analizu Međunarodnoj komisiji za nestala lica, koja je vratila 1.484 rezultata.

U aprilu je Kancelarija za nestala lica i sudsku medicinu započela iskopavanje pećine i okolnog područja u opštini Klina koja je korišćena za odlaganje posmrtnih ostataka 21 lica.

UNMIK je i dalje ohrabrivao srpsku vladu da ubrza svoju saradnju u prebacivanju identifikovanih ostataka kosovskih žrtava rata iz 1999. pronađenih u masovnim grobnicama u Srbiji; međutim, napredovalo se veoma sporo. Kancelarija za nestala lica i sudsku medicinu primila je 638 tela, od kojih je većina vraćena porodicama da bi se obavile sahrane. Porodice nestalih lica nastavile su sa zahtevima da srpske vlasti vrate sve kosovske posmrtne ostatake koji su i dalje u Srbiji i omogući pristup državnim podacima koji bi mogli ukazati na lokacije drugih masovnih grobnica ili mesta gde su tela Kosovara možda spaljena.

Tokom 2004. godine, kancelarija tužilaštva u Prizrenu objavila je da su izdati nalozi za hapšenje dvojice etničkih srba, bivših policajaca, Gorana Janjuševića i Slaviše Milkovića, zbog počinjenih ratnih zločina nad civilnim stanovništvom u oblasti Prizrena, uključujući i otmicu i ubistvo Ardiana Zirnađijua tokom sukoba 1999. Krajem godine osumnjičeni su bili na slobodi.

Ustavni okvir i zakon o krivičnom postupku zabranjuje ovakvu praksu i nije bilo izveštaja da su ih UNMIK ili KFOR primenjivali.

U junu su članovi Pokreta za samoopredeljenje Kosova aktiviste Albina Kurtija počeli po zgradama i drugoj imovini da sprejom ispisuju slogane tipa «protiv pregovora, za samoopredeljenje» da bi tokom godine intenzivirali svoju aktivnost. Dana 19. oktobra, KPS je navodno uhapsio i zlostavljao protestante, od kojih su neki sprejom ispisivali slogane po vozilima UN-a nakon demonstracija članova Pokreta u Prištini. U pismu od 25. oktobra upućenom specijalnom predstavniku UN-a u vezi sa incidentom, ombudsman za Kosovo Marek Novicki naveo je izveštaje očevidaca da su «mnogi» aktivisti doživeli «teško zlostavljanje» za vreme hapšenja i izjave uhapšenih osoba da se zlostavljanje nastavilo nakon što su odvedeni u pritvor. Interna istraga KPS-a nije završena do kraja godine.

Neki pojedinci su optužili KFOR za upotrebu prekomerne sile pri vršenju pretresa. Dana 18. septembra, policija UNMIK-a i KPS uz podršku KFOR-a pretresali su privatnu kuću i uhapsili četri etnička Srbina u Gračanici koji su osumnjičeni za učestvovanje u brojnim ubistvima u opštini Lipljan u 1999. Porodica je prijavila da su ih vukli i gurali vojnici KFOR-a i pripadnici KPS-a koji su učestvovali u raciji; slučaj je predat međunarodnom tužiocu i istraga je krajem godine bila u toku.

Dana 22. avgusta, međunarodni javni tužilac odbacio je predlog da se dozvoli oslobađanje komandanta Kosovskog zaštitnog korpusa generala Selima Krasnićija uhapšenog sa još četiri oficira Kosovskog zaštitnog korpusa zbog sumnje da su 1998. godine učestvovali u zlostavljanju osoba iz logora u Drenovcu na području Prizrena. Dana 22. avgusta, sud je oslobodio jednog od pet oficira Milaima Latifija, koji je vraćen na dužnost u Kosovski zaštitni korpus.

Bilo je izveštaja o napadima i pretnjama usmerenim protiv etničkih Albanaca koji su političke i društvene ličnosti kao i protiv privatnih lica. Dana 15. marta, nepoznate osobe su aktivirale eksplozivnu napravu u blizini automobilske povorke u kojoj se nalazio predsednik Ibrahim Rugova i tom prilikom su ranjeni prolaznici. Dana 18. aprila, nepoznate osobe su aktivirale eksploziv u sedištu opozicione političke stranke Ora, ranivši nekoliko osoba u stanovima iznad kancelarija. U nekim slučajevima se sumnjalo na postojanje nepolitičkih motiva, uključujući rivalitet kriminalnih grupa i običan kriminal.

Bilo je tokom godine izveštaja o politički motivisanom nasilju nad etničkim Srbima. Dana 8. februara, nepoznate osobe su eksplozivom uništile zvanično vozilo vođe etničkih Srba Olivera Ivanovića, ali u tom napadu nije bilo nastradalih. Dana 4. jula, nepoznate osobe su bacile ručnu granatu u kancelarije Srpske demokratske stranke za Kosovo i Metohiju u Zubinom Potoku.

Tokom godine, vlasti su izvele pred sud brojne osobe zbog krivičnih dela u vezi sa međuetničkim sukobima marta 2004 (vidi odeljak 5).

Zatvori i centri za pritvor su generalno u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima, i UNMIK dozvoljava posete nezavisnim posmatračima za ljudska prava; međutim, lokalna nevladina organizacija Savet za odbranu ljudskih prava i sloboda (CDHRF) tvrdio je da im UNMIK od maja ne dozvoljava da posete pritvorenike u zatvorima i pritvorskim centrima.

Objekti su ponekad bili prenatrpani; međutim, izgradnja dva nova objekta nastavljena je tokom godine. Zatvorima i centrima za pritvor upravljaju pripadnici UNMIK-ove zatvorske policije ali sve više prenose dužnosti na Kosovsku zatvorsku službu.

Zatvori se nalaze u Lipljanu i Dubravi, a tokom godine radilo je i pet centara za pritvor. CDHRF je izvestio da dnevno dobijaju otprilike deset telefonskih poziva od zatvorenika i njihovih porodica koji se žale na zlostavljanje i prekomerno zatvaranje u zatvorske samice. Mada bi žene i maloletnici trebalo da budu odvojeni od muškaraca, CDHRF je obavestio da je bilo slučajeva da su žene i maloletnici držani u zatvoru u Lipljanu u neposrednoj blizini muškaraca na odsluženju kazne za lakša krivična dela.

U decembru je OEBS ustanovio nedostatke u higijenskom održavanju ćelija ali je primećeno poboljšanje u uslovima od 2002. zahvaljujući tome što su UNMIK i KPS obnovili postojeće ćelije i sagradili nove ćelije u policijskim stanicama.

UNMIK je izvestio da je tokom godine trideset pet disciplinskih postupaka pokrenuto protiv pripadnika Kosovske zatvorske službe, što je za posledicu imalo jedno otpuštanje, jednu suspenziju, dvadeset pismenih opomena, dvanaest usmenih opomena i jednu suspenziju napredovanja u službi.

Nije bilo izveštaja da su tokom godine međunarodne posmatračke grupe posetile kosovske zatvore.

Ustavni okvir i zakon o krivičnom postupku zabranjuju proizvoljno hapšenje i pritvor i te zabrane su UNMIK, KFOR i PISG generalno poštovali u praksi.

UNMIK je nastavio da prenosi policijska ovlašćenja i funkcije na KPS ne prekidajući nadzor. Međunarodni policijski komesar upravlja i UNMIK-ovom policijom i KPS-om. Udružene snage su načelno efikasne i zapaženo je poboljšanje u odnosu na prethodne godine. Pripadnici etničkih manjina su na kraju godine činili otprilike 16 posto sastava KPS-a u poređenju sa 2004. godinom kada ih je bilo 15 posto.

Međunarodna krizna grupa je izvestila da je korupcija bezbednosnih snaga bila problem, posebno kod granične policije KPS-a.

UNMIK-ova kancelarija za nadzor je istraživala nivo korupcije u UNMIK-u i sistemu krivičnog pravosuđa. Sudstvo je efikasno gonilo pripadnike bezbednosnih snaga koji su počinili zloupotrebe. Pod upravom policije UNMIK-a, jedinica KPS-a za profesionalne standarde je vodila preko dve stotine disciplinskih istraga protiv pripadnika KPS-a zbog toga što su učestvovali ili nisu sprečili nasilje u neredima marta 2004. godine; većina ovih istraga je i dalje bila u toku krajem godine.

Od novembra, od 426 osoba optuženih za krivična dela u vezi sa neredima u martu 2004. godine, sudovi su osudili 209 a oslobodili 12 lica. Nerešeno je 110 predmeta a od optužbi se odustalo u 95 slučajeva. U decembarskom izveštaju, OEBS je optužio sudove za neodgovarajuće tužbe i presude kao i za neprikladnu upotrebu nagodbi koje nisu ni eksplicitno dozvoljene niti regulisane zakonom. Sposobnost vlasti da vode krivične istrage o neredima ometena je premeštanjem povređenih lica izvan Kosova, gubitkom materijalnih dokaza i zastrašivanjem svedoka ili pomanjkanjem volje da svedoče.

Policija je uopšte uzev otvoreno hapsila osumnjičene koristeći nalog koji je izdao sudija ili tužilac; međutim, u određenim slučajevima visokog rizika, osumnjičene su tajno hapsili maskirani policajci ili policajci na tajnom zadatku. Po zakonu, za hapšenje je neophodan nalog tužioca, a uhapšeni mora biti izveden pred sudiju u roku od 72 časa; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da je policija UNMIK-a zloupotrebljavala ovo ovlašćenje hapseći lica, a naročito manje prestupnike, i zadržavajući ih kraće od 72 sata bez namere da ih optuže i duže od 72 sata bez podizanja formalne optužnice. Osumnjičeni imaju pravo da budu obavešteni o razlogu za hapšenje na jeziku koji razumeju; da ne govore i ne odgovaraju ni na kakva pitanja osim ona koja se tiču njihovog identiteta; da dobiju besplatne prevodilačke usluge; da imaju advokata i da im se advokat obezbedi ukoliko sami ne mogu da plate pravnu pomoć; da dobiju lekarsku pomoć uključujući i psihijatrijsku pomoć; i da obaveste jednog člana porodice. Policija UNMIK-a i KPS su generalno poštovali ova prava u praksi. Zakon dozvoljava kauciju kao alternativu pritvoru po pozivu, ali se ovo primenjivalo samo u nekolicini slučajeva.

KFOR je mogao uhapsiti i pritvoriti pojedince bez naloga, a komandant KFOR-a je mogao pojedincima produžiti pritvor i do trideset dana, a da pred sudom ne budu optuženi za krivično delo pod uslovom da ih sud ne oslobodi. Nije bilo izveštaja da je tokom godine KFOR vršio hapšenja bez naloga.

Nije bilo izveštaja da su KFOR, UNMIK ili KPS tokom godine držali političke pritvorenike.

Policija UNMIK-a i KPS mogu držati pojedince u pritvoru pred suđenje najduže mesec dana od dana hapšenja, što sud može produžiti i do ukupno 18 meseci. Prosečno trajanje pritvora pred suđenje bilo je 30 dana. Zakon dozvoljava kućni zatvor, molbu da se po pozivu stupi u pritvor i dodatnu upotrebu kaucije kao alternativu pritvoru pred suđenje. Postojao je zastoj u rešavanju 700 do 800 slučajeva pritvora pred suđenje, tokom godine je otprilike 2.200 lica bilo u pritvoru po pozivu.

Ustavni okvir predviđa nezavisno sudstvo; međutim, lokalno sudstvo je povremeno postupalo pristrasno i bilo pod spoljnim uticajima, pogotovo u međuetničkim predmetima i nije u svim slučajevima obezbedilo pravičan postupak. Bilo je verodostojnih izveštaja o korupciji lokalnog sudstva, a u pojedinim slučajevima Vrhovni sud kao i drugi sudovi postupali su po odlukama vlade.

Zakonodavna vlast pripada UNMIK-u prema Rezoluciji 1244 Saveta Bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija. Policija i sudski organi UNMIK-a zadržali su izvršnu vlast u okviru pravosudnog sistema ali su sarađivali sa lokalnim sudijama i tužiocima. U enklavama etničkih Srba vlada Srbije je vodila nedozvoljeni paralelni pravosudni sistem.

Sudski sistem se sastoji od Vrhovnog suda, pet okružnih sudova, dvadeset pet opštinskih sudova i Trgovinskog suda. Dana 27. decembra, broj međunarodnih sudija koje je postavio UNMIK smanjen je sa osamnaest na četrnaest, dok se broj međunarodnih tužilaca povećao sa osam na trinaest. Krajem trećeg tromesečja, u opštinskim sudovima je bilo 125.974 krivičnih i građanskih nerešenih parnica, dok u okružnim sudovima 11.924 krivične i građanske parnice nisu bile rešene. Krajem trećeg tromesečja, prema sopstvenim podacima, Vrhovni sud je ima 1.445 nerešenih predmeta.

UNMIK-ova jedinica za inspekciju sudova nadgledala je rad sudstva i dala preporuke u vezi sa disciplinom i obukom. Zajednički kosovski sudski i tužbeni savet UNMIK-a i PISG-a (KJPC) imao je obavezu da razmatra slučajeve nepravilnog rada u pravosuđu. Do 27. decembra, KJPC je primio 266 žalbi na nepravilnosti u radu sudija i tužilaca, uključujući 10 optužbi za počinjena krivična dela, 170 optužbi za nemaran rad sudija i tužilaca (95 se odnosilo na kašnjenje predmeta), 20 optužbi za kršenje principa nepristrasnosti, 6 žalbi na etničku pristrasnost i 24 optužbi za kršenje etičkih principa. KJPC je obavio istrage u vezi sa 159 žalbi, odbacio 147, a u 12 slučajeva preporučio disciplinsku meru.

Mada je po zakonu predviđeno da u teškim slučajevima sudi veće sastavljeno od pet sudija, od koji su dva profesionalna a tri laika, po UNMIK-ovim propisima međunarodnim tužiocima je dozvoljeno da sude u predmetima osetljive etničke ili političke prirode, u šta spadaju postupci pred većem sastavljenim od trojice međunarodnih sudija. Od dvesta pedeset aktivnih predmeta koje su do kraja septembra vodili međunarodni tužioci, međunarodne sudije su sudile u otprilike sedamdeset pet slučajeva, a presude su donete u preko 90 posto slučajeva.

Suđenja su javna, a zakon optuženom omogućava da prisustvuje suđenju, suoči se sa svedocima, vidi dokaze i ima pravnog zastupnika, čije troškove, ukoliko je potrebno, snosi država; međutim, ovi postupci se retko koriste u praksi. Optuženi se smatra nevinim dok se ne dokaže suprotno i ima pravo žalbe. Suđenje se odvija pred većem koje se sastoji od laika i profesionalnih sudija; nema suđenja sa porotom.

Pravni stručnjaci i posmatrači za ljudska prava nastavili su da izražavaju zabrinutost zbog nepravičnih krivičnih postupaka koji se vode protiv pripadnika etničkih manjina, a u kojima su tužioci ili sudije etnički Albanci. Odeljenje UNMIK-a za sudsku integraciju bavilo se problemima pravosudnog sistema koji su se odnosili na manjine. Osim toga, UNMIK je vodio devet kancelarija za vezu sa sudom, od kojih su četiri osnovane tokom godine, s ciljem da se pomogne manjinskim zajednicama u područjima gde su Srbi većina tako što se s njima odlazi u sud, u njihovo ime se sudu podnose dokumenta, a izbeglicama i interno raseljenim licima se obezbeđuju informacije i pruža pravna pomoć.

Istražni, sudski i kazneni sistemi Kosova i Međunarodni krivični tribunal za bivšu Jugoslaviju nastavili su sa identifikacijom i kažnjavanjem počinilaca ratnih zločina tokom sukoba 1999. godine; međutim, mnogi slučajevi su ostali nerešeni. Suđenja su nastavljena pred lokalnim sudovima u otprilike četrdeset predmeta za navodne ratne zločine i genocid u vezi sa sukobom iz 1999. Na primer, dana 12. maja, Okružni sud u Prištini je trojicu od pet boraca OVK, pripadnika «Kačaničke grupe», proglasio krivim za ratne zločine počinjene nad civilima u periodu između 27. februara i 21. marta 1999. i osudio ih na kaznu zatvora u trajanju od tri do pet godina; sud je preostalu dvojicu oslobodio. Tužba za ratne zločine podignuta protiv bivšeg komandanta OVK (i bivšeg komandanta Kosovskog zaštitnog korpusa) Selimija Krasnićija krajem godine je bila u predkrivičnom postupku. Dana 10. oktobra, ubijen je svedok u ovom predmetu Hasan Rustemi.

Nije bilo izveštaja da su KFOR, UNMIK ili PISG tokom godine držali političke zatvorenike.

Direktorat UNMIK-a za stanovanje i imovinu (HPD) ima zadatak da rešava imovinske žalbe u vezi sa sukobom iz 1999. godine. U Mitrovici, etnički Srbi u severnom delu grada i dalje nezakonito koriste imovinu etničkih Albanaca, dok etnički Albanci u južnom delu grada nezakonito koriste imovinu etničkih Srba kojima ne dozvoljavaju pristup. Do kraja godine, HPD je izvestio da je rešio sva 1.824 imovinska predmeta u severnoj Mitrovici, Leposaviću i Zvečanu i svih 29.000 zahteva. U više od polovine ovih predmeta, HPD je zahteve rešio dozvoljavajući nelegalnim stanarima da ostanu na posedu s tim da vlasnik da saglasnost, a HPD upravlja imovinom.

Preko 17.000 zahteva u vezi sa imovinom nagomilano je u opštinskim sudovima; ovo su gotovo isključivo novčani zahtevi etničkih Srba na ime odštete u vezi sa ratom. OEBS je procenio da je krajem godine na rešenje čekalo još 11.000 zahteva koji se odnose na poljoprivrednu i trgovinsku imovinu.

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir zabranjuju takve aktivnosti i UNMIK, KFOR i PISG su se u praksi generalno pridržavali ovih zabrana; međutim, snage KFOR-a su pomagale civilnoj policiji UNMIK-a i KPS-u u obavljanju pretresa u slučajevima visoko rizičnih osumnjičenih osoba i samostalno su obavljali pretrese na privatnim posedima tražeći oružje bez naloga suda, na osnovu ovlašćenja mirovne misije po Rezoluciji 1244 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija.

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir predviđaju slobodu govora i štampe, i UNMIK i KFOR su generalno poštovali ova prava u praksi; međutim bilo je tvrdnji da je PISG ometao slobodu govora i štampe, posebno u medijskim kućama koje su kritikovale stavove i rad PISG-a.

U načelu, pojedinci mogu javno ili privatno kritikovati vlasti bez represalija.

Propisi UNMIK-a zabranjuju govor mržnje i govor koji poziva na etničko nasilje, kao i novinske tekstove koji mogu ohrabriti kriminalne radnje ili nasilje.

Nezavisni mediji, kojih ima 111 (89 radio i 22 televizijske stanice) bili su aktivni i iznosili široku paletu gledišta. Međunarodna tela su kontrolisala Radio-televiziju Kosova (RTK), kosovsku javnu medijsku kuću. PISG nije posedovao niti posebno kontrolisao nijednu medijsku kuću.

Kancelarija privremenog komesara za medije sprovodila je propise UNMIK-a koji regulišu medije i stavila na snagu kodeks ponašanja radio, televizijskih i štampanih medija. Kako je predviđeno Ustavnim okvirom, dana 21. aprila, Skupština Kosova je donela, a 11. jula, specijalni predstavnik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih nacija (SRSG) proglasio je zakon o osnivanju stalne nezavisne komisije za medije koja reguliše radio i televizijske medije. Usvajanje zakona pokrenulo je tranziciju, koja je započela u septembru, a za vreme koje Kancelarija privremenog komesara treba da se razvije u stalnu komisiju koju nadgleda sedmočlani upravni savet.

Dana 18. marta, predstavnici vodećih štampanih medija usvojili su novinarski kodeks, a 10.avgusta i statut novinarskog saveta u cilju samouređivanja štampanih medija. Kancelarija privremenog komesara je u oktobru počela da postepeno ukida svoje propise za štampane medije.

PISG se povremeno mešao u rad medija. Dana 15. decembra, lokalna televizijska stanica je prenosila prilog o navodnim finansijskim zloupotrebama Envera Muje, izvršnog načelnika opštine Gnjilane, u izgradnji puta. Policijski izveštaji navode da su Mujin telohranitelj i dva prijatelja napali tri televizijska izveštača, pri čemu su jednog povredili, a televizijsku kameru polomili. Posle ovoga, u Gnjilanu je trinaest novinara dalo otkaz, optužujući poslodavca za pokušaj sprečavanja objavljivanja priloga zbog pritisaka iz opštine.

Tokom godine, Kancelarija privremenog komesara za medije (TMC) novčano je kaznila «Bota Sot» sa otprilike 78.000 dolara (65.000 evra), a «Pavaresiju», koja je posle toga prestala da izlazi, sa otprilike10.800 dolara (9.000 evra) zbog kršenja izborne procedure u septembru i oktobru 2004.

Dana 9. avgusta, TMC je novčano kaznila «Jedinstvo», novine etničkih Srba sa 13.200 dolara (11.000 evra) zbog objavljivanja neistinitih tekstova u kojima je oklevetana jedna etnička grupa kao i zbog propusta da se ispravka pravovremeno objavi. Kasnije je kazna smanjena na 8.400 dolara (7.000 evra).

Dana 3. juna, nepoznate osobe su pucale i smrtno ranile Bardila Ajetija, urednika novina «Bota Sot». Kancelarija privremenog komesara je izvestila da je napad usledio posle kontakta između Ajetija i kancelarije komesara, za vreme kojeg je Ajeti izjavio da se ne slaže sa uređivačkom politikom lista «Bota Sot» i da namerava da napusti ove novine sa drugim članovima redakcije i osnuje novu publikaciju. Policijska istraga ovog ubistva bila je krajem godine u toku.

Udruženje profesionalnih novinara Kosova (APJK) izvestilo je da su 30. marta pripadnici KPS-a fizički napali Bedžeta Begu i Barda Bektešija iz RTK-a u Vučitrnu zbog navodno nepropisnog parkiranja na opštinskom posedu. Interna istraga KPS-a krajem godine je bila u toku.

APJK je izvestio da su 19. oktobra pripadnici KPS-a napali i uhapsili novinare na demonstracijama članova Pokreta za samoopredeljenje. U pismu specijalnom predstavniku Ujedinjenih nacija od 25. oktobra, kosovski ombudsman Marek Novicki zatražio je nezavisnu istragu o udelu KPS-a u ovom incidentu, navodeći da je KPS uhapsio dva novinara koji su fotografisali demonstracije, a jednog maltretirali. Neki očevici su izjavili da su novinari zapravo učestvovali u demonstracijama. Interna istraga KPS-a je krajem godine bila u toku.

APJK je tokom godine izvestio i o drugim slučajevima uznemiravanja medija. U februaru je Udruženje optužilo KZK za sprečavanje snimanja posete predsednika Srbije Borisa Tadića Kosovu. APJK je takođe izvestio da su u februaru nepoznate osobe telefonom pretile smrću glavnom i odgovornom uredniku radija «Top Ilira» ukoliko ne prestane da izveštava o stranki Demokratska liga Kosova (LDK).

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir predviđaju slobodu okupljanja i u praksi UNMIK, KFOR i PISG generalno poštuju ovo pravo.

UNMIK zahteva da ih organizatori demonstracija o tome obaveste 48 sati ranije radi koordinacije sa policijom. KPS i policija UNMIK-a retko koriste silu da bi rasterali demonstrante.

Dana 19. oktobra, pripadnici KPS-a navodno su fizički maltretirali demonstrante tokom hapšenja i pritvaranja posle demontracija u Prištini (vidi odeljak 1.c).

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir predviđaju slobodu udruživanja i u praksi UNMIK, KFOR i PISG generalno poštuju ovo pravo.

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir predviđaju slobodu veroispovesti i u praksi UNMIK i PISG generalno poštuju ovo pravo.

Nema nekih posebnih propisa u vezi sa odobravanjem dozvola za verske grupe; međutim, da bi mogle kupiti imovinu ili dobiti finansijsku pomoć od UNMIK-a ili nekih drugih međunarodnih organizacija, verske organizacije se moraju registrovati pri UNMIK-u kao nevladine organizacije.

Verska i etnička pripadnost su tesno povezani. Kosovski Srbi se poistovećuju sa Srpskom pravoslavnom crkvom, koja ima uticaj na njihova kulturna, istorijska, politička i verska gledišta (vidi odeljak 5). Mada značajan deo albanske etničke zajednice i dalje smatra Srpsku pravoslavnu crkvu simbolom srpskog nacionalizma, odnosi između lidera albanske etničke zajednice i Srpske pravoslavne crkve neznatno su tokom godine poboljšani pošto su se zvaničnici PISG-a i političke ličnosti u nekoliko navrata susreli sa sveštenstvom ove crkve.

U aprilu su nadležni u jednoj osnovnoj školi izbacili učenicu sa časa jer je nosila maramu. Sličan slučaj je u junu 2004. imao za posledicu stav obmudsmana Organizacije za bezbednost i saradnju u Evropi (OEBS) da se zabrana marama koju je izdalo Ministarstvo treba odnositi samo na nastavnike i zvaničnike, a ne i na učenike. Obe strane su podnele peticije Ministarstvu obrazovanja i formalne žalbe ombudsmanu OEBS-a; istrage su krajem godine bile u toku.

Dana 23. maja, mediji su obavestili da je direktor jedne javne škole suspendovao nastavnicu zbog nošenja marame za vreme nastave, navodeći da zakon obavezuje javne obrazovne institucije da prema religiji imaju neutralan odnos. Dana 29. maja, prištinsko opštinsko odeljenje za obrazovanje nastavnicu je otpustilo.

Protestanti su takođe izvestili da su školski organi ponekad pozivali roditelje učenika da decu odvrate od protestantizma.

Islamska zajednica je nastavila da tvrdi da su UNMIK-ovo odbijanje da dodeli radio frekvenciju za islamsku radio stanicu, zatvaranje prostorije za molitvu u Nacionalnoj biblioteci i odbijanje prištinske opštine da dodeli javno zemljište za izgradnju džamije primeri pomanjkanja verskih sloboda.

Protestanti su se žalili na diskriminaciju u pristupu medijima, posebno na RTK, koja je odbila zahtev protestantske zajednice kojim su tražili svoj televizijski program.

Napadi etničkih Albanaca na srpske pravoslavne crkve i groblja tokom nereda marta 2004. za posledicu su imali veliku materijalnu štetu, uključujući uništavanje ili oštećenja trideset verskih objekata od kojih neki potiču iz 14. veka. Misija Saveta Evrope procenila je da će otprilike 13.1 milion dolara (9.7 milion evra) biti potrebno da se poprave i obnove oštećeni objekti. Neredi su prekinuli prenošenje nadležnosti za zaštitu srpskih pravoslavnih crkava i drugih verskih simbola sa KFOR-a na policiju UNMIK-a i KPS; međutim, proces prenošenja nadležnosti nastavljen je u oblasti manjih verskih objekata.

Iz bezbednosnih razloga, monasi i monahinje u nekim srpskim pravoslavnim manastirima nisu mogli koristiti određene delove manastirskih poseda, a porodice etničkih Srba su izvestile o svom strahu da putuju sa Kosova u Srbiju da bi sa rođacima proslavili verske praznike i druge svečanosti. Da bi umanjili zabrinutost bezbednosnom situacijom, policija UNMIK-a je u januaru rasporedila 350 pripadnika međunarodne policije na trideset lokacija određenih za povratak raseljenih etničkih Srba i nastanjenih etničkim Srbima. Vladika Srpske pravoslavne crkve Teodosije izjavio je da je 31. decembra na zemlji čiji je vlasnik Crkva, Opština Đakovica podigla spomenik etničkim Albancima, pripadnicima OVK.

Otprilike četrdeset osoba iz dve porodice u Prizrenu ima jevrejsko poreklo, ali ne postoje ni sinagoge niti jevrejske institucije. Nije bilo izveštaja o antisemitskim delima.

Više detalja videti u Međunarodnom izveštaju o slobodi veroispovesti za 2005.

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir predviđaju slobodu kretanja; međutim, međuetničke tenzije i objektivni i subjektivni bezbednosni problemi ograničili su slobodu kretanja. Tokom godine, UNMIK, KFOR, i PISG su generalno poboljšali ova prava za manjinske zajednice.

Sporadični slučajevi nasilja i zastrašivanja usmereni na manjine i dalje su ograničavali kretanje etničkih Albanaca na severu Kosova. PISG i UNMIK su povećali napore da olakšaju putovanje pripadnika manjinskih zajednica po celom Kosovu, ali su objektivni i subjektivni rizici odvratili mnoge pripadnike manjina od putovanja van njihovih oblasti.

Da bi se umanjili rizici od napada pomoću jednakog označavanja vozila etničkih Srba i etničkih Albanaca, UNMIK je nastavio da nudi kosovske registarske tablice etničkim Srbima koji su svoja vozila već registrovali u Srbiji.

Dana 22. aprila, KFOR je uklonio oklopna vozila i barikade sa mosta Austerlic koji povezuje severnu Mitrovicu gde su većina etnički Srbi i južni deo Mitrovice gde su u većini etnički Albanci. KPS je 6. juna preuzela kontrolu nad mostom; dana 18. jula, most je otvoren za civilni saobraćaj prvi put od 1999. godine. Međutim, svega nekoliko lica je preko mosta prevezlo vozila sa kosovskim registarskim tablicama u strahu od napada u severnoj Mitrovici.

Propisi UNMIK-a predviđaju da centralni matični ured izdaje putna dokumenta svakom licu koje ima stalni boravak na Kosovu, i matični ured takva dokumenta u praksi rutinski izdaje. Dana 3. oktobra, UNMIK je preneo upravne i operativne nadležnosti matičnog ureda na PISG, ali je zadržao sveukupnu nadležnost, u šta spada izdavanje UNMIK-ovih putnih dokumenata i bezbednost centralne baze podataka.

Prema podacima Kancelarije Visokog komesara za izbeglice Ujedinjenih nacija (UNHCR), krajem godine je od sukoba 1999. godine, otprilike 225.487 osoba bilo raseljeno na području Srbije i Crne Gore, dok je i dalje raseljeno 1.364 od 4.100 lica koja su proterana iz svojih kuća u neredima marta 2004. godine, i to uglavnom iz Mitrovice i Prištine. Tokom godine, vratio se mali broj interno raseljenih lica zbog nesigurnosti u pogledu budućeg političkog statusa Kosova, nemogućnosti zapošljavanja, bezbednosnih problema i imovinskih sporova. Mada su neke međunarodne agencije, nevladine organizacije i PISG nastavili da organizuju projekte za povratak malih razmera, posmatrači su kritikovali novostvoreno Ministarstvo PISG-a za zajednice i povratak zbog toga što PISG odlaže finansiranje projekata za povratak. Opštine su zaposlile osoblje i napravile opštinske strategije za povratak bez značajnih konkretnih rezultata.

UNHCR je izvestio da se tokom godine na Kosovo vratilo 2.048 pripadnika manjina, uključujući etničke Albance koji su se vratili u područja gde predstavljaju manjinsko stanovništvo. Od 2000. do kraja godine na koju se ovaj izveštaj odnosi ukupno se vratilo 14.433 lica. U odnosu na 2004. godinu, vratio se nešto manji broj etničkih Srba, a više Bošnjaka i Goranaca. Etnički Srbi čine otprilike 35 posto povratnika ove godine, u poređenju sa 33 posto koliko ih je bilo 2004. Romi (uključujući Aškalije i Egipćane) nastavili su da se vraćaju u nešto većem broju, i predstavljaju 45 posto ukupnog broja povratnika. U Mitrovici etnički Srbi u severnom delu grada i etnički Albanci u južnom delu grada i dalje jedni drugima bespravno koriste imovinu i ometaju potencijalne povratnike.

Iako je PISG obnovio više od 95 posto domova uništenih ili oštećenih u martovskim neredima 2004. godine, većina osoba raseljenih zbog nereda nije se vratila i zbog objektivnih i zbog subjektivnih bezbednosnih problema, nezaposlenosti i žalbi stanovnika na kvalitet rekonstrukcije. Perspektiva za povratnike je bila različita u zavisnosti od područja i etničke grupe.

Tokom godine, UNMIK je započeo izgradnju objekata za preseljenje i potencijalni smeštaj otprilike 531 raseljenog lica, Roma, Aškalija i Egipćana, koji žive na severu Kosova u tri kampa izložena olovnom zagađenju; međutim, sva raseljena lica su ostala u zagađenim kampovima do kraja godine. Ispitivanje koje je obavila Svetska zdravstvena organizacija pokazalo je opasno visoke koncentracije olova u krvi mnogih stanovnika kampova. UNMIK je započeo istovremenu donatorsku kampanju za ponovnu izgradnju originalnog naselja u južnom delu Mitrovice gde su interno raseljena lica živela, a koje su 1999. uništili etnički Albanci, koji su Rome optužili da su srpski saradnici, ali je do kraja godine završeno samo delimično uklanjanje ruševina. Ograničena finansijska sredstva usporila su projekat za povratak. Dana 2. septembra, Evropski centar za prava Roma podneo je molbu kosovskom tužilaštvu za pokretanje istrage u ovom predmetu; do kraja godine nije podneta formalna tužba.

Zakon ne predviđa davanje azila niti izbegličkog statusa u skladu sa Konvencijom Ujedinjenih nacija iz 1951. koja se odnosi na Status izbeglica i protokol iz 1967; međutim, UNMIK je raseljenim licima davao status «osoba sa privremenom zaštitom na Kosovu». U praksi, UNMIK je pružao zaštitu od ponovnog proterivanja, tj. vraćanja osoba u zemlju u kojoj strahuju od progona; međutim, UNMIK nije davao izbeglički status niti azil. UNMIK je sarađivao sa Kancelarijom visokog komesara za izbeglice Ujedinjenih nacija i drugim humanitarnim organizacijama u pružanju pomoći izbeglicama.

Propisi UNMIK-a i Ustavni okvir predviđaju pravo stanovnika da mirnim putem promene vladu i oni su to pravo u praksi koristili na periodičnim i generalno slobodnim i fer izborima zasnovanim na opštem pravu glasa.

Kosovo je i dalje pod civilnom upravom UNMIK-a. UNMIK i njegov glavni administrator, specijalni predstavnik generalnog sekretara (SRSG), uspostavili su međunarodnu civilnu vlast 1999. godine po završetku vojne intervencije NATO-a koja je srpske snage naterala na povlačenje. UNMIK je 2001. proglasio Ustavni okvir za PISG. Prema Ustavnom okviru, Skupština Kosova, koja broji 120 članova, bira predsednika, premijera i druge ministre i zvaničnike PISG-a. Kosovski lideri nastavili su da kritikuju UNMIK zbog sporosti u prenošenju nadležnosti na PISG; međutim, međunarodna misija je zadržala veliki broj nadležnosti, uključujući bezbednost i odnose sa inostranstvom.

Međunarodni i domaći posmatrači su ustanovili da su skupštinski izbori oktobra 2004. bili uopšte uzev slobodni i fer mada je učestvovalo manje od 5 posto etničkih Srba, uglavnom zbog pritisaka srpske vladi da ne glasaju. Kosovo ima višestranački sistem kojim dominiraju četiri praktično jednoetničke albanske stranke i nekoliko manjinskih stranaka i koalicija.

Po propisima UNMIK-a, pojedinci se mogu kandidovati u okviru svojih stranaka, koje moraju održati otvorene i transparentne interne izbore da bi se napravila lista kandidata. Najveća stranka, LDK, gotovo je u potpunosti ignorisala ovaj zahtev na stranačkoj konvenciji 2004. godine. Stranačka pripadnost je imala značajnu ulogu u dobijanju pozicija u službi vlade i za društvenu afirmaciju. Tradicionalne društvene veze i plemenska lojalnost takođe su igrali veliku, mada nezvaničnu ulogu u političkim organizacijama.

Bilo je izveštaja o napadima i pretnjama etničkim albanskim političkim i društvenim ličnostima (vidi odeljak 1.c).

U Skupštini ima sto dvadeset poslanika od čega su trideset šest žene. Ženama mora pripasti svako treće mesto na listi kandidata svake političke stranke. Žena nije bilo u osmočlanom u rukovodećem skupštinskom telu, dok je kao ministar radila samo jedna žena. Žene predstavljaju 28 posto izabranih opštinskih predstavnika. Dana 20. septembra, trideset četiri članice Skupštine osnovale su neformalni kokus sa osmočlanim multietničkim odborom.

U Skupštini od sto dvadeset poslanika, bio je dvadeset jedan pripadnik etničkih manjina, od kojih deset etničkih Srba i jedanaest članova drugih grupa, uključujući etničke Turke, Bošnjake, Gorance, Rome, Aškalije i Egipćane. U PISG-u su na ministarskim mestima bila dva pripadnika manjina, jedan etnički Srbin i jedan Bošnjak, a na mestima zamenika ministara – tri pripadnika manjina. Jedan Bošnjak i jedan etnički Turčin su se smenjivali na mestu u Predsedništvu Skupštine; mesto predviđeno za jednog etničkog Srbina ostalo je prazno usled srpskog bojkota. Na kraju godine, etnički Srbi u najvećoj političkoj stranci kosovskih Srba nisu tražili položaje u kabinetu koji su im namenjeni nastavljajući da bojkotuju Skupštinu; međutim, članovi političke stranke Slaviše Petkovića preuzeli su dva predviđena mesta i vodili ministarstvo. Po Ustavnom okviru, deset poslaničkih mesta mora biti rezervisano za Srbe, a deset za druge etničke manjine na Kosovu, ali na opštinskom nivou manjine su nedovoljno zastupljene.

U javnosti je uvreženo mišljenje da korupcija postoji i u PISG-u i u UNMIK-u. Bilo je verodostojnih izveštaja o nepravilnostima u radu PISG-a na prvom međunarodnom tenderu za licencu za mobilnu telefoniju. UNMIK je poništio dobitnika koja je PISG odabrao i zahtevao da se tender ponovo raspiše. Najveća opoziciona stranka, Demokratska stranka Kosova, nastavila je da kritikuje vladu i dostavlja optužbe UNMIK-u radi istrage; krajem godine UNMIK je izjavio da je istraga u toku.

UNMIK je 2003. stavio na snagu zakon o dostupnosti zvaničnih dokumenata; međutim, zakon izuzima dokumenta UNMIK-a i retko se koristi. Prema izveštajima OEBS-a, PISG tokom godine javnosti nije omogućio pristup dokumentima.

Odeljak 4 Stav vlade o istragama međunarodnih i nevladinih organizacija o navodnim slučajevima kršenja ljudskih prava

Široka paleta domaćih i međunarodnih grupa koje se bave ljudskim pravima generalno je radila bez ograničenja, vodila istrage i objavljivala svoja saznanja o slučajevima u vezi sa ljudskim pravima. UNMIK, KFOR i PISG su generalno sarađivali i reagovali na njihove stavove.

Domaće nevladine organizacije su se pojavile u velikom broju sa prilivom donacija neposredno po završetku sukoba 1999. godine, što je za posledicu imalo snažno građansko društvo i mnoge, konkurentne nevladine organizacije. Domaće nevladine organizacije su se žalile da donacije više nisu dostupne kao ranije. Verske nevladine organizacije su se žalile na nedostatak poreskih olakšica u pogledu određenih artikala uvezenih na Kosovo; neke verske nevladine organizacije su izvestile o diskriminaciji na osnovu verske pripadnosti.

Međunarodna organizacija za migracije (IOM) koordinisala je obuku i projekte za KZK u saradnji sa drugim nevladinim organizacijama. Posmatrači za ljudska prava, uključujući one iz OEBS-a i nekih lokalnih nevladinih organizacija, bile su aktivne u oblasti dokumentovanja etnički ili politički motivisanih ubistava, napada i slučajeva zastrašivanja.

Ombudsman OEBS-a vodio je istrage u vezi sa tvrdnjama o vladinim zloupotrebama međunarodnih zakona o ljudskim pravima. Mada je kancelarija ombudsmana aktivno objavljivala izveštaje i preporuke, UNMIK, a naročito policija UNMIK-a su retko postupali po tim preporukama. Većina slučajeva koju je ova kancelarija ispitivala ticala se imovinskih prava, zloupotrebe službenog položaja, administrativnih odluka ili propusta javnih službi, pitanja u vezi sa pravičnošću i dužinom trajanja sudskih postupaka, sporova iz oblasti radnih odnosa i nekažnjivosti.

UNMIK, KFOR i PISG generalno su sarađivali sa Međunarodnim krivičnim tribunalom za bivšu Jugoslaviju u vezi sa zločinima počinjenim tokom sukoba 1999. Dana 10. marta, Tribunal je podigao optužnicu protiv tadašnjeg premijera Ramuša Haradinaja i saoptuženih Idriza Balajanda i Lahija Brahimaja. Dana 30. novembra, Tribunal je okončao sudski postupak protiv Fatmira Limaja, lidera kokusa PDK, i druge dvojice etničkih Albanaca, Haradina Balaja i Isaka Musliua, koje je počelo novembra 2004. U prvoj odluci koju je doneo u vezi sa sukobom na Kosovu, Tribunal je osudio Balaja na trinaest godina zatvora dok su Limaj i Musliu oslobođeni.

Propisi UNMIK-a precizno zabranjuju diskriminaciju na osnovu rase, pola, etničke pripadnosti, umanjenih sposobnosti i jezika; međutim, nasilje i diskriminacija žena, osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima i etničkih manjina nastavljeni su.

Nasilje nad ženama u porodici, uključujući supružničko zlostavljanje, i dalje je ozbiljan i uporan problem. Propisi UNMIK-a zabranjuju nasilje u porodici i zaprećene su kazne zatvorom u trajanju od šest meseci do pet godina. U slučajevima kada su žrtve podnele prijavu, KPS je obavljao istrage i slučajeve izvodio pred sud. Prema podacima UNMIK-a, mali broj tužbi posledica je porodične lojalnosti i tesno povezanih zajednica kao i nagomilani broj predmeta pred sudovima i u krivičnim i u građanskim parnicama.

Centar za zaštitu žena i dece, lokalna nevladina organizacija, dobila je tokom godine otprilike 3.650 zahteva za pomoć žrtvama nasilja. Do kraja oktobra, advokati UNMIK-a za pomoć žrtvama radili su na 1.468 predmeta u vezi sa nasiljem u porodici. Sudski sistem je od januara do oktobra obradio 77 naloga za zaštitu; vlasti su uhapsile 341 osobu, što je za posledicu imalo pokretanje 1.045 predmeta. Ukupno 52 od 53 predmeta obrađena do oktobra završena su presudama, a izrečene kazne išle su od sudskih opomena do kazne zatvorom. Tradicionalni društveni stavovi prema ženama u ovom društvu gde muškarci dominiraju doprineli su visokom stepenu nasilja u porodici i malom broju prijavljenih slučajeva.

Nije postojala vladina agencija posvećena isključivo problemu nasilja u porodici. Četiri prihvatilišta su pomagala žrtvama nasilja u porodici i trgovine ljudima, od kojih dva vode lokalne nevladine organizacije, a dva međunarodne nevladine organizacije. KPS je izvestio da je tokom godine šezdeset šest žrtava nasilja u porodici smešteno u prihvatilišta. Nekoliko domaćih i međunarodnih nevladinih organizacija aktivno je pomagalo ženama; međutim, u tome su imali poteškoća jer se o nasilju u porodici, seksualnom zlostavljanju i silovanju po tradiciji ne govori.

Tokom godine, OEBS, kabinet premijera i UNMIK uspostavili su anonimnu dežurnu telefonsku liniju za prijavljivanje zlostavljanja u porodici. Pored toga, škola za obuku KPS-a ponudila je u okviru svog nastavnog programa specijalne kurseve o nasilju u porodici i silovanju.

Prema propisima UNMIK-a silovanje je krivično delo; međutim, supružničko silovanje se ne navodi taksativno. Po kosovskom zakonu, za silovanje je zaprećena kazna zatvora u trajanju od jedne do deset godina zatvora; za silovanje maloletnice (seksualni odnos sa devojčicom mlađom od četrnaest godina) zaprećena je kazna od jedne do pet godina zatvora.

Silovanja se izuzetno retko prijavljuju zbog sramote koja u ovoj kulturi prati žrtve i njihove porodice. Prema podacima UNMIK-a, advokati žrtava pružili su svoje usluge u otprilike trideset slučajeva silovanja. Do oktobra su sudovi procesuirali otprilike pedeset slučajeva silovanja u kojima je izrečeno šezdeset presuda; u nekim slučajevima jedna osoba je silovala više žrtava.

Zakon zabranjuje prostituciju, ali je prostitucija i dalje rasprostranjena. Jedinica policije UNMIK-a za istraživanje trgovine ljudima i prostitucije ispitivala je slučajeve prostitucije kao i slučajeve u kojima se sumnjalo na trgovinu ljudima.

Trgovina ženama u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja bila je ozbiljan problem (vidi odeljak 5, Trgovina ljudima).

Ne postoji poseban zakon protiv seksualnog uznemiravanja koje je čest problem. Društvena svest o seksualnom uznemiravanju je i dalje na niskom nivou, i mali broj slučajeva je prijavljen.

Žene imaju ista zakonska prava kao i muškarci, ali tradicionalno nemaju jednak društveni položaj, zbog čega ih sudski sistem drugačije tretira. Iako nema zakonskih prepreka, relativno mali broj žena dobija položaje višeg ranga u privredi, KPS-u i vladi. Mada je broj zaposlenih žena porastao, u odnosu na nezaposlenost ukupnog stanovništva koja iznosti 40 do 70 posto, nezaposlenost žena je i dalje visoka i iznosila je oko 70 posto. Tradicionalni društveni odnos prema ženama za posledicu je imao diskriminaciju. U nekim seoskim sredinama, žene često nisu u mogućnosti da donose odluke koje se tiču dece niti da vrše kontrolu nad imovinom. Mada žene i muškarci imaju jednaka zakonska prava koja se tiču nasleđivanja imovine, porodična imovina po običaju prelazi isključivo u posed muškarca. Albanske udovice, naročito u seoskim područjima, bile su izložene opasnosti da izgube starateljstvo nad decom zbog običaja po kojem deca i imovina prelaze u ruke porodice pokojnog oca, dok se udovica vraća porodici u kojoj je rođena.

U avgustu je kabinet premijera oformio Kancelariju za jednakost polova, koja je sa Kancelarijom UNMIK-a za probleme polova koordinisala napore u pogledu rešavanja problema iz ove oblasti. U toku godine Kancelarija za jednakost polova preuzela je od Kancelarije za dobru upravu nadležnost nad dvadeset šest albanskih i četiri srpska opštinska službenika koji su se bavili pitanjem polova. U oktobru je Skupština oformila funkcionalni Pododbor za ljudska prava, jednakost polova, molbe i javne zahteve.

U cilju borbe protiv diskriminacije žena, UNMIK je u nastavni program Univerziteta u Prištini u oblasti prava uvrstio predavanja koja se bave ljudskim pravima i borbom protiv diskriminacije i trgovine ljudima.

Prema propisima UNMIK-a, upis u državne škole obavezan je za decu između šest i petnaest godina starosti; međutim, neka deca iz redova manjinskih zajednica (isključujući etničke Srbe) nisu pohađala državne škole pod upravom PISG-a iz bezbednosnih razloga. Osnovno obrazovanje je besplatno. Prema podacima UNICEF-a, 97,5 posto albanske i 99 posto srpske dece upisano je u osnovne škole, dok je nastavu pohađalo samo 77 posto dece uzrasta između sedam i četrnaest godina iz nesrpskih manjinskih zajednica (Romi, Aškalije, Egipćani, Turci, Bošnjaci, Goranci i ostali). Fond za decu Ujedinjenih nacija (UNICEF) je izvestio da se manje od 52 posto dece sa završenom osnovnom školom upisalo u srednje škole; od toga su 43 posto ženska deca. Stopa pohađanja i završavanja srednjih škola niža je kad su u pitanju albanske devojčice od stope koja se odnosi na albanske dečake ili srpske devojčice. Neka deca su bila primorana da rano napuste školu i počnu da rade (vidi odeljak 6.d).

Propisi UNMIK-a predviđaju jednake uslove za školsku decu i pravo na obrazovanje na maternjem jeziku za učenike osnovnih i srednjih škola koji su pripadnici manjina. Nastava se tokom godine održavala na srpskom, bošnjačkom i turskom jeziku. I srpska i albanska deca su pohađala škole neadekvatnih prostorija u kojima nije postojala osnovna oprema. Malobrojne škole imaju učenike iz redova i etničkih Srba i etničkih Albanaca koji rade po različitom nastavnom programu i izmenjivom rasporedu časova.

Deca Roma, Aškalija i Egipćana pohađala su mešovite škole sa albanskom decom ali su navodno bila izložena zastrašivanju u područjima sa većinskim albanskim stanovništvom. Romska deca su često zbog siromaštva u nepovoljnom položaju što je navelo mnoge da počnu da rade i kod kuće i na ulicama kako bi uvećali prihode porodice. Neka bošnjačka deca u sredinama sa većinskim bošnjačkim stanovništvom povremeno su bila u mogućnosti da nastavu u osnovnoj školi prate na svom jeziku, ali mali broj dece koja žive izvan takvih sredina nastavu su pratili na jeziku albanske većine.

Vlada je obezbeđivala zdravstvenu zaštitu koja je bila jednako dostupna i dečacima i devojčicama.

Bilo je izveštaja o zlostavljanju dece, mada se smatralo da takva praksa nije rasprostranjena; međutim, visoka stopa nezaposlenosti i razdvojenost porodica za posledicu su imali veliki broj napuštene dece. Kako broj usvajanja i smeštaja u hraniteljske porodice nije u dovoljnoj meri pratio broj napuštene dece, vlasti su povremeno novorođenčad i decu smeštali u zbirne domove sa nekoliko negovatelja. Od završetka rata 1999. godine, roditelji su navodno ostavili pet stotina dece. Deca sa umanjenim sposobnostima često su sakrivana i nisu dobijala odgovarajuću negu, naročito u seoskim područjima.

Tokom godine, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu pomoć vodilo je trideset dva centra za socijalnu pomoć koji su pružali pomoć za 1.250 siročića, hiljadu sedamdeset petoro dece prestupnika, pedesetoro zlostavljane dece, šezdeseto osmoro napuštene dece i sto dvadesetoro dece sa problemima u ponašanju. Ministarstvo je takođe upravljalo hraniteljskim domovima i koordinisalo rad nevladinih organizacija pri smeštaju dece u privremena prihvatilišta. Prema podacima Centra za socijalni rad, devetnaestoro napuštene dece sa umanjenim sposobnostima, uzrasta od tri do osamnaest godina, živeli su u domovima koje vlada finansira gde su imali dvadesetčetvoročasovnu negu; njih petnaestoro je pohađalo specijalizovane škole.

Postoje izveštaji da je bilo brakova dece, naročito u etničkim zajednicama Roma, Aškalija, Egipćana i Albanaca, mada UNMIK nema statističke podatke o ovom problemu.

Postojala je trgovina dece u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja (vidi odeljak 5, trgovina ljudima).

Prema propisima UNMIK-a, trgovina ljudima je krivično delo; međutim, trgovina ženama i decom je i dalje ozbiljan problem. Bilo je dokaza da su u trgovinu ljudima umešani i međunarodni i lokalni zvaničnici.

Za trgovinu ljudima zaprećena je kazna od dve do dvadeset godina zatvora. Bavljenje ili pokušaj bavljenja trgovinom ljudima kažnjava se sa dve do dvanaest godina zatvora ili do petnaest godina ukoliko je žrtva maloletna; organizivanje grupe u cilju bavljenja trgovinom ljudima kažnjava se sa pet do dvadeset godina zatvora; omogućavanje trgovine ljudima iz nemara kažnjava se sa šest meseci do pet godina zatvora. Za seksualni odnos sa žrtvom trgovine ljudima može se izreći kazna do pet godina zatvora, dok je za seksualni odnos sa maloletnom žrtvom trgovine ljudima zaprećena kazna do deset godina zatvora. Dobrovoljna prostitucija kažnjava se kao lakši prestup; prostitke mogu biti kažnjene ali ne i njihovi klijenti ukoliko policija ne dokaže da je klijent svesno koristio usluge žrtve trgovine ljudima. Prostitucija je osnov za proterivanje.

Tokom godine, zajednička jedinica UNMIK-a i KPS-a za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima obavila je 2.025 provera barova (od kojih je 25 bilo tajno), 60 racija i 2.386 inspekcija, na osnovu čega je zatvoreno 76 lokala gde je postojala sumnja za umešanost u trgovinu ljudima. UNMIK i KPS su uhapsili 92 osobe zbog trgovine ljudima, a još 32 osobe uhapšene su zbog prestupa u vezi sa trgovinom ljudima, na osnovu čega je tužilaštvo podnelo 70 sudskih predmeta i donete su 22 presude. U julu su tri albanska državljana osuđena za trgovinu ljudima, prostituciju i silovanje na kazne zatvorom u trajanju od deset do dvanaest godina; u grupama koje se bave prostitucijom bilo je i pripadnika KPS-a. Faktori zbog kojih je broj optužnica veoma mali bili su sve veća usavršenost rada organizovanog kriminala na izbegavanju direktnih veza između žrtava i kriminalaca višeg ranga, odsustvo programa za zaštitu svedoka (iako je pismenim svedočenjem obezbeđena anonimnost na suđenju), neadekvatno obučeno sudsko osoblje i neuspešnost policije da se prilagodi novim tehnikama koje primenjuju trgovci ljudima.

Za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima odgovorni su UNMIK, KPS, granična policija, OEBS, Kancelarija za dobru upravu i ministarstva za zdravlje, obrazovanje, javne službe i rad i socijalnu pomoć. Akcioni plan PISG-a za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima objavljen je u maju u cilju objedinjavanja napora vlade u borbi protiv trgovine ljudima.

Kosovo je izvor, tranzitno područje i odredište za žrtve trgovine ljudima. Trgovina ljudima unutar Kosova je postala sve veći problem. Kao i prethodnih godina, ogroman broj žrtava su bile žene i deca koja su prebacivana skoro isključivo iz Istočne Evrope, sa Balkana i iz bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza na Kosovo, prvenstveno radi seksualnog iskorištavanja ali takođe i u cilju služenja po kućama ili prisilnog rada po barovima i restoranima, i preko Kosova u Makedoniju, Albaniju i Zapadnu Evropu. U toku godine, 30 od 55 identifikovanih žrtava trgovine ljudima repatrirano je ili vraćeno u njihove sredine.

U toku godine, Centar za zaštitu žena i dece pružio je pomoć za 59 žrtava trgovine ljudima, od kojih su 52 žene, 41 maloletnik, 50 lokalnih stanovnika, a 46 etnički Albanci. Prema podacima IOM-a, od žrtava van Kosova, kojima ova organizacija pruža pomoć od 2000. godine, preko 45 posto je bilo iz Moldavije, 19 posto iz Rumunije, 12 posto iz Ukrajine, dok su ostali bili iz Bugarske, Albanije, Rusije, Srbije i Crne Gore, Slovačke i Nigerije. Većina ovih žrtava je starosti između 18 i 24 godine. Podaci IOM-a ukazuju da je 64 posto kosovskih žrtava bilo predmet trgovine ljudima unutar Kosova, dok je otprilike 15 posto prebačeno u Makedoniju, a 13 posto u Albaniju i Italiju. Tokom godine, IOM je pomoć obezbedio za 19 žrtava — koji su svi bili maloletnici — a od kojih su njih osmoro bili sa Kosova.

Ukupan broj slučajeva gde su maloletnici žrtve trgovine ljudima povećao se od 2004. Deca i mlade devojke iz seoskih područja naročito su izloženi opasnosti da postanu žrtve trgovine ljudima, kao i oni iz gradskih sredina sa visokom stopom siromaštva, nezaposlenosti i nepismenosti. IOM je izvestio da je 73 posto Kosovara koji su bili žrtve trgovine ljudima završilo samo osnovnu školu.

Žrtve trgovine ljudima radile su prevashodno u seksualnoj industriji, uglavnom u javnim kućama i noćnim klubovima ali sve više i u privatnim domovima. Manje od 20 posto je izvestilo da su znali da će raditi u seksualnoj industriji kada su napustili svoje domove. Žrtve trgovine ljudima su izvestile da su bile redovno izložene batinama i silovanju, te da im je zdravstvena zaštita uskraćena, a putna i lična dokumenta oduzeta. Žrtve su često nalažene u teškom zdravstvenom i psihičkom stanju.

UNMIK je izvestio da su trgovci ljudima često radili kao sastavni deo koordinisanog rada elemenata organizovanog kriminala iz redova kosovskih Srba i kosovskih Albanaca, dok su Srbija i Crna Gora služili kao tranzitni centar za prebacivanje žrtava trgovine ljudima iz Istočne Evrope na Kosovo ili preko Kosova. Vlasnici barova i javnih kuća kupovali su žrtve od organizovanih kriminalnih grupa.

Metode trgovine ljudima sve su se više usavršavale. Reagujući na agresivnu kampanju suzbijanja trgovine ljudima koje je sprovela Jedinica UNMIK-a za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima, trgovci ljudima su prebacili komercijalni seks iz javnih barova i klubova u privatne domove gde je mnogo teže otkriti ovakvu aktivnost. Trgovci ljudima su sve više koristili novčane nagrade da bi žrtve nagovorili da odbiju pomoć. IOM je izvestio da je od 476 žrtava kojima je pomogao od 2000. godine, a od kojih je većina bila iz inostranstva, 40 posto postalo plen trgovaca ljudima tako što su prihvatili lažne ponude za posao u inostranstvu, 30 posto je tvrdilo da su kidnapovani, dok je 17 posto dobilo ponudu za brak. U 83 posto slučajeva, vrbovanje je obavljeno u ličnom kontaktu; u 45 posto slučajeva žrtvu je vrbovao poznanik, a u otprilike 10 posto slučajeva to je uradio prijatelj žrtve ili prijatelj porodice. Vrbovanje su najčešće obavljale žene.

Postoje anegdote koje potvrđuju da su u toku godine neki službenici UNMIK-a i PISG-a dozvoljavali trgovinu ljudima i da postoji komplikovana struktura finansijskih i rođačkih veza između političkih lidera i organizovanih kriminalnih mreža koji imaju finansijski interes u trgovini ljudima. Pored toga, neki lokalni tužioci su prijavili slučajeve gde je isti advokat zastupao i trgovca ljudima i žrtvu.

Tokom godine, zvaničniku UNHCR-a Rašidu Kunu je suđeno pred međunarodnim sudijom za seksualni odnos sa maloletnicom, žrtvom trgovine ljudima, i snabdevanje drugih maloletnih žrtava trgovine ljudima narkoticima u periodu između septembra i decembra 2004. Dana 2. novembra, Kun je osuđen na tri godine zatvora po jednoj tački optužnice za zlostavljanje osobe mlađe od šesnaest godina i falsifikovanje službenog dokumenta. Njegova saučesnica, Albanka, osuđena je na dve godine zatvora.

Mada propisi UNMIK-a predviđaju odbranu za žrtve trgovine ljudima u optužbama za prostituciju i nezakonit prelazak granice, neke lokalne sudije su povremeno neispravno izricale kazne zatvora za žrtve trgovine ljudima. Neke lokalne sudije su takođe pogrešno izdavale naloge za proterivanje žena osuđenih za prostituciju ili za neposedovanje dokumenata; međutim, UNMIK nije izvršavao takve naloge. Zbog kulturnih tabua i opasnosti od društvene diskriminacije većina repatriranih kosovskih žrtava nije svedočila o svojim iskustvima.

Međunarodne i lokalne nevladine organizacije bile su glavni izvor pomoći za žrtve trgovine ljudima. Lokalne nevladine organizacije, kao što su Ujedinjeni metodistički komitet za pomoć i Centar za zaštitu žena i dece, držali su prihvatilišta u kojima je žrtvama trgovine ljudima pružana zdravstvena nega i savetodavne usluge psihologa u saradnji sa UNMIK-om, OEBS-om i IOM-om. Privremena sigurna kuća je takođe pružala privremeno utočište žrtvama dok su rešavali da li će biti repatrirani ili će svedočiti protiv trgovaca ljudima. Policija je žrtve trgovine ljudima često upućivala na IOM preko regionalnih službenika OEBS-a.

PISG se uključio u pomaganje žrtvama trgovine ljudima u januaru kada je, u saradnji sa UNMIK-om i OEBS-om, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu pomoć otvorilo polunezavisnu pomoćnu jedinicu za smeštaj maloletnih žrtava trgovine ljudima, zlostavljanja i nasilja u porodici. Pet mladih odraslih ljudi dobilo je smeštaj, hranu, nastavu i obuku za posao u ovom objektu.

Međunarodne organizacije, a naročito IOM i nevladine organizacije, vodili su preventivne kampanje s ciljem sprečavanje trgovine ljudima. U julu je IOM pokrenuo dvanaestomesečnu kampanju za povećanje javne svesti o ovom problemu. Kancelarija premijera za dobru upravu, Ministarstvo obrazovanja i IOM obezbedili su materijale za edukaciju o borbi protiv trgovine ljudima za osnovne i srednje škole. U septembru je Kancelarija za dobru upravu započela javnu kampanju usmerenu na sprečavanje potencijalnih klijenata prostitutki koje su žrtve trgovine ljudima.

Propisi UNMIK-a zabranjuju diskriminaciju osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima pri zapošljavanju, obrazovanju, zdravstvenoj zaštiti i obezbeđivanju drugih državnih usluga; međutim, u praksi je postojala znatna diskriminacija. Zakon nije bio u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima i nije bilo nikakve ekspertize u pogledu prava osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima. Nije bilo ni zakona o starateljstvu sa odgovarajućim sudskim postupkom zaštite i zakon ne priznaje smeštaj osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima u institucije i nedobrovoljno lečenje kao posebna zakonska pitanja. Zakon propisuje pristup javnim zgradama; međutim, ovo nije bilo sprovedeno u praksi.

Prema podacima Međunarodne nevladine organizacije za prava osoba sa umanjenim mentalnim sposobnostima (MDRI), pacijenti sa umanjenim mentalnim sposobnostima i dalje su držani u izolovanim uslovima bez ikakvog zakonskog osnova, pošto ne postoji nikakav zakon koji bi regulisao proces smeštanja pojedinaca u institucije za psihijatrijsku ili socijalnu pomoć ili štitio prava u okviru ovih institucija. Povremeno su pojedinci kojima je potrebno lečenje u ustanovi za mentalno zdravlje osuđivani zbog izmišljenih ili sitnih prekršaja i upućivani u zatvore u kojima ne postoje sredstva za adekvatno lečenje.

Krajem godine, ni UNMIK ni PISG nisu podneli krivične prijave niti preduzeli ijednu zakonsku radnju u vezi sa izveštajem koji je MDRI objavio 2002. po kojem je MDRI našao brojne dokaze o fizičkom zlostavljanju, silovanju, nebrizi i proizvoljnom zatvaranju koje su izvršavali osoblje i pacijenti u ustanovama za mentalno zdravlje i negu pri Institutu u Štimlju, Domu za stare u Prištini i u prištinskoj Univerzitetskoj bolnici.

Ministarstva za obrazovanje, zdravlje, socijalnu pomoć i javne službe odgovorna su za zaštitu prava osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima.

Procenjeno je da postoji 14.000 osoba sa umanjenim mentalnim sposobnostima. Reagujući na izveštaj koji je MDRI objavio decembra 2004. godine, po kojem intitucionalna nega osoba sa umanjenim mentalnim sposobnostima dovodi do njihove izolacije, proizvoljnog zatvaranja i izloženosti fizičkom nasilju i seksualnom zlostavljanju, PISG je proširio mogućnosti za samostalan život ovakvih osoba i uložio između 144.000 i 240.000 dolara (120.000 i 200.000 evra) u četrnaest integrisanih domova koje je odobrio MDRI. . UNMIK je izvestio da je u toku godine Ministarstvo zdravlja preduzelo korake na razvoju administrativnih uputstava za ustanove za negu mentalnog zdravlja što je dovelo do prebacivanja zatvorenika sa umanjenim mentalnim sposobnostima u bolnice za mentalno zdravlje. CDHRF je izvestio da su zatvorenici sa umanjenim mentalnim sposobnostima često držani u zatvorskim prostorijama zbog nepostojanja mogućnosti za psihijatrijsko lečenje.

U oblasti zvanične i društvene diskriminacije na polju zapošljavanja, socijalnih usluga, upotrebe jezika, slobode kretanja, prava na povratak i drugih osnovnih prava i uznemiravanja pripadnika etničkih manjina, situacija je poboljšana u odnosu na prethodnu godinu, iako diskriminacija i dalje postoji, naročito kad su u pitanju etnički Srbi i Romi, Aškalije i Egipćani. Nasilje i zločini nad imovinom koji se sprovode nad manjinama manji su ali i dalje predstavljaju problem.

Policija UNMIK-a registrovala je otprilike 184 etnički motivisana krivična dela do kraja trećeg tromesečja. Međutim, prema podacima UNMIK-a, incidenti upereni protiv manjina uopšte uzev nisu prijavljivani u velikoj meri zbog nepoverenja u KPS i pravni sistem. U prvoj polovini godine, nevladine organizacije su registrovale otprilike šest incidenata nedeljno u kojima su vršena kamenovanja, napadi i uznemiravanje kosovskih Srba i drugih manjina, kao i krivična dela u vezi sa imovinom kao što su namerno paljenje i vandalsko ponašanje.

U toku godine, policija i KFOR pokrenuli su operacije velikih razmera radi privođenja osoba odgovornih za međuetničke nerede marta 2004. godine u kojima je poginulo osam etničkih Srba i dvanaest etničkih Albanaca, povređeno preko devetsto lica, u velikoj meri oštećeno ili uništeno više od devet stotina kuća etničkih Srba, Roma i Aškalija i trideset pravoslavnih crkava i manastira. U svom izveštaju iz meseca jula o aktivnostima preduzetim nakon nereda, UNMIK je obavestio da je 348 lica izvedeno pred sud zbog prestupa u vezi sa neredima. Od ovog broja,179 predmeta je završeno, 71 je čekao na suđenje, dok je 98 bilo pod istragom. Najmanje 57 teških slučajeva vodili su međunarodni tužioci a presuđene su kazne zatvorom u trajanju do šesnaest godina. Kosovske sudije su donele više od 85 presuda, a kazne su varirale od sudske opomene do novčanih kazni u iznosu do 240 dolara (200 evra) i zatvorskih kazni u trajanju od dva meseca do dve godine. Dana 19. maja, međunarodno veće sudija Okružnog suda u Gnjilanu osudilo je šest etničkih Albanaca zbog ubistva dvojice etničkih Srba za vreme nereda na zatvorske kazne u trajanju od tri i po do šesnaest godina.

Od sedam lica prvobitno pritvorenih pod sumnjom da su organizovali ili predvodili nerede, krivične istrage su vođene u predmetima četiri osobe: rezervnog komandanta KZK Nasera Šatrija; predsedavajućeg Udruženja boraca OVK u Peći Nedžmija Lajcija; predsedavajućeg Udruženja boraca OVK u Gnjilanu Šaćira Šaćirija; i predsedavajućeg Udruženja boraca OVK u Vučitrnu Saliha Salihua.

Krajem godine, PISG je obnovio više od 95 posto kuća oštećenih ili uništenih u martu 2004. i započeo obnovu crkava (vidi odeljak 2.c).

Etnički Albanci su uništavali, često namernim paljenjem, privatnu imovinu etničkih Srba; moguće je da su neki slučajevi nasilja nad Srbima bili pokušaji da se Srbi primoraju da prodaju imovinu. Propis UNMIK-a zabranjuje otkup na veliko u mnogim srpskim zajednicama da bi se u određenim sredinama sprečilo zastrašivanje vlasnika imovine koji su ujedno pripadnici manjina; međutim, taj propis se retko sprovodi u delo. Ombudsman i grupe za ljudska prava kritikovali su ovaj propis smatrajući da ograničava mogućnost etničkih Srba da koriste svoja imovinska prava.

Nastavljena je diskriminacija etničkih Srba u pogledu pružanja obrazovnih i zdravstvenih usluga PISG-a. Broj zaposlenih pripadnika manjina u PISG-u i dalje je mali i generalno ograničen na poslove nižeg ranga u vladi. U ministarstvima PISG-a zaposleni pripadnici manjina čine 11 posto uprkos cilju PISG-a da ih bude više od 16 posto.

Vlasti nisu postigle nikakav napredak tokom godine u istragama i krivičnom gonjenju u predmetima nasilja nad etničkim Srbima.

Romi žive u užasnom siromaštvu, a one koji žive u Mitrovici mnogi etnički Albanci smatraju saradnicima etničkih Srba; to je za posledicu imalo uništavanje njihovih kuća 1999. godine, a Romi su bili primorani da žive u kampovima za interno raseljena lica, gde se i dalje nalaze. Širom Kosova Romi su bili izloženi dubokoj socijalnoj i ekonomskoj diskriminaciji i često im nisu dostupni osnovni higijenski uslovi, zdravstvena zaštita i školovanje, a u velikoj meri zavise od humanitarne pomoći. Mada je bilo nekih uspešnih pokušaja da se Romi, Aškalije i Egipćani presele u kuće u kojima su živeli pre sukoba 1999. godine u Vučitrnu, i dalje postoje bezbednosni problemi.

Bošnjački lideri se i dalje žale da su hiljade pripadnika njihove zajednice napustile Kosovo zbog diskriminacije i nemogućnosti privređivanja.

U septembru su vlasti započele proces reforme lokalne uprave (decentralizacija) pokretanjem pilot projekata u jednoetničkim sredinama kao što su Đeneral Janković (albanska), Mamuše (turska) i Junik (albanska). Proces je odložen jer se opozicione stranke i dalje protive radnom programu vlade, vlada je sporo reagovala, a etnički Srbi su napuštali razgovore zbog nemogućnosti da postignu saglasnost o granicama dva pilot projekta u Gnjilanu i Gračanici gde su etnički Srbi većina.

Zakon zabranjuje diskriminaciju na osnovu seksualne orijentacije; međutim, tokom godine zakon nije primenjivan.

Zbog straha od tradicionalnih društvenih stavova prema homoseksualnosti, većina lezbijki i gej osoba kriju svoju seksualnu orijentaciju. Lezbijke i gej osobe se uopšte uzev osećaju nesigurno, a mnogi od njih su prijavili da im je lična sigurnost ugrožena. Prethodno su štampani mediji učvrstili ovakve stavove objavljivanjem, bez povlačenja, negativnih tekstova o homoseksualnosti koji su okarakterisali lezbijke i gej osobe kao mentalno obolele i sklone seksualnom zlostavljanju dece. Pojedini homoseksualci su takođe izvestili o diskriminaciji na radnom mestu. Najmanje jedna politička stranka, proislamska Stranka pravde, u svojoj političkoj platformi osuđuje homoseksualnost.

Dana 31. decembra, lokalni mediji su objavili da su pripadnici KPS-a i prisutni lekar verbalno maltretirali dva mlada muškarca nakon što ih je nepoznata osoba napala nožem. KPS je suspendovao svoja dva pripadnika koji ne primaju platu dok čekaju na istragu.

Propisi UNMIK-a dozvoljavaju radnicima da se po svom izboru učlanjuju i osnivaju sindikate bez prethodnog ovlašćenja ili preteranih zahteva, i radnici to pravo koriste u praksi.

Jedini značajan sindikat, Udruženje nezavisnih sindikata Kosova (BSPK) ima preko 120.000 članova; od toga je zaposleno samo 50.000 članova (otprilike 10 posto svih zaposlenih). Propisi UNMIK-a zabranjuju diskriminaciju sindikata; međutim, u praksi su neki sindikalni zvaničnici prijavili slučajeve diskriminacije. BSPK je izvestio da samo mali broj preduzeća poštuje propis o zabrani diskriminacije sindikata i tvrdio da se radnička prava krše u svim sektorima, uključujući međunarodne organizacije, gde zaposleni nemaju socijalno osiguranje ni penzije.

Propisi UNMIK-a dozvoljavaju sindikatima da svoje aktivnosti sprovode neometano i UNMIK je ovo pravo štitio u praksi. Propisi UNMIK-a takođe predviđaju pravo na organizovanje i kolektivno pregovaranje bez ometanja, a vlada nije ograničavala ovo pravo u praksi; međutim, kolektivno pregovaranje se odigralo samo u jednoj prilici. Propisi UNMIK-a ne priznaju pravo na štrajk; međutim, štrajkovi u praksi nisu zabranjeni i bilo ih je tokom godine.

Propisi UNMIK-a zabranjuju prinudni i obavezni rad, uključujući i rad dece; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da ima takvih aktivnosti (vidi odeljak 5 i 6.d).

Propisi i procedure UNMIK-a zabranjuju iskorištavanje dece na radnom mestu, u šta spada i prinudni i obavezni rad i obezbeđivanje prihvatljivih uslova rada; međutim, UNMIK i PISG su retko reagovali kada bi se ovakve aktivnosti ustanovile.

Po Zakonu o radu, koji je donet pre 1989. godine i još uvek je na snazi, donja starosna granica za zapošljavanje jeste šesnaest godina, odnosno osamnaest kod poslova gde postoji verovatnoća da su štetni po zdravlje, sigurnost i moral mlade osobe, ali se rad dozvoljava deci koja imaju petnaest godina pod uslovom da nije štetan ili da ne ometa redovno pohađanje nastave.

U selima i poljoprivrednim sredinama, mlađa deca obično u poslu pomažu porodici. Gradska deca su često obavljala razne neprijavljene sitne poslove, kao što je pranje prozora na automobilima i prodaja novina, cigareta ili telefonskih kartica na ulici; broj takve dece povećao se tokom prošle godine iako o tome ni UNMIK ni PISG nemaju statističkih podataka. Neka deca takođe obavljaju fizički posao kao što je prevoz robe.

Trgovina decom pre svega u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja takođe je predstavljala ozbiljan problem (vidi odeljak 5).

U saradnji sa UNMIK-om, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu pomoć koordinisalo je politiku zaštite dece, a odeljenje Ministarstva za socijalnu pomoć imalo je zadatak da obezbedi zaštitu dece; međutim, tokom godine, Ministarstvo nije obavljalo inspekcije niti je na drugi način sprovelo zakone o zabrani rada dece.

Iako propisi UNMIK-a predviđaju minimalnu zaradu, ona još nije usvojena. Mada mnoge međunarodne agencije i nevladine organizacije isplaćaju odgovarajuće zarade, prosečna mesečna plata stalno zaposlenog radnika u javnom sektoru u iznosu od 181 dolara (151 evra) i prosečna mesečna plata u privatnom sektoru u iznosu od 250 dolara (208 evra) nedovoljne su da bi se obezbedio pristojan životni standard radnika i njegove porodice.

Propisi UNMIK-a predviđaju standardnu četrdesetočasovnu radnu nedelju, pauze za odmor, ograničavaju prekovremeni rad na dvadeset časova nedeljno, odnosno četrdeset časova mesečno, propisuju plaćanje nadoknade za prekovremeni rad i zabranjuju prekomerni obavezan prekovremeni rad. Inspektorat rada pri Ministarstvu za rad i socijalnu pomoć odgovoran je za sprovođenje radnih standarda. Inspektorat je prvenstveno savetovao poslodavce i novčano kaznio samo jednog poslodavca za kršenje ovih standarda. Poslodavci često nisu primenjivali ove propise zbog male zaposlenosti i velike nezaposlenosti na Kosovu.

Inspektorat rada je odgovoran za sprovođenje zdravstvenih i sigurnosnih standarda ali nema obučeno osoblje tako da se ovo ne obavlja efikasno. Zakon ne dozvoljava zaposlenima da u slučaju opasnosti napuste radno mesto, a da pri tome ne rizikuju da će biti otpušteni.

Crna gora je konstitutivna republika Državne Zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore u kojoj živi otprilike 673.000 stanovnika. Republika ima predsednički i parlamentarni sistem vlasti. Predsednički izbori održani 2003. sprovedeni su generalno u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima. Iako su civilne vlasti održavale načelno efikasnu kontrolu nad snagama bezbednosti, bilo je nekoliko slučajeva gde su elementi snaga bezbednosti delovali nezavisno od vlasti.

Vlada je generalno poštovala ljudska prava svojih građana i pokazala povećanu brigu u pogledu zaštite ljudskih prava; međutim, bilo je problema u izvesnim oblastima. Problemi prijavljeni u pogledu ljudskih prava su sledeći:

Nije bilo izveštaja da su vlasti ili njihovi predstavnici počinili proizvoljna ili nezakonita ubistva.

Zakon zabranjuje ovakvu praksu; međutim, policija je povremeno batinala osumnjičene za vreme hapšenja ili u pritvoru za vreme ispitivanja.

Dana 1. spetembra, policija je izvršila raciju u glavnom kaznenom zavodu nakon što je 30. avgusta ubijen načelnik kriminalne policije. Za vreme racije, policija je navodno tukla zatvorenika s namerom da im nanese teške unutrašnje povrede pri tome ne ostavljajući vidljive tragove batina. Povređeno je između 18 i 31 zatvorenika, od kojih neki teško. I ministar unutrašnjih poslova i vrhovni državni tužilac odmah su najavili istragu postupka policije; krajem godine istraga je bila u toku.

Lokalni tužilac je nakon istrage odbacio tužbu protiv policajaca odgovornih da su 2003. godine navodno pretukli Igora Zindovića.

Lokalni državni tužilac je podigao optužnicu protiv policijskog inspektora Dobrašina Vulića koji je 2003. godine navodno pretukao Nikolu Popovića. Suđenje je krajem godine bilo u toku.

Uslovi u zatvorima su generalno u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima; međutim, neki problemi i dalje postoje. Zatvorski objekti su zastareli, prenatrpani, slabo održavani i bez odgovorajućih higijenskih uslova.

Po zakonu je obavezno da se maloletnici drže odvojeno od odraslih te da se pritvorenici koji čekaju na suđenje drže odvojeno od osuđenih počinilaca krivičnih dela; međutim, ovo nije uvek bio slučaj u praksi zbog prenatrpanosti zatvora.

Vlada je dozvoljavala da zatvore posete posmatrači za ljudska prava, među kojima Međunarodni komitet Crvenog krsta (ICRC) i lokalne nevladine organizacije. I Međunarodni komitet Crvenog krsta i Helsinški komitet Crne Gore su tokom godine u nekoliko navrata posetili zatvore. Zaposleni u Kancelariji ombudsmana su posećivali zatvore i sastajali se sa pritvorenicima i zatvorenicima bez prethodne najave.

Zakon zabranjuje proizvoljno hapšenje i pritvor i vlada generalno ove zabrane poštuje.

I lokalna i granična policija su pod kontrolom Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova. Mada su ove službe generalno bile delotvorne u održavanju osnovnog reda i zakona, njihova efikasnost u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala bila je ograničena. Značajan deo policijskih snaga čine Bošnjaci (bosanski muslimani), od kojih su mnogi raspoređeni u Sandžaku, uglavnom muslimanskom području na severu. Nekažnjivost je bila problem. Vlada je vršila istrage policijskih zloupotreba, ali su retko vođeni krivični postupci i izricane presude protiv pripadnika policije.

Korupcija je bila problem; malo, tesno povezano društvo nije ohrabrivalo prijavljivanje slučajeva korupcije i kriminalcima je omogućavalo pristup policajcima.

Za hapšenje je neophodan sudski nalog ili «izrazita sumnja da je osumnjičeni počinio prestup». Osumnjičeni može biti zadržan u pritvoru do 48 sati pre nego što bude optužen i izveden pred sudiju. Prilikom izvođenja pred sud, pritvorenici dobijaju obaveštenje o prestupima za koje su optuženi, a sudija donosi početnu sudsku odluku o zakonitosti pritvora. U praksi su pritvorenici uglavnom izvođeni pred sud u zakonski dozvoljenom periodu od 48 sati nakon hapšenja. Zakon predviđa dostupnost advokata u ovom početnom periodu, ali se to nije često dešavalo. Pritvorenicima je ubrzo po zatvaranju bio dozvoljen kontakt sa porodicom. Sistem kaucije postoji; međutim, nije često korišten jer građani retko mogu da prikupe novac za kauciju.

Dugotrajna odlaganja suđenja, u kombinaciji sa teškoćama prilikom prikupljanja novca za kauciju, povremeno su za posledicu imala dugotrajan pritvor pred suđenje. Otprilike dve trećine svih zatvorenika čine pritvorenici koji čekaju suđenje, a prosečno vreme njihovog pritvora bilo je pet meseci.

Zakon predviđa nezavisno sudstvo; međutim, nedostatak saradnje između policije i tužilaca, nagomilani predmeti, često primitivni objekti u kojima se vrše suđenja i korupcija sudstva i dalje su bili problem. Vlada je povremeno uticala na tužioce iz političkih razloga. Bilo je izveštaja da su sudije donosile nepravilne odluke iz straha od osvete ili gubitka položaja ukoliko bi doneli odluke protiv određenih stranaka.

Sudski sistem se sastoji od opštinskih sudova, viših (ili okružnih) sudova i Vrhovnog suda na republičkom nivou. Po zakonu je obavezno osnivanje Apelacionog suda i Administrativnog suda u cilju smanjenja obima posla Vrhovnog suda; ovi sudovi osnovani su tokom godine. Predmeti se dodeljuju sudu koji ima zakonsku i fizičku jurisdikciju.

Krivični sudski postupci su javni; porota ne postoji. Optuženi ima pravo da prisustvuje svom suđenju i pravovremeno se konsultuje sa advokatom. Optuženi ima pravo na advokata; međutim, troškove advokata država snosi jedino ukoliko je zaprećena kazna veća od zatvorske kazne u trajanju od pet godine. Optuženi i njihovi advokati imaju pristup dokazima u posedu države koji su relevantni za njihove predmete. Optuženi se smatra nevinim dok se ne dokaže suprotno i ima pravo na žalbu; mada je vlada povremeno uticala na sudstvo, ova prava su uopšte uzev bila poštovana u praksi.

Zakon zabranjuje ovakva dela, a vlada generalno poštuje ove zabrane u praksi. U septembru je izmenjen zakon koji sada propisuje da Agencija za nacionalnu bezbednost mora nabaviti sudsko ovlašćenje za prisluškivanje. Neki posmatrači su smatrali da je policija selektivno koristila prisluškivanje i praćenje opozicionih stranaka i drugih grupa. Mnogi pojedinci i organizacije radili su pod pretpostavkom da jesu ili mogu biti praćeni.

Proterivanje Roma iz bespravnih naselja, a ponekad i iz legalnog mesta boravka bio je problem (vidi odeljak 5).

Zakon predviđa slobodu govora i štampe; međutim, u praksi je bilo ograničavanja slobode štampe.

Postojao je mali broj verodostojnih optužbi o postojanju političkih i poslovnih pritisaka na medije. U decembru je Savet Radio-televizije Crne Gore (RTCG) otpustio direktora državne televizije TVCG (TV Crna Gora), objašnjavajući ovaj potez kao reakciju na propust direktora da podnese programsku shemu TVCG. Uredništvo TVCG je podnelo ostavke u znak protesta. Neki posmatrači su na ovaj otkaz gledali kao na pokušaj da se uredništvo TVCG približi pozicijama vlade.

Nezavisni mediji su bili aktivni i generalno su iznosili široku paletu političkih i društvenih gledišta bez ograničavanja vlasti.

Nije bilo izveštaja o novinarskoj autocenzuri; međutim, neke nevladine organizacije su upozoravale da je mogućnost podnošenja tužbe za klevetu protiv novinara, koju prati potencijalno velika novčana kazna u iznosu do 16.800 dolara(14.000 evra), mogla odvratiti novinare od slobodnog izveštavanja o događajima.

Uprkos nekim pokušajima da se mediji odvoje od uticaja vlade, izvesni mediji su zadržali tesne veze sa vladom. Privatizovana je samo jedna od desetak lokalnih novinskih kuća u državnom vlasništvu.

Štampane medije čine privatne novinske kuće i jedne nacionalne državne novine koje objavljuju raznovrsne domaće i strane tekstove.

Postoji široka paleta državnih i privatnih radio i televizijskih kuća, među kojima je državna radio i televizijska stanica RTCG kao i šesnaest privatnih televizijskih i trideset devet privatnih radio stanica. Domaće radio i televizijske stanice redovno reemituju određeni program beogradske Televizije BK i Nacionalne televizije Srbije, kao i brojne strane programe.

Suđenje jednoj osobi za ubistvo Duška Jovanovića, direktora i glavnog i odgovornog urednika vodećeg opozicionog dnevnog lista «Dan», izvršeno maja 2004. godine, još je bilo u toku krajem godine. Iako su motivi ubistva ostali nepoznati, «Dan» i druge medijske kuće su ubistvo nazvali najvećim napadom na slobodu štampe i sigurnost novinara. Dana 30. avgusta, nepoznate osobe su pucale i ubile glavnog policijskog zvaničnika koji je vodio istragu o ubistvu Jovanovića i drugim značajnim nerešenim ubistvima.

Zvaničnici su povremeno podnosili ili pretili da će podneti tužbe za klevete protiv medijskih organizacija kada su ih optuživali za nepravilnosti u radu. Nije bilo objavljenih slučajeva direktne cenzure koju je vlada sprovodila nad medijima. Za razliku od prethodnih godina, državni zvaničnici su protiv medijskih organizacija podneli svega nekoliko tužbi za klevete. Jedan ministar vlade i rukovodstvo opštinske vlade tužili su opozicioni dnevni list «Dan» za klevetu i objavljivanje neistinitih informacija. Dana 17. januara, Osnovni sud u Podgorici je novčano kaznio izdavača dnevnog lista «Publika», koji je prestao da izlazi, po tužbi za klevetu koju je podneo šef bivše Službe državne bezbednosti (SDB). Uprkos nekim nerešenim sudskim predmetima i postojećem riziku od tužbe za klevetu, tokom godine mediji su pokazali blago povećanje spremnosti da kritikuju vladu.

Zakon propisuje kontrolne strukture stvorene da bi se bivši državni mediji izolovali od direktne stranačke kontrole; među njima je Savet radio-televizije (RTVCG) koji je od vlade preuzeo uređivački nadzor nad nacionalnim državnim radijom i televizijom. Savet RTVCG je osnovan 2003. godine, a njegovi članovi su izabrani iz raznih nevladinih i profesionalnih organizacija; međutim, neki posmatrači su primetili da su mnogi članovi RTVCG bili tesno povezani sa vladom. U decembru je Savet doneo odluku da ne prihvati programsku shemu koju je predložio direktor TVCG zbog čega je otpušten nakon čega je kompletno uredništvo podnelo ostavke.

Od 2003. godine radio i televizijske stanice su dobile licence za emitovanje koje izdaje nezavisno kontrolno telo, koju je tu nadležnost preuzelo od vlade. Tokom godine, kontrolno telo je dodelilo frekvencije za šesnaest televizijskih i trideset devet radio stanica na svom prvom javnom tenderu.

Vlada nije ograničavala pristup internetu niti akademske slobode; međutim, grupa profesora i drugih prosvetnih stručnjaka iz Nikšića protestovala je što ih je vlada otpustila jer su odbili da predaju «maternji jezik», tvrdeći da imaju dozvolu da predaju jedino «srpski» jezik. Vlada je nedavno preimenovala «srpski» u «maternji jezik» tvrdeći da promena odražava postojanje različitih dijalekata koji su u upotrebi. Profesori su tvrdili da je ponašanje vlade politički motivisano. Vlada je izjavila da su otkazi opravdani kasnijim štrajkom prosvetnih radnika, koji je vlada protumačila kao kršenje ugovora (vidi odeljak 6.b).

Zakon predviđa slobodu okupljanja i udruživanja i vlada je generalno poštovala ova prava u praksi.

Zakon predviđa slobodu veroispovesti i u praksi je vlada uopšte uzev poštovala ovo pravo. Ne postoji državna religija, iako republički Ustav navodi Pravoslavnu crkvu, Islamsku zajednicu i Rimokatoličku crkvu kao jednake i odvojene od države; međutim, Srpska pravoslavna crkva ima povlašćen položaj u praksi.

Iako ne postoji zahtev za formalnu registraciju vera, verske grupe su morale da se registruju kao grupe građana pri republičkom Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova i Odeljenju za statistiku da bi dobili status pravnog lica koji je neophodan za kupovinu nekretnina i druge administrativne poslove. U praksi nije bilo problema sa registracijom.

Nije primećen nikakav napredak u povraćaju ranije oduzete crkvene imovine. Srpska pravoslavna crkva je tvrdila da postoji diskriminacija u načinu na koji vlada primenjuje zakon o restituciji. U toku godine, Crkva je podnela tužbu Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava (ECHR), navodeći da je odlaganje u rešavanju njenih zahteva u vezi sa imovinom koju su vlasti oduzele posle Drugog svetskog rata politički motivisano. ECHR do kraja godine nije radio na ovom predmetu.

Verska i etnička pripadnost su tesno povezane i u mnogim slučajevima je bilo teško utvrditi da li su razlozi diskriminacije prevashodno verske ili etničke prirode. Manjinske verske zajednice su izvestile o boljoj saradnji sa vladinim organizacijama, što je dovelo do veće mogućnosti za normalan rad; međutim, neki elementi društva nastavili su sa diskriminacijom takvih zajednica.

Tenzije i dalje postoje između kanonski nepriznate Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve i Srpske pravoslavne crkve. U junu, postavljanje montažne srpske pravoslavne kapele na poznatu planinu u jugozapadnom delu Republike, uz pomoć helikoptera Vojske Državne Zajednice, izazvalo je protivljenje nepripadnika Srpske pravoslavne crkve, koji su ovo smatrali političkim činom.

Nije bilo izveštaja o antisemitskom ponašanju. Prema izveštaju državne kancelarije za statistiku iz septembra 2004. zaključeno je da ne postoji organizovana jevrejska zajednica. Mali broj rasutih pripadnika jevrejske veroispovesti verovatno živi u Republici.

Više detalja videti u Međunarodnom izveštaju o slobodi veroispovesti za 2005.

d. Sloboda kretanja unutar zemlje, putovanja u inostranstvo, iseljavanje i repatrijacija

Postoji otprilike 17.000 interno raseljenih lica sa Kosova. Većina ovih interno raseljenih lica su etnički Crnogorci ili Srbi; međutim, ima i otprilike 1.300 Roma i ostalih. Romsko interno raseljeno stanovništvo je živelo u kolektivnim centrima gde imaju ograničen pristup zdravstvenoj zaštiti i školovanju. Diskriminacija i uznemiravanje Roma i dalje predstavlja ozbiljan problem (vidi odeljak 5).

Zakon ne predviđa davanje azila niti izbegličkog statusa u skladu sa Konvencijom Ujedinjenih nacija iz 1951. koja se odnosi na Status izbeglica i protokol iz 1967. Državna Zajednica je usvojila Zakon o azilu koji daje okvir ali ne spominje postupke i sprovođenje. U praksi vlada je pružala izvesnu zaštitu od ponovnog proterivanja, tj. vraćanja osoba u zemlju u kojoj strahuju od progona. Vlada je davala izbeglički status ali ne i azil. Prema ustanovljenim procedurama, predmeti potencijalnih izbeglica na razmatranje su upućivani Kancelariji Visokog komesara Ujedinjenih nacija za izbeglice (UNHCR) u Beogradu. U toku godine nijedna osoba nije zatražila izbeglički status niti od crnogorske vlade niti od UNHCR-a.

Vlada je takođe bila spremna da pruži privremenu zaštitu osobama koje se u skladu sa Konvencijom Ujedinjenih nacija iz 1951. koja se odnosi na Status izbeglica i protokolom iz 1967. godine, ne mogu okarakterisati kao izbeglice; međutim, u toku godine niko nije zatražio takvu vrstu zaštite.

Vlada je uopšte uzev sarađivala sa UNHCR-om i drugim humanitarnim organizacijama u pružanju pomoći izbeglicama i osobama koje traže azil. Uslovi za izbeglice su se razlikovali; oni koji su u zemlji imali rođake ili imovinu bili su u mogućnosti da nađu smeštaj, a, u nekim slučajevima, i zaposlenje.

Zakon predviđa pravo građana da mirnim putem promene vladu i građani su ovo pravo koristili na periodičnim, slobodnim i fer izborima koji su održani na osnovu opšteg prava glasa.

Filip Vujanović je izabran za predsednika 2003. godine na izborima za koje je posmatračka misija Organizacije za bezbednost i saradnju Evrope (OEBS) ocenila da su generalno sprovedeni u skladu sa međunarodnim standardima, kao što je bio slučaj i sa parlamentarnim izborima održanim 2002. U seoskim sredinama, muževi uobičajeno govore svojim suprugama kako da glasaju.

U Parlamentu koji ima sedamdeset pet poslanika radilo je osam žena, a u vladi dve.

U Skupštini koja ima sedamdeset pet poslanika, bilo je jedanaest pripadnika etničkih manjina, dok ih je u vladi bilo troje. Etnički Albanci i Bošnjaci su učestvovali u političkom procesu, a njihove stranke, kandidati i glasači na svim izborima; Romi su izuzetno nedovoljno zastupljeni u vladi.

U javnosti je rašireno mišljenje da korupcija u vladi postoji, naročito u izvršnoj vlasti i sudstvu. U septembru je vodeća nevladina organizacija objavila obimnu studiju prema kojoj su nejasni zakonski propisi i velika sloboda odlučivanja u primeni državne vlasti institucionalizovali korupciju kao «najefikasniji način rada». Takođe su veoma česte optužbe da korupcija utiče na privatizaciju privrede; posmatrači su primetili da odsustvo transparentnosti sprečava utvrđivanje valjanosti ovih optužbi. Bilo je izveštaja da su zvaničnici restrukturirali firme pogodne za privatizaciju da bi odvratili spoljne kupce i tako ih prepustili kontroli zvaničnika.

Dana 8. novembra, Skupština je usvojila Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacijama; početna primena ovog zakona dala je mešovite ali generalno pozitivne rezultate, a vlasti su u praksi sve više obezbeđivale pristup državnim informacijama. Građani su mogli pregledati tajne dosijee koje je o njima vodio SDB (prethodnik Agencije za nacionalnu bezbednost) od 1945. do 1989. godine.

Odeljak 4 Stav vlade o istragama međunarodnih i nevladinih organizacija o navodnim slučajevima kršenja ljudskih prava

Brojne domaće i međunarodne grupe za ljudska prava su generalno radile bez ograničenja vlade, vršile istrage i objavljivale svoja saznanja o slučajevima u vezi sa ljudskim pravima. Zvaničnici vlade su sarađivali i reagovali na njihova gledišta.

Ljudska prava su istraživale brojne nevladine organizacije, uključujući Helsinški komitet Crne Gore i Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava. Nevladinim organizacijama pripala je zasluga za pomoć u cilju smanjivanja policijske brutalnosti i ostalih zloupotreba. Vlada je uopšte uzev sarađivala sa međunarodnim organizacijama.

Vlada je sarađivala sa Međunarodnim krivičnim tribunalom za bivšu Jugoslaviju tako što je dozvoljavala pristup svedocima.

Ombudsman za ljudska prava nema ovlašćenja nad radom sudova, izuzev u slučajevima produžavanja sudskog postupka, očiglednih zloupotreba postupka i propusta u sprovođenju sudskih odluka. Kancelarija ombudsmana je radila bez mešanja vlade i stranačkog uplitanja, a vlada joj je obezbedila odgovarajuća sredstva. Ombudsman se generalno smatra efikasnim. Nakon što ustanovi kršenje ljudskih prava i sloboda, ombudsman može pokrenuti disciplinski postupak ili tražiti otpuštanje počinioca prekršaja. Neodazivanje na zahtev ombudsmana da mu se omogući pristup zvaničnim podacima, dokumentima ili prostorijama, ili neodazivanje na zahtev ombudsmana da se svedoči u nekom sudskom postupku povlači novčanu kaznu deset do dvadeset puta veću od minimalne mesečne zarade od 600 do1.200 dolara (500 to 1.000 evra). U toku godine niko nije ovako kažnjen, pošto se u praksi sve preporuke ombudsmana poštuju. U martu je kancelarija ombudsmana objavila svoj prvi godišnji izveštaj u Skupštini. Najveći broj žalbi odnosi se na odlaganja u sudovima i rad lokalne uprave; svega nekoliko žalbi odnosilo se na nepravilnosti u radu policije. Uopšte uzev, vlada i sudovi su sprovodili preporuke ombudsmana.

Parlamentarni odbor za ljudska prava i dalje postoji, ali je tokom godine bio neaktivan.

Zakon zabranjuje diskriminaciju na osnovu rase, pola, umanjenih sposobnosti, jezika i društvenog statusa; međutim, u praksi vlada ove zabrane nije efikasno sprovodila. Nasilje i diskriminacija žena, zlostavljanje dece, trgovina ljudima i diskriminacija etničkih manjina bili su problemi.

Iako je nasilje nad ženama, uključujući supružničko zlostavljanje, nezakonito, i dalje postoji u velikoj meri, a naročito u seoskim sredinama. U toku godine, zvanične službe, uključujući policiju, bolje su reagovale na nasilje u porodici; međutim, njihovi napori su još uvek nedovoljni. Nasilje u porodici je krivično delo za koje je zaprećena novčana kazna ili kazna zatvorom u trajanju do deset godina u zavisnosti od težine prestupa, odnosno u trajanju od tri do dvanaest godina ukoliko je u pitanju smrtni ishod. Žrtve nasilja u porodici vlastima retko prijavljuju ovakve slučajeve. Prema istraživanju koje je 2004. godine obavila jedna nevladina organizacija, samo 30 posto žrtava policiji prijavljuje slučajeve nasilja u porodici; međutim, prestupi vezani za nasilje u porodici predstavljaju 30 posto svih policijskih hapšenja. Vlada je pokrenula krivične postupke u malom broju slučajeva nasilja u porodici; međutim, nevladine organizacije su izvestile da sudije odbijaju da odrede zatvorske kazne mada tužioci za osuđene prestupnike rutinski zahtevaju zatvorske kazne; većina presuda je uslovna.

Silovanje, uključujući i supružničko silovanje, nezakonito je. Vlada je nastojala da primeni zakon, ali po duboko ukorenjenim društvenim stavovima, žrtva silovanja je i dalje izložena sramoti, a sudije često dozvoljavaju takvo šikaniranje žrtava tokom sudskog postupka. Zbog toga žrtve nerado prijavljuju silovanje, uključujući i supružničko silovanje. Kazna zaprećena za silovanje, uključujući i supružničko silovanje, jeste kazna zatvora od jedne do deset godina; međutim, sudski postupak za ovo krivično delo može se pokrenuti samo na osnovu tužbe koju podnese žrtva. Prema jednoj lokalnoj nevladinoj organizaciji, 80 posto slučajeva nasilja u porodici gde su žrtve žene jeste supružničko silovanje; međutim, nije bilo izveštaja da je neko optužen za silovanje.

Prostitucija je krivično delo jednako kao što je to i posredovanje i omogućavanje prostitucije. Vlada je preduzela aktivne mere za suzbijanje prostitucije, posredovanja i omogućavanja prostitucije. Prostitucija je postojala ali nije bila veoma rasprostranjena.

Trgovina ženama u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja bila je problem (vidi odeljak 5, trgovina ljudima).

Seksualno uznemiravanje je predstavljalo problem. Seksualno uznemiravanje je nezakonito ali ga društvo uglavnom toleriše. Mada su žrtve oklevale da prijave uznemiravanje, policija je obično bila delotvorna kada je bilo zatraženo da interveniše.

Žene nemaju jednak položaj kao muškarci i veoma mali borj žena se nalazi na položajima visokog ranga u vladi i privredi, mada sve veći broj žena radi kao sudija, a mnoge žene su zaposlene u stručnim oblastima kao što je pravo, nauka i medicina. Tradicionalno je patrijarhalno shvatanje prema kojem žena treba da bude podređena muškim članovima porodice, a žena je i dalje izložena diskriminaciji kod kuće. U seoskim sredinama, posebno među manjinskim zajednicama, žene nisu uvek u mogućnosti da vrše kontrolu nad imovinom, a muževi obično govore suprugama kako da glasaju.

Po zakonu, žene bi trebalo da budu plaćene jednako kao i muškarci za isti posao; međutim, u praksi to nije uvek tako. Vladina Kancelarija za jednakost polova ima zadatak da ženama obezbedi zakonska i ekonomska prava.

Vlada je bila posvećena zdravstvenim i obrazovnim potrebama dece; međutim, nedovoljna sredstva su bila prepreka za ostvarivanje ovog cilja.

Sistem obrazovanja predviđa osmogodišnje besplatno, obavezno opšte obrazovanje. Dečaci i devojčice jednako su tretirani u osnovnim i srednjim školama i jednako ih pohađaju. Mada je deci etničkih Albanaca obezbeđena nastava na maternjem jeziku, neki Albanci su kritikovali vladu da ne razvija nastavni program po kojem bi Albanci učili o svojoj etničkoj kulturi i istoriji. Većina romske dece dobija oskudno ili nikakvo obrazovanje nakon završene osnovne škole; međutim, u nastojanju da reši ovaj problem, vlada je u toku godine obezbedila 13.000 udžbenika na romskom jeziku.

Zlostavljanje dece se nedovoljno prijavljuje, a vlada nije učinila gotovo ništa da ovaj problem reši. Zakon ne dozvoljava maloletnicima da iznesu optužbe za krivična dela bez prisustva roditelja ili staratelja; usled toga, vlastima nije prijavljen gotovo nijedan slučaj zlostavljanja dece ili incesta.

Brakovi dece su poseban problem među Romima. U romskoj zajednici, dečaci i devojčice se generalno venčavaju kao veoma mladi, s tim što devojčice u brak ulaze nešto ranije od dečaka.

Trgovina devojčicama u cilju seksualnog iskorištavanja bila je problem (vidi odeljak 5, trgovina ljudima).

Zakonom je zabranjena trgovina ljudima; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da je obavljana trgovina ljudima u, iz i unutar Republike. Bilo je izveštaja da su policija i drugi zvaničnici umešani u trgovinu ljudima; međutim, bilo je znatno manje izveštaja nego prethodnih godina.

Zakonom je predviđena zatvorska kazna u trajanju do deset godina za sve prestupe u vezi sa trgovinom ljudima. U toku godine, šest lica je uhapšeno i optuženo na osnovu sumnje da su trgovali ljudima. Nekoliko slučajeva iz ranijih godina i dalje su na sudu. Tužioci su u toku godine podneli sedam novih krivičnih prijava za trgovinu ljudima i uspeli da šest lica bude osuđeno u predmetima koji su podneti prethodnih godina. Prosečna dužina zatvorskih kazni izrečenih za trgovinu ljudima povećala se tokom godine, sa šest meseci do dve i po godine.

Nacionalni koordinator na nivou Državne Zajednice, koga je naimenovalo Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, predsedava radnom grupom za borbu protiv trgovine ljudima koja je sastavljena od predstavnika relevantnih ministarstava (unutrašnji poslovi, zdravstvo, rad i obrazovanje), socijalnih službi, OEBS-a, Međunarodne organizacije za migracije (IOM) i nevladinih organizacija. Vlada je koordinisala svoje napore u borbi protiv trgovine ljudima sa drugim zemljama u regionu, naročito preko Južnoevropskog inicijativnog centra za saradnju u Bukureštu.

Republika je i dalje prevashodno tranzitno područje za trgovinu ljudima, naročito ženama i decom, a u manjoj meri i odredište. Prema podacima policije, žrtve dolaze iz Srbije i često produžavaju u Italiju i druge zapadnoevropske zemlje. Policija i nevladine organizacije su prijavile veći broj slučajeva trgovine ljudima unutar zemlje, naročito gde su žrtve iz Srbije. Teško je prikupiti statističke podatke o trgovini ljudima jer trgovci sve manje drže žrtve u javnim lokalima kao što su barovi i restorani. Žrtve su uglavnom žene skromnog obrazovanja i obično, mada ne i uvek, siromašne. IOM je izvestio da su šest od petnaest žrtava trgovine ljudima, koji su smešteni tokom godine u lokalna prihvatilišta, bili maloletnici.

Trgovci ljudima su često bili građani koji povremeno rade sa stranim partnerima i uglavnom su uključeni u organizovani kriminal. Obično su se služili prevarom da bi namamili žrtve, a prinudom i silom da bi žrtve sprečili da odu.

Bilo je izveštaja o umešanosti policije i drugih zvaničnika u trgovinu ljudima, na primer da je granična policija i carinska služba primala mito i omogućavala prelazak granice trgovcima ljudima i njihovim žrtvama.

Zakon predviđa postupak za zaštitu žrtava trgovine ljudima po kojem se pravi razlika između njih i prostitutki i ilegalnih emigranata, kao i uspostavljanjem postupaka za upućivanje žrtava u odgovarajuće socijalne službe; međutim, prema podacima lokalnih nevladinih organizacija, policija je nastavila sa nepravilnim radom u nekim slučajevima koji su se odnosili na potencijalne žrtve. Repatrijaciju žrtava je obavljala vlada uz pomoć IOM-a.

Međunarodne organizacije su sponzorisale obuku policije za metode koji se primenjuju u borbi protiv trgovine ljudima. Međunarodne organizacije su sponzorisale obuku policije (uključujući graničnu policiju), tužilaca i sudija za metode koji se primenjuju u borbi protiv trgovine ljudima. Lokalne nevladine kancelarije, uz sredstva dobijena od međunarodnih donatora, vodile su prihvatilište u Podgorici i dežurne telefonske linije širom Republike; vlada je preuzela odgovornost za finansiranje drugog prihvatilišta koje je otvoreno 2004. Širom Republike vođene su kampanje za podizanje javne svesti koje je, uz međunarodnu podršku, sponzorisala vlada.

Zakon zabranjuje diskriminaciju osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima pri zapošljavanju, školovanju, zdravstvenoj zaštiti i pružanju drugih državnih usluga; međutim, postojala je društvena diskriminacija osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima. Zakonom je propisan pristup osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima novim javnim zgradama i vlada je u praksi te odredbe generalno poštovala; međutim, objekti za osobe sa umanjenim sposobnostima bili su neadekvatni, što se odnosi i na birališta.

Vlada je obezbedila mobilno glasanje za osobe sa umanjenim sposobnostima ili glasače koji nisu mogli doći na birališta.

Ministarstva zdravlja, rada i socijalne pomoći i obrazovanje odgovorni su za zaštitu prava osoba sa umanjenim sposobnostima.

Društvena diskriminacija etničkih manjina je bila problem. Predrasude o Romima su rasprostranjene, a lokalne vlasti su često ignorisale ili prećutno odobravale društveno zastrašivanje ili loše postupanje sa Romima, od kojih se neki interno raseljena lica sa Kosova. Prema podacima jedne lokalne nevladine organizacije, 70 posto Roma je nepismeno, 70 posto ne govori lokalni jezik, 95 posto je zvanično nezaposleno, 40 posto nema pristup javnim komunalnim uslugama, a 90 posto živi ispod granice siromaštva.

Romi, interno raseljena lica, koji uglavnom žive u kolektivnim centrima i raštrkanim naseljima širom Republike, često nisu imali lična dokumenta ni pristup elementarnim uslugama (vidi odeljak 2.d). Proterivanje iz bespravnih naselja, a ponekad i iz legalnih domova, bilo je ozbiljan problem. U toku godine, ovaj problem je u izvesnoj meri zvanično priznat, a vlasti u glavnom gradu su obezbedile zemljište i komunalne usluge za jedan projekat međunarodne nevladine organizacije koji treba da zameni bespravni i neodgovarajući romski smeštaj.

Društvo načelno pokazuje antipatiju prema homoseksualcima zbog čega većina homoseksualaca prikriva identitet. Nasilje nad homoseksualcima je retko, a vlada ga ne odobrava.

Zakon dozvoljava radnicima, izuzev uniformisanom vojnom i policijskom osoblju, da se po svom izboru učlanjuju i osnivaju sindikate, bez prethodnog ovlašćenja ili prekomernih zahteva, a radnici su to pravo koristili u praksi. Otprilike 95 posto svih zaposlenih u zvaničnoj privredi članovi su sindikata.

Zakon dozvoljava da sindikati neometano sprovode svoje aktivnosti, a vlada je ovo pravo štitila u praksi. Zakon predviđa pravo na kolektivno pregovaranje; međutim, kolektivno pregovaranje ostalo je na početnom nivou razvoja. Po zakonu, sporazumi o kolektivnom pregovaranju odnose se na sve registrovane zaposlene radnike. Zakon predviđa pravo na štrajk i radnici su to pravo generalno koristili organizujući legalne štrajkove; međutim, zakon zabranjuje štrajkove vojnog i policijskog osoblja.

Zakon zabranjuje prinudni i obavezni rad, uključujući i rad dece; međutim, bilo je izveštaja da se takve stvari dešavaju u praksi (vidi odeljak 5).

Vlada ima zakone i propise za zaštitu dece od iskorištavanja na radnom mestu, u šta takođe spada i zabrana prinudnog i obaveznog rada, i propise o prihvatljivim uslovima rada i vlada je uglavnom efikasno sprovodila ove zakone i propise.

Donja starosna granica za zapošljavanje jeste petnaest godina, mada je u poljoprivrednim zajednicama uobučajeno da mlađa deca pomažu svojim porodicama. Romska deca se takođe mogu naći kako rade razne neprijavljene sitne poslove, obično peru prozore na automobilima ili prodaju male stvari kao što su novine. Neka takva deca su radila u «sivoj zoni», između dobrovoljnog i prinudnog rada; međutim, nije bilo izveštaja da se takva praksa sprovodi sistematski.

Obavljana je trgovina decom u cilju seksualne eksploatacije i dečje prostitucije (vidi odeljak 5).

Minimalna nacionalna mesečna zarada od 62 dolara (52 evra) nedovoljna je za pristojan životni standard radnika i njegove porodice. Nije bilo izveštaja o poslodavcima koji nisu isplaćivali minimalnu zaradu koju propisuje Ministarstvo rada.

Zakon predviđa dnevni odmor u trajanju od 30 minuta, ograničava radnu nedelju na 40 sati, izuzev pod određenim neuobičajenim okolnostima, i propisuje neodređenu nadoknadu za rad duži od četrdesetočasovne radne nedelje. Ne postoji precizna zabrana u pogledu prekomernog obaveznog prekovremenog rada. Ministarstvo rada efikasno primenjuje propise o radnom vremenu.

Vlada nije dala prioritet sprovođenju propisa o sigurnosti i zdravlju radnika. Radnici nisu imali pravo da napuste radno mesto u situacijama kada su im zdravlje i sigurnost bili ugroženi a da pri tome ne dođu u opasnost da će biti otpušteni.

____________________________

*Izveštaj o Srbiji i Crnoj Gori podeljen je na tri odeljka koji se odnose na stanje ljudskih prava u Srbiji, na Kosovu i u Crnoj Gori. Deo o aktivnostima i institucijama na nivou Državne Zajednice koje imaju uticaja na stanje ljudskih prava nalazi se u odeljku o Srbiji